What went wrong with economics ¨é

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What about trying to fix it? Here the financial crisis has blown apart the fragile consensus between purists and Keynesians that monetary policy was the best way to smooth the business cycle. In many countries short-term interest rates are near zero and in a banking crisis monetary policy works less well. With their compromise tool useless, both sides have retreated to their roots, ignoring the other camp's ideas. Keynesians, such as Mr Krugman, have become uncritical supporters of fiscal stimulus. Purists are vocal opponents. To outsiders, the cacophony underlines the profession's uselessness.
Add these criticisms together and there is a clear case for reinvention, especially in macroeconomics. Just as the Depression spawned Keynesianism, and the 1970s stagflation fuelled a backlash, creative destruction is already under way. Central banks are busy bolting crude analyses of financial markets onto their workhorse models. Financial economists are studying the way that incentives can skew market efficiency. And today's dilemmas are prompting new research: which form of fiscal stimulus is most effective? How do you best loosen monetary policy when interest rates are at zero? And so on.
But a broader change in mindset is still needed. Economists need to reach out from their specialised silos: macroeconomists must understand finance, and finance professors need to think harder about the context within which markets work. And everybody needs to work harder on understanding asset bubbles and what happens when they burst. For in the end economists are social scientists, trying to understand the real world. And the financial crisis has changed that world.

A. ¾îÈÖ
fix ¼ö¸®ÇÏ´Ù. financial crisis ±ÝÀ¶À§±â. blow apart Æø¹ß½ÃÄÑ Èð¾î¹ö¸®´Ù.
blow-blew-blown Æø¹ß½ÃŰ´Ù, ¹Ù¶÷ÀÌ ºÒ´Ù. apart »ê»êÀÌ, µû·Îµû·Î.
fragile ±úÁö±â ½¬¿î. consensus ÇÕÀÇ, ÀÏÄ¡. purist ¼ø¼öÁÖÀÇÀÚ.
monetary policy ±ÝÀ¶Á¤Ã¥. business cycle ÌØÑ¨âàü»(°æ±â¼øÈ¯). interest rate ÀÌÀÚÀ². compromise ŸÇù. retreat ÈÄÅðÇÏ´Ù, Åð°¢, ëßÔíô¥(ÀºµÐó).
Krugman 2008³âµµ ³ëº§»ó(°æÁ¦ÇÐ)¼ö»óÀÚ. uncritical ¹«ºñÆÇÀû. fiscal ÀçÁ¤ÀûÀÎ.
vocal ¼Ò¸®³»´Â, ¸ñ¼Ò¸®ÀÇ. opponent ¹Ý´ëÀÚ. cacophony ºÒÇùÈ­À½.
profession Íëåë(°ø¾ð)¡´ÄÉÀÎÁî ÇÐÆÄ¿Í ºñÄÉÀÎÁî ÇÐÆÄÀÇ Å¸Çù¼±¾ð¡µ.
the Depression 1930³â´ëÀÇ ¼¼°è°æÁ¦ ´ë°øÈ². spawn ...À» »ý±â°Ô ÇÏ´Ù, ¾ËÀ» ³º´Ù.
fuel ¿¬·á¸¦ ÁÖÀÔÇÏ´Ù. backlash ¹Ý¹ß, ¹Ýµ¿. bolt º¼Æ®·Î ÁË´Ù.
workhorse ³»±¸·ÂÀÌ ÀÖ´Â ±â°è, ºÎÁö·±È÷ ÀÏÇÏ´Â »ç¶÷, Àϸ».
workhorse models ¹Ì±¹ Ç×°ø±âÁ¦ÀÛȸ»ç McDonnell Douglas°¡ Á¦ÀÛÇÑ ¿©°´±â¡´º»¹®¿¡¼­´Â °æÁ¦¸ðµ¨À» Àǹ̡µ
skew Á¶Á¤ÇÏ´Ù, ±¸ºÎ¸®´Ù, ¾ïÁö·Î °®´Ù ºÙÀÌ´Ù. efficiency À¯´É, ´É·ü.
prompt ÀçÃËÇÏ´Ù, ÀÚ±ØÇÏ´Ù. mindset Á¤½ÅÀÚ¼¼. specialised silos ¹èŸÀû Àü¹®ºÐ¾ß.
asset bubble ÀÚ»ê°Åǰ.

B. ±¸¹®
- Central banks are busy . . . onto their workhorse models.
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