1970년대 말 카터 미국 대통령이 주한미군 철수 계획을 발표하자 당시 야당인 신민당의 李哲承 총재는 미국에 가서 험프리 전 부통령, 브레진스키 당시 대통령 안보보좌관 등 요인들을 만나 不可 입장을 전했다.

歸國하니 黨內에서 반발이 심했다고 한다. 왜 朴正熙 대통령 편을 들어 청부외교를 하는가라고 따지는 의원들이 많았다. 이들에게 李 총재가 한 유명한 말이 있다.

"安保는 둑이고, 자유는 물이다. 그 물을 가지고 농사를 짓고 金氏, 李氏가 나눠가지다가 서로 싸울 수는 있다. 그러나 둑이 터지도록 해선 안 되는 것 아닌가. 둑은 與野가 같이 지켜야 한다."

'자유는 물이다'는 말이 재미 있다. 인간에게 주어지는 자유는 생물에게 주어지는 물처럼 삶을 윤택하게 하고 나라를 강하게 만든다.

李 총재의 말은 지금도 유효하다. 與野는 內政으로 서로 싸우더라도 安保를 위해선 같이 싸워야 한다.
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92. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1971. Secret Exdis.
Seoul, April 19, 1971, 0930Z.

2141. For Ambassador Brown. Subj: Alleged Threats Against Kim Tae-Chung.

1. Last Friday Kim Tae Chung sent word that he would like to see me rather urgently that evening noting he would be absent in Choola-Do campaigning all this week. I sent word back that I was sure he would understand why my meeting with him at this time might be misunderstood and that if he had any special message he could have some of his close advisers meet with PolCouns.

2. Dr. Chong Il-Hyong had quiet lunch with PolCouns at latter’s residence today. He said he and Kim Tae-Chung have received several threatening telephone calls and letters, which they believe are govt-directed, that they have reason to believe there is ROK–CIA scheme to assassinate Kim as public sentiment continues to swing in direction Kim victory, and that Kim had hoped might be possible for me to find a way to discourage government from carrying out any such attempt. PolCouns replied in relaxed way that calls and letters could of course be from cranks or attempt to intimidate, and Chong agreed. At other times during conversation Chong spoke of NDP concern with possible massive rigging (but had nothing impressive when pressed for details as to how government would carry out rigging), spoke of possibility of palace coup, and even of possibility DRP would create confusion at selected key polling places to invalidate balloting in those places. Chong did not convey impression that he or Kim Tae-Chung was overwhelmed by threats, but I thought I should let you know of this development. I do not plan any further reply.

3. In quiet way which conveyed impression he was genuinely persuaded, Chong also said NDP elated with way campaign is going, that conservatively at present time Kim expected win by half million votes in honest election and that further swings to Kim in coming final days of campaign should substantially increase that margin. As NDP manager for presidential campaign he is highly partisan, but as you know Chong is quiet and serious man.

Porter

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1971. Secret Exdis.




123. Memorandum of Conversation11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Dorr on February 14 and approved in draft by Ranard and in final by Green on February 14. The meeting was held in Green’s office at the Department of State.
Washington, February 1, 1972.

SUBJECT
The Situation in Korea
PARTICIPANTS
Koreans
Kim Tae-chung, National Assemblyman
Om Yong-dal, New Democratic Party
Dr. Yu Ki-hong, Kim’s associate in Washington
United States
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Donald L. Ranard, Director for Korean Affairs
Robert F. Dorr, Country Officer for Korea
Accompanied by former ROK diplomat Om and by Dr. Yu, his associate in Washington, Kim called on Assistant Secretary Green February 1 and expressed apprehension over the ROK state of national emergency.

Kim questioned the motives of President Park in declaring the emergency and suggested that Park is harming US–ROK relations. Kim also pointed out that North Korean Premier Kim Il-song has seized the initiative in his propaganda campaign against the ROK and questioned ROK sincerity in Red Cross meetings at Panmunjom.

During his call, Kim did most of the talking and concentrated on the following points:

(a) North Korean Threat:Kim noted the contradiction between the public statements of the ROKG and of the U.S. State Department. As member of National Assembly’s Defense Committee, he had been thoroughly briefed and did not believe there is a danger of imminent North Korean attack. He also doubted that President Park believes an attack is imminent.

(b) ROK “Emergency”:Kim believes Park is using North Korean threat as a pretext for actions motivated by both internal and international developments. On the international side, admission of the PRC to the United Nations was one of the many factors that had motivated Park. But Park’s main motive was internal: 5.4 million people had voted for Kim, thus showing desire for a leader other than Park. After the April 1971 presidential election, Koreans had wanted democratic processes to continue, but Park had not been responsive to the wishes of the electorate and had acted harshly, for example, in the case of student dissenters. Kim said the ROK President should not excite and “stir up people” with talk of the North Korean threat, nor should he muzzle dissent.

