¹Ì±¹ Áß¾ÓÁ¤º¸±¹(CIA)ÀÌ Áß±¹¿¡ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃá Áß±¹¹Ì¼Ç¼¾Å͸¦ ½Å¼³ÇÑ °¡¿îµ¥ Æ®·³ÇÁ Á¤ºÎ ½ÃÀý ¸¸µé¾îÁø ÄÚ¸®¾Æ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ´Â »óÀ§ Á¶Á÷À¸·Î Èí¼öµÆ½À´Ï´Ù. CIA Ãâ½Å Àü¹®°¡µéÀº CIA°¡ ºÏÇÑ À§ÇùÀ» °æ½ÃÇÑ´Ù´Â ÀνÄÀ» ÁÙ ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Ù°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù. Á¶ÀºÁ¤ ±âÀÚ°¡ º¸µµÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
¹Ì Áß¾ÓÁ¤º¸±¹(CIA)ÀÇ Àª¸®¾ö ¹ø½º ±¹ÀåÀÌ 7ÀÏ ¼º¸íÀ» ³»°í Áß±¹¹Ì¼Ç¼¾Å͸¦ ½Å¼³ÇÑ´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
[CIA ¼º¸í]¡°CMC will further strengthen our collective work on the most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century, an increasingly adversarial Chinese government¡±
¹ø½º ±¹ÀåÀº ¡°Áß±¹¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ´Â 21¼¼±â¿¡ ¿ì¸®°¡ Á÷¸éÇÑ °¡Àå Áß¿äÇÑ ÁöÁ¤ÇÐÀû À§Çù, Áï Á¡Á¡ ´õ Àû´ëÀûÀÎ Áß±¹ Á¤ºÎ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ì¸®ÀÇ Áý´ÜÀû ¾÷¹«¸¦ ´õ¿í °ÈÇÒ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. ¹ø½º ±¹ÀåÀº Áß±¹¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅͰ¡ CIA Á¶Á÷ Àü¹ÝÀÇ Áß±¹¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´ëÀÀÀ» ¸ðÀ¸°í ÅëÇÕÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
¹ø½º ±¹ÀåÀº ¶Ç ¡°CIA´Â °ø°ÝÀûÀÎ ·¯½Ã¾Æ¿Í µµ¹ßÀûÀÎ ºÏÇÑ, Àû´ëÀûÀÎ À̶õ, Å×·¯¿ÍÀÇ ÀüÀï°ú °°Àº ´Ù¸¥ Áß¿äÇÑ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼µµ °è¼Ó ³¯Ä«·Ó°Ô ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃß°Ú´Ù¡±°í °Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
À̹ø Á¶Á÷°³ÆíÀ» ÅëÇØ ºÏÇѰú À̶õ¿¡ ÁýÁßÇÏ´Â º°µµÀÇ ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ´Â »óÀ§ Á¶Á÷À¸·Î Èí¼öµË´Ï´Ù. À͸íÀ» ¿ä±¸ÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ ´ç±¹ÀÚ´Â 7ÀÏ VOA ´º½º¼¾ÅÍ¿¡ ÄÚ¸®¾Æ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ´Â µ¿¾Æ½Ã¾ÆÅÂÆò¾ç¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ·Î, À̶õ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ´Â ±Ùµ¿¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ·Î °¢°¢ Èí¼öµÈ´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ ´ç±¹ÀÚ´Â ÀÌ·± º¯È°¡ Á¶Á÷ ±¸Á¶¿Í °ü·ÃµÈ °ÍÀÌ¸ç ºÏÇѰú À̶õÀ» ´ã´çÇÏ´ø ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾Å͵éÀÌ Ãà¼ÒµÇ´Â °ÍÀº ¾Æ´Ï¶ó°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
¹Ì±¹ ¡®´º¿åŸÀÓ½º¡¯´Â °íÀ§ CIA ´ç±¹ÀÚ¸¦ ÀοëÇØ À̶õ°ú ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ µ¶¸³ÀûÀÎ ¼¾Å͸¦ ´Ý´Â´Ù°í ÇØ¼ CIA°¡ ÀÌµé ³ª¶óµéÀ» ´ú Áß¿äÇÏ°Ô »ý°¢ÇѴٰųª À§ÇùÀÌ ÁÙ¾ú´Ù°í »ý°¢ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó°í º¸µµÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ´Ù¸¸ CIA Ȱµ¿À» Á¡°ËÇÑ °á°ú À̶õ°ú ºÏÇÑÀº º¸´Ù ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ Áö¿ªÀÇ ¸Æ¶ô¿¡¼ ºÐ¼®ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ÃÖ¼±À̶ó´Â °á·ÐÀÌ ³µ´Ù´Â °ÍÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
