90-3-425
The first charge is half right. Macroeconomists, especially within central banks, were too fixated on taming inflation and too cavalier about asset bubbles. Financial economists, meanwhile, formalised theories of the efficiency of markets, fuelling the notion that markets would regulate themselves and financial innovation was always beneficial. Wall Street's most esoteric instruments were built on these ideas.
But economists were hardly naive believers in market efficiency. Financial academics have spent much of the past 30 years poking holes in the "efficient market hypothesis". A recent ranking of academic economists was topped by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrei Shleifer, two prominent hole-pokers. A newly prominent field, behavioural economics, concentrates on the consequences of irrational actions.
So there were caveats aplenty. But as insights from academia arrived in the rough and tumble of Wall Street, such delicacies were put aside. And absurd assumptions were added. No economic theory suggests you should value mortgage derivatives on the basis that house prices would always rise. Finance professors are not to blame for this, but they might have shouted more loudly that their insights were being misused. Instead many cheered the party along (often from within banks). Put that together with the complacency of the macroeconomists and there were too few voices shouting stop.
A. ¾îÈÖ
charge ºñ³, °í¼Ò. macroeconomist °Å½Ã°æÁ¦ÇÐÀÚ. fixate °íÁ¤½ÃŰ´Ù.
tame ¾ïÁ¦ÇÏ´Ù, ±æµéÀÌ´Ù. cavalier ±³¸¸ÇÑ, ´ë¹üÇÑ, È£¹æÇÑ, ÑÈÞÍ(±â»ç).
asset bubbles Àç»ê°Åǰ(½ÇÁ¦º¸´Ù ºÎÇ®·ÁÁø Àç»ê). financial economist ±ÝÀ¶ÇÐÀÚ.
meanwhile ÇÑÆíÀ¸·Î´Â. formalise Çü½Ä(°ø½Ä)ÈÇÏ´Ù. efficiency È¿À², ´É·Â.
fuel ¿¬·á¸¦ °ø±ÞÇÏ´Ù. regulate Á¶ÀýÇÏ´Ù, ±ÔÁ¤ÇÏ´Ù, ÅëÁ¦ÇÏ´Ù. innovation Çõ½Å.
Wall Street ¹Ì±¹ ±ÝÀ¶½ÃÀåÀÇ Áß½ÉÁö. esoteric ÝúÎç(ºñ±³)ÀûÀÎ, ºñ¹ÐÀÇ, ³ÇØÇÑ.
instrument (±ÝÀ¶)±â°ü, µµ±¸. naive ¼øÁøÇÑ. academic ÇÐÀÚ.
poke ÄîÄî Â´Ù, ¾¥½Ã´Ù. hypothesis Ê£àã(°¡¼³). prominent Ź¿ùÇÑ.
behavioural economics ÇൿÁÖÀǰæÁ¦ÇÐ. consequence °á°ú.
irrational action ºñÇÕ¸®ÀûÀÎ Çൿ. caveat °æ°í, ÁÖÀÇ. aplenty dzºÎÇϰÔ, ¸¹ÀÌ.
insight ÅëÂû, ÀνÄ, °ß½Ä. academia ùÊÍ£(Çаè).
rough and tumble ûèîú(È¥Àü), Ñê÷ã(³Åõ). delicacy òÒÚ«(Áø¹Ì), ïñöÆ(Á¤Ä¡), ¿ì¾Æ.
absurd ºÎÁ¶¸®ÇÑ, ºÒÇÕ¸®ÇÑ, ¾î¸®¼®Àº. assumption Ê£ïÒ(°¡Á¤).
mortgage Àú´ç, î½Ó×Ïí(Àú´ç±Ç). derivative (±ÝÀ¶)ÆÄ»ý»óǰ, ÆÄ»ý¾î, µµÇÔ¼ö.
are not to blame ºñ³À» ¹Þ¾Æ¼´Â ¾Æ´Ï µÈ´Ù. complacency Àڱ⸸Á·, Ôðëò(µæÀÇ).
B. ±¸¹®
- A recent ranking of academic economists . . . and Andrei Shleifer,
[ÃÖ±ÙÀÇ °æÁ¦ÇÐÀÚ ¼øÀ§ ¸Å±è¿¡¼ Joseph Stiglitz¿Í Andrei Shleifer°¡ 1µîÀ» ÇÏ¿´´Ù.]
- they might have shouted more. . . were being misused.
[±×µéÀº ±×µéÀÇ °ßÇØ°¡ è¦éÄ(¿À¿ë)µÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù°í º¸´Ù ´õ Å«¼Ò¸®·Î ¿ÜÄ¥ ¼öµµ ÀÖ¾ú´Âµ¥ ¿ÜÄ¡Áö ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù(±×·¡¼ À¯°¨ÀÌ´Ù)].
- many cheered the party along
[¸¹Àº ÀçÁ¤ÇÐ ±³¼öµéÀÌ ÆÄƼ(°æÁ¦Àû ³«°ü)¸¦ ÇÔ²² Áñ°å´Ù.]
- Put that together with the complacency . . . few voices shouting stop.
cf. ¸í·É¹®, and. ...¡æifÀý.
ex. Work hard, and you will succeed.=If you work hard, you will succeed.
[ÀçÁ¤ÇÐ ±³¼öµéÀÇ ÆÄƼ¿Í °ÅÁ¦°æÁ¦ÇÐÀÚµéÀÇ Àڱ⸸Á·ÀÌ ÇÕÄ¡´Â ¹Ù¶÷¿¡ stop(³«°üÀû °æÁ¦Àü¸ÁÀ»)Ç϶ó°í ¿ÜÄ¡´Â ¼Ò¸®°¡ °ÅÀÇ ¾ø¾ú´Ù.]