(c) Red Cross Talks: Mr. Green was particularly interested in Kim’s views on the Red Cross talks. Kim said he had urged in the National Assembly and in his presidential campaign that there be dialogue and postal exchanges between North and South Korea. He could not understand why the ROKG was now pursuing a “difficult” matter (divided families) while taking no steps to solve an “easy” problem (i.e., postal exchanges). Kim said the Red Cross talks will not succeed if the ROKG continues to publicize the North Korean threat. Kim feels Park has a “changed attitude” since the election and now does not wish the Red Cross talks to make progress. While North Korea’s Kim Il-song will have to abandon his intention of exploiting the Red Cross for political reasons, it will also be necessary for the ROKG to confine its role to the humanitarian purpose of the talks.

(d) Kim Il-song Peace Pact Proposal: Referring to Kim Il-song’s January 11 interview with the Yomiuri, Mr. Kim believed it indicated that the North Korean Premier was prepared to meet with Park and the DRP, and that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is not a condition for the peace pact which Kim proposed. Subsequently, however, Kim Tae-chung said he thought that Kim Il-song was trying for a more flexible image and that Park was the more militaristic of the two. He acknowledged that Kim’s statements were propaganda, but that he should not be allowed to get away with it.

Mr. Green told Kim that North Korea seems to be intent on improving its propaganda image and its diplomatic position in the world.22. An INR analysis of the North Korean initiative is in Intelligence Note REAN𔃄, “North Korea’s Peace Offensive,” dated January 18. The Intelligence Note concluded: “This offensive is designed to seize the diplomatic and propaganda initiative from the ROK, create difficulties between the ROK and its US and Japanese allies, and foment dissension in the South. Kim’s efforts may be having some success.” (Ibid., POL KOR N–KOR S) The North Koreans have become well known for events such as the 1950 invasion, the Blue House Raid, the Pueblo seizure, the EC? incident, and the insurgency in Ceylon. They now seem anxious to project a different and more reasonable image. With respect to the ROK emergency, Mr. Green said we of course are very interested in following this matter but it is essentially a domestic development within the ROKG. On the Red Cross talks, the USG naturally welcomes dialogue of this type and feels that it is always useful to talk with adversaries, even when views on important issues are widely divergent. It was in this same spirit of tough-minded dialogue that the U.S. had sought to open communications with China.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Dorr on February 14 and approved in draft by Ranard and in final by Green on February 14. The meeting was held in Green’s office at the Department of State.

2 An INR analysis of the North Korean initiative is in Intelligence Note REAN𔃄, “North Korea’s Peace Offensive,” dated January 18. The Intelligence Note concluded: “This offensive is designed to seize the diplomatic and propaganda initiative from the ROK, create difficulties between the ROK and its US and Japanese allies, and foment dissension in the South. Kim’s efforts may be having some success.” (Ibid., POL KOR N–KOR S)
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Persons
Brown, Winthrop G.Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972
Dorr, Robert F.Country Officer for Korea, Department of State, 1972
Green, MarshallAssistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1, 1969
Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung)Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung), Korean opposition leader and New Democratic Party presidential candidate
Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung)Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung), Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of the DPRK until December 28, 1972 President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) of the DPRK from December 28, 1972 and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Ranard, Donald L.Country Officer for Korea, Department of State, from July 1970
Abbreviations & Terms
DRPDemocratic Republican Party (Republic of Korea)
EC?unarmed, four-engine propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft
INRBureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
PRCPeople’s Republic of China
RGrecord group
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKGRepublic of Korea Government
SOffice of the Secretary of State
USUnited States
USGUnited States Government


150. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL KOR N–KOR S. Secret Exdis. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Green visited the ROK July 5𔃄 as part of a trip to Southeast Asia taken at Nixon’s request in order to gauge reaction to the joint North-South Korean communiqué announced on July 4 concerning opening dialogue between the two countries.
Seoul, July 7, 1972, 0630Z.

3946. Department pass to Secretary. Subj: Assistant Secretary Green’s Conversation with President Park Chung Hee, July 6, 1972.

1. Summary:Park made following major points in commenting on South-North communiqué: South had sought contact at high level to forestall reckless act by Kim Il Sung. ROK is still suspicious, but wants to make sincere test of North’s intentions. Continued U.S. support of ROK position of strength is essential. Reunification will take much time, but opening dialogue reduces chances of war. North wants to plunge into hot political issues. South wants gradual approach beginning with exchanges. North is already demanding U.S.–UN withdrawal, and will press this line. Green said communiqué welcomed, U.S. would continue to do what it could to help the ROK negotiate from strength. Park expressed hope ROK’s friends not get ahead in dealing with North. ROK would hope to delay world acceptance of two Koreas. End summary.