ÄÚ¸®¾Æ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ´Â 2017³â 5¿ù ½Å¼³µÆ°í À̶õ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ´Â ¸î´Þ µÚ â¼³µÆ½À´Ï´Ù. 2018³â ¾Øµå·ç ±è ´ç½Ã ÄÚ¸®¾Æ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍÀåÀÌ ¸¶ÀÌÅ© ÆûÆä¿À ´ç½Ã ±¹¹«Àå°ü°ú Æò¾çÀ» ¹æ¹®ÇØ ¹ÌºÏ Çù»ó¿¡¼ ÁÖµµÀûÀÎ ¿ªÇÒÀ» Çϱ⵵ Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
1996³âºÎÅÍ 2001³â±îÁö CIA Çѱ¹´ã´ç ºÎ±¹ÀåÀ» Áö³½ ºê·ç½º Ŭ¸µ³Ê Ç츮ƼÁöÀç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº 7ÀÏ VOA¿¡ ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ Áø°ø »óÅ¿¡ ÀÖ´Â °ÍÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ¿ª³» ´Ù¸¥ ±¹°¡µé »çÀÌ¿¡¼ Ȱµ¿ÇÏ´Â ±¹°¡À̱⿡ À̹ø °áÁ¤Àº (CIA Ȱµ¿À») ´õ È¿°úÀûÀ¸·Î Çϱâ À§ÇÑ °ÍÀÏ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°It¡¯s either make it more effective because Korea does not exist in a vacuum, it operates as a country with other nations in the region, or it will certainly be perceived as a reduction in the importance of North Korea as a hard target for the CIA.¡±
Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°¹Ý¸é¿¡ CIA¿¡°Ô ÀÖ¾î ºÏÇÑÀÇ Á߿伺ÀÌ ÁÙ¾îµç °ÍÀ¸·Î ºÐ¸íÈ÷ ÀÎ½ÄµÉ ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Â °áÁ¤¡±À̶ó¸ç, ÇÏÁö¸¸ ±×·¸°Ô ÀνĵǴõ¶óµµ ºÏÇÑ Á¤º¸ ºÐ¼®Àº °ú°Å¿Í ¸¶Âù°¡Áö·Î À̾îÁú °ÍÀ̶ó°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
2006³âºÎÅÍ 2013³â±îÁö CIA¿¡¼ ºÏÇѺм®°üÀ¸·Î Ȱµ¿ÇÑ ¼ö ±è ·£µå¿¬±¸¼Ò ¿¬±¸¿øÀº CIA°¡ ¼º¸í¿¡¼ ºÏÇÑ µî¿¡ ¡®°è¼Ó ³¯Ä«·Ó°Ô ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃß°Ú´Ù¡¯°í ¹àÈù ºÎºÐ¿¡ ÁÖ¸ñÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[¼ö ±è ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°There may of course be resource implications, but a sharper, tailored focus on the North Korean threat may not be such a bad idea either. It may have more to do with cultivating and nurturing existing talent and resources than brining on additional hands in the absence of a clearer organizational strategy.¡±
±è ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°(´ëºÏ Á¤º¸¿¡ ¹èÄ¡µÇ´Â) ÀÚ¿ø¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿µÇâÀÌ ÀÖÀ» ¼öµµ ÀÖ°ÚÁö¸¸ ºÏÇÑ À§Çù¿¡ ³¯Ä«·Ó°Ô Á¶Á¤µÈ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃß´Â °ÍÀÌ ³ª»Û »ý°¢ÀÌ ¾Æ´Ò ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯¸é¼ Á¶Á÷ÀÇ Àü·«ÀÌ ¸íÈ®ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀº »óÅ¿¡¼ ÀηÂÀ» Ãß°¡ÇÏ´Â °Íº¸´Ù ±âÁ¸ÀÇ Àη°ú ÀÚ¿øÀ» ¼ºÀå½ÃŰ°í ½ÉȽÃŰ´Â