90-4-426
Blindsided and divided
The charge that most economists failed to see the crisis coming also has merit. To be sure, some warned of trouble. The likes of Robert Shiller of Yale, Nouriel Roubini of New York University and the team at the Bank for International Settlements are now famous for their prescience. But most were blindsided. And even worrywarts who felt something was amiss had no idea of how bad the consequences would be.
That was partly to do with professional silos, which limited both the tools available and the imaginations of the practitioners. Few financial economists thought much about illiquidity or counterparty risk, for instance, because their standard models ignore it and few worried about the effect on the overall economy of the markets for all asset classes seizing up simultaneously, since few believed that was possible.
Macroeconomists also had a blindspot: their standard models assumed that capital markets work perfectly. Their framework reflected an uneasy truce between the intellectual heirs of Keynes, who accept that economies can fall short of their potential, and purists who hold that supply must always equal demand. The models that epitomise this synthesisthe sort used in many central banksincorporate imperfections in labour markets ("sticky" wages, for instance, which allow unemployment to rise), but make no room for such blemishes in finance. By assuming that capital markets worked perfectly, macroeconomists were largely able to ignore the economy's financial plumbing. But models that ignored finance had little chance of spotting a calamity that stemmed from it.
A. ¾îÈÖ
Blindsided and divided ÇÑÂÊ ´«ÀÌ ¸Ö°í ºÐ¿µÈ. crisis À§±â. merit ¶Ù¾î³², ÀåÁ¡.
The likes ÔÒ×¾(µ¿·ù), ...¿Í °°Àº »ç¶÷µé. settlement ̽ߩ(°á»ê).
prescience à»Ì¸ñýÙ¥(¼±°ßÁö¸í), çÕòª(¿¹Áö). worrywart °ÆÁ¤ÇÏ´Â »ç¶÷.
amiss À߸øµÈ, Ʋ¸°. was partly to do with ºÎºÐÀûÀ¸·Î ...¿Í °ü·ÃÀÌ ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.
silo ÁöÇÏÀúÀå½Ç, »çÀÌ·Î. professional silos Àü¹®»çÀÌ·Î(°æÁ¦ÇÐÀÇ Ãë±Þ¹üÀ§¸¦ ÀǹÌ).
available ÀÌ¿ë °¡´ÉÇÑ.
practitioner º»¹®¿¡¼´Â °æÁ¦½Ç¹«¸¦ Ãë±ÞÇÏ´Â Àü¹®°¡¸¦ ÀǹÌ, ËÒåöì¢(°³¾÷ÀÇ), º¯È£»ç.
financial economist ±ÝÀ¶Àü¹®°¡. illiquidity À¯µ¿¼º ºÎÀç.
counterparty risk °Å·¡»ó´ë¹æÀÌ °®°í ÀÖ´Â À§Çè¿ä¼Ò. ignore ¹«½ÃÇÏ´Ù.
asset classes Àç»ê°è±Þ. seize up ¸ÅÁúÇϱâ À§ÇÏ¿© µ¿¿©¸Å´Ù. seize ºÙÀâ´Ù.
simultaneously µ¿½Ã¿¡, ÀÏÁ¦È÷. macroeconomist °Å½Ã°æÁ¦ÇÐÀÚ.
blindspot ØîïÇ(¸ÍÁ¡). framework ϰðã(±¸Á¶), üÁ¦, °èȹ. truce ýÌîú(ÈÞÀü).
intellectual heir Áö½ÄÀÇ ÈİèÀÚ. fall short of ...¿¡ µµ´ÞÇÏÁö ¸øÇÏ´Ù, ¸ðÀÚ¶ó´Ù.
potential °¡´É¼º, ÀáÀç·Â. purist ¼ø¼öÁÖÀÇÀÚ. equal ...¿¡ ù¯îØ(ÇÊÀû)ÇÏ´Ù, °°´Ù.
epitomise ¿ä¾àÇÏ´Ù. synthesis ÅëÇÕ, ÇÕ¼º. incorporate °áÇÕÇÏ´Ù, ÆíÀÔÇÏ´Ù, ÇÕº´ÇÏ´Ù.
imperfection °áÁ¡, ¾àÁ¡, ºÒÃæºÐ. sticky ²öÀû°Å¸®´Â, ²Ä¦ ¾Ê´Â .
¡°sticky wages º¯ÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â ìüÑÑ(ÀÓ±Ý). blemish çýïÇ(¿ÀÁ¡), áßß¿(¼Õ»ó).
financial plumbing ±ÝÀ¶½Ã½ºÅÛÀÇ Òèâ©(´©¼ö)Çö»óÀ» ã¾Æ³»¾î ¼ö¸®ÇÏ´Â °Í, ±ÝÀ¶³³¶«Áú.
spot ºÐ°£ÇÏ´Ù, ¾Ë¾Æ³»´Ù, °üÃøÇÏ´Ù. calamity î¬äê(Àç¾Ó). stem À¯·¡ÇÏ´Ù.
B. ±¸¹®
- few worried about the effect . . . few believed that was possible.
[ÀÚ»êÀ» °¡Áø ¸ðµç °èÃþÀÌ µ¿½Ã¿¡ ½ÃÀåÀ¸·Î ´Þ·Áµå´Â °ÍÀÌ ½ÃÀå°æÁ¦ Àü¹Ý¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¿µÇâ¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼ °ÅÀÇ ¾Æ¹«µµ °ÆÁ¤ÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù. ¿Ö³ÄÇÏ¸é ±×·± ÀÏÀÌ ÀϾ °ÍÀ̶ó°í´Â °ÅÀÇ ¾Æ¹«µµ ¹ÏÁö ¾Ê¾Ò±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù.]
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