2. Assistant Secretary Green, accompanied by Ambassador Habib called on President Park for one hour twenty minute discussion. Foreign Minister Kim and Presidential Secretary General Kim Chu Yom also were present.

3. President Park inquired after the health of President Nixon. Mr. Green replied that the President was in very good health and had asked Mr. Green to convey his warmest personal regards to President Park as had Secretary Rogers. Park said President Nixon must be tired after his strenuous efforts during the recent trips to Peking and Moscow. Green replied the President is in excellent health and is the kind of man who is reinvigorated by such travels given his deep interest in international affairs.

4. Green said he had discussed with the Foreign Minister in some detail recent international developments including President Nixon’s Moscow trip, SEATO and ANZUS meetings and recent developments in Asia.22. Telegram 7140 from Tokyo, July 6, contains a report of Green’s conversation with Kim Yong Shik on July 5. (Ibid.) Among the latter were, of course, the latest developments in Korea concerned [contained] in the joint South-North communiqué. This was a development the United States welcomed and for which we commended ROK initiative and courage.

5. The President said he was sure the Ambassador had briefed Green on the details of the actual discussions with the North so he would not go into these details. The ROK had been concerned over the possibility of a reckless act by Kim Il Sung. Therefore last year they had started trying to solve this problem and had proposed the opening of a dialogue at any meeting place. The North Koreans accepted the proposal and proposed Pyongyang where the initial meting had been held. Park said he wished to stress that in order to achieve their objectives in this dialogue with the North and to obtain fruitful results, he believes it is imperative to have the strong support of the United States Government.

6. Park said he did not consider North Korean acceptance of the proposal for a dialogue an act of sincerity or sign of good intentions by Kim Il Sung. He anticipated there could even be unfavorable things arising during the course of the negotiations, knowing the nature and past record of the North Korean Communists. Agreement in principle in itself does not give the South Koreans reason to trust the North Koreans. On the other hand they are not appearing totally distrustful. They are willing to test North Korean sincerity and good intentions which must be proven by actions in the future. He noted that toward the end of the joint communiqué the observation of the aforementioned principles are pledged before the Korean people by both North and South. It is to be hoped that Kim Il Sung—as reckless as he is—will observe what he agreed upon but the ROK will wait to test his credibility and hope that there will be no unacceptable recklessness.

7. The reunification of a divided country requires considerable time with perseverance and patience. It is a difficult problem in view of the fact that North and South Korea are at two extremes of ideology and institutions. Neither side will accept the other’s institutions or ideology. They will have to be compromised, and he does not perceive how this would come about at the present time. The important thing was to open a dialogue and to avoid recurrence of war in order to reach the ultimate [goal?] of reunification. There were intermediate steps beginning with an exchange of people, goods and culture so as to improve understanding and eliminate misunderstandings. He does not at present expect the political talks to go into hot discussion on reunification. There will be much time and much to do before that. The North Koreans on the contrary want to get into the hot issues now. Park had explained to Park Sang Chol of North Korea that it is not time to go into the difficult political problems. The North Korean approach is far ahead of political realities. For example they proposed summit talks right away, which is impractical. If the atmosphere matures then, of course, political talks will be possible but this is not the case. There is no mutual confidence after a separation of twenty years. Direct confrontation on political issues now would only lead to charges and counter-charges. No fruitful results would follow and the meetings would end. So it would be better to eliminate the causes of separation and approach the easy problems before the difficult problems. Park Sang Chol said he would report these views to Kim Il Sung.

8. Park said that upon announcement of the joint communiqué the general public reaction was to welcome the move. They were simply glad a dialogue had been opened between the North and South. More thoughtful people who understood the problems expressed their welcome but at the same time showed some concern because they know the nature of Communism. In the joint communiqué North Korea has affirmed it would not use force to achieve unification. Park was pleased he had finally gotten North Korea to accept this principle. So long as the dialogue continued he did not expect Kim Il Sung would seek to use force. But he does expect the North Koreans to seek something else. The intention of Kim Il Sung is to realize his long-term demand that U.S. forces should withdraw from Korea. This is already demonstrated by the fact Park Sang Chol had stated in a press interview that with the agreement in the joint communiqué there was no need for foreign forces to remain in Korea and that UNCURK should be dissolved. These sorts of demands could be expected continuously in the future.