ÀÛ¾÷ÀÏ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù°í ºÐ¼®Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[¼ö ±è ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°There will of course be concerns that folding KMC into East Asia-Pacific Center risks diminishing or downplaying the seriousness of the North Korea problem¡¦ Once resources are cut and the center is folded into a larger organization, it¡¯ll be easy to dismiss or routinize the gravity of the problem. Should this happen, it would only make it more challenging for the US to deal with the regime¡¯s weapons, illicit activities, human rights issues, cyber and other problems.¡±
±è ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ´Ù¸¸ ÄÚ¸®¾Æ¹Ì¼Ç¼¾Å͸¦ µ¿¾Æ½Ã¾ÆÅÂÆò¾ç¹Ì¼Ç¼¾ÅÍ·Î Èí¼ö½ÃŰ´Â °ÍÀÌ ¡°ºÏÇÑ ¹®Á¦ÀÇ ½É°¢¼ºÀ» ÁÙÀÌ°í °æ½ÃÇÒ ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Ù´Â ¿ì·Á°¡ Á¦±âµÉ °Í¡±À̶ó¸ç ¡°ÀÚ¿øÀÌ Ãà¼ÒµÇ°í ´õ Å« Á¶Á÷¿¡ Èí¼öµÇ¸é ¹®Á¦ÀÇ ½É°¢¼ºÀ» ÀÏÃàÇϰí ÀÏ»óÀÎ °ÍÀ¸·Î Ä¡ºÎÇÒ ¼ö Àֱ⠶§¹®¡±À̶ó°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
±è ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ÀÌ °æ¿ì ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¹«±â, ºÒ¹ý Ȱµ¿, À뱂 À¯¸°, »çÀ̹ö ¹üÁË µîÀÇ ¹®Á¦¿¡ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ´ëÀÀÇϱ⠴õ ¾î·Á¿öÁú °ÍÀ̶ó¸ç, CIA´Â ¹°·Ð ¹Ì±¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ ºÏÇÑ ¹®Á¦¿¡ °è¼ÓÇØ¼ ÁÖÀǸ¦ ±â¿ï¿©¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í °Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
ÇÑÆí Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ºÏÇÑÀÌ CIA¿¡ ÀÖ¾î ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇϸ鼵µ °¨½ÃÇϱ⠾î·Á¿î ³ª¶ó¶ó°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù. Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿øÀº CIA°¡ ·¯½Ã¾Æ, Áß±¹, À̶õ, À̶óÅ©, ºÏÇÑÀ» ¡®Çϵå Ÿ°Ù¡¯ Áï °¨½ÃÇϱ⠾î·Á¿î ±¹°¡·Î ºÐ·ùÇÑ´Ù°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°North Korea was, as we said the hardest of the hard targets because people can¡¯t go there as easily as they could travel to Russia or China... In retrospect I thought the Soviet Union was an open book compared to North Korea.¡±
±×Áß¿¡¼µµ ºÏÇÑÀº Áß±¹°ú ·¯½Ã¾Æº¸´Ù ´õ ¹æ¹®ÇÏ±â ¾î·Æ±â ¶§¹®¿¡ ¡®°¡Àå °¨½ÃÇϱ⠾î·Á¿î ³ª¶ó¡¯·Î Àνĵȴٴ °Ì´Ï´Ù. Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ÀÚ½ÅÀÌ CIA¿¡¼ ¼Ò·Ã¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤º¸ ºÐ¼®À» ÇßÀ» ¶§ ¡®±â¹Ð ¼ö´Ü¡¯À» Ȱ¿ëÇØ¾ß ÇØ¼ °¨½Ã°¡ ¾î·Æ´Ù°í »ý°¢Çß´Ù¸ç, ÇÏÁö¸¸ ºÏÇÑ ºÐ¼®À» ½ÃÀÛÇÑ µÚ·Î´Â ¼Ò·ÃÀº ºÏÇѰú ºñ±³ÇØ ¡®¾ÆÁÖ ½±°Ô ÀÌÇØÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ³ª¶ó¡¯·Î ´À²¸Á³´Ù°í ȸ°íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
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