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China should rein in N. Korea if it's concerned about S. Korea's nuclear armament: Russel
2016/09/29 05:53
"The Chinese are very mindful of the risk that either South Korea or Japan might distance itself from the U.S. nuclear umbrella and pursue their own capabilities, and that, I believe, ought to motivate China to redouble its efforts to push back on the North Koreans," Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel said during a Senate hearing.
"That's only one of many examples of why we believe it is so in the best interest of China to tighten up on the North, to expand their cooperation with us, and to really abandon an old pattern of tolerating a significant amount of provocative and dangerous behavior of the DPRK," he said.
"The pressure in the mainstream political society in either the Republic of Korea or in Japan to contemplate the acquisition of nuclear weapons is directly commensurate with their faith in America's commitment as an ally to their defense and to the extended deterrence or the nuclear umbrella provided by their alliance with the United States," Russel said.
He said, however, that the U.S. commitment to South Korea's defense is strong enough for Seoul not to consider nuclear armament.
"We are giving enough confidence... that our deterrence, our nuclear umbrella, our willingness to utilize the full range of U.S. national security programs," Russel said.
Russel, however, did not specifically say whether the U.S. is willing to use nuclear weapons against the North, saying, "I'll leave it to the president to decide if and when the United States is going to use a nuclear weapon."
"The certainty on the part of the DPRK that the United States would either prevent their use of nuclear weapons or retaliate in a devastating manner is an effective deterrent," he said.