9. Another intention of Kim Il Sung is to use the communiqué to try and influence U.S. public opinion to call for an end of U.S. military aid to South Korea. It was encouraging to learn that the State Department’s spokesman had made it known that U.S. military assistance will be continued and U.S. forces will not be reduced as a result of the latest development. Park said he believes that if uncertainty arises over future U.S. support the South-North talks would either reach deadlock or break off. The South is trying to test the sincerity of the North. To do so it needs continuing U.S. support because without such aid it would not be possible to negotiate from a position of strength with Kim Il Sung. This is needed in order to gain fruitful results.

10. Green said he appreciated President Park’s lucid, articulate and convincing statement of motivation and prospects. He knew President Park as practical, realistic and tough-minded. He was particularly struck by the comment concerning inhibitions imposed upon the North Koreans. It would become more difficult for them to take provocative actions now that world attention was focussed on them and this was important. He also appreciated the truth of what the President was saying about North Korean objectives. Their objectives were obviously not friendly. As the President said, we distrust them but not to the point where we can’t have a dialogue and a step-by-step approach for a reduction of tensions and a long-run goal of reunification. We also appreciate the necessity of negotiating from a position of strength as well as the importance of solidarity at home and with friends abroad. The joint communiqué had been welcomed by Korea’s friends. The move into South-North talks and an expanding dialogue has our full support. The United States would do that which is within its capabilities to enable Korea to negotiate from strength. This would not be the kind of strength that would threaten the North but it was the kind that would produce honest negotiations. As with our own negotiations with the Soviet Union we did not believe in unilateral reductions or actions. We believe in reciprocity, so we fully understand the point President Park was making.33. Green also provided these assurances to Lee Hu Rak on July 6. According to telegram 3939 from Seoul, July 7, Green told Lee that the South Koreans could “count on the moral and material support of the U.S. Government and people” in their South-North initiatives. Lee said the South thought “it might be better at first to exchange people, material, and communications” than to work on the terms of achieving reunification. Green agreed with this and added “that to the extent exchanges can be achieved it will make it more difficult for North Koreans to create incidents.” He commented, “There is no question the South will gain from such exchanges and one can hope North Korean views will be moderated as they are exposed to the outside world rather than remain a closed garrison state.” (Ibid.)

11. Park said that the North Koreans had already started propaganda demands for immediate U.S. withdrawal and cut in the level of military forces in Korea. To people outside of Korea who did not understand the situation these proposals might sound good. Some might even feel that North Korea was being more positive and South Korea was being quite passive in the steps toward peace. But people who understood the situation knew better. Park hoped that he would have the full cooperation of the United States and other friends, as well as neighboring Japan. He hopes no one will suggest anything in advance of South Korean proposals. They have a program in mind but they did not wish others to jump ahead in advance of their own views.

12. Green said that we would take this into account. We recognize what has been done is on Korean initiative. We were informed and we welcomed it. We will not get into the business of interpreting what will happen. We hope there will be progress. We recognize the point the President was stressing and we want to remain in close touch on these and all developments. With regard to any such matter as withdrawal or anything that has to do with North Korea—these are subjects for consultation, as Secretary Rogers made clear in his statement of May 7. We appreciate that aside from the question of the reduction of U.S. military presence in Korea we appreciate the great importance of carrying through on the ROK forces modernization program.

13. Park said that they would stay in close touch with the U.S. through Ambassador Habib. They don’t consider this an interference of external powers but as assistance, and beneficial to their cause and therefore by definition it could not be interference. Green said that he did not see any reason to inerpret the call for independent Korean efforts for reunification as denying U.S. assistance. We do not impose or interfere in other people’s affairs. We have close relations with Korea as we do with many countries in the world.

14. Park said the opening of the dialogue with North Korea is only a beginning. He hopes to improve understanding through various actions which would create an atmosphere of mutual confidence. This would be the first half of an effort for Korean reunification. After that would come the political talks. What happens then will be dictated by internal developments and the course of events which are hard to predict.

15. Meanwhile as he had suggested, our friends should refrain from suggesting things that are in advance of their own proposals. Speaking frankly, he said, the reference made by Secretary Rogers to the “DPRK” of course had no significance of recognition or other political implications. But once the statement had been made the public wondered if the United States was beginning to recognize North Korea. This demonstrated Korean sensitivity to remarks by high-ranking U.S. officials. If someone outside of the government, in the press or in the world of sports, were to make such a statement there would be no significance attached. It is different when a ranking figure is involved. It makes the North Koreans happy and the South Koreans unhappy and he hopes that there is no reason to make North Koreans happy. He asked that we refrain from high official recognition of North Korea.

16. Green said that Park was aware that there was no implication of recognition or normalization of our relations with North Korea in the terms used. We have tended to use terms which countries used to describe themselves as a matter of civility. There was no other implication to be drawn.

17. Park said he had one further point to make before breaking up. Some scholars and others were claiming that in the long-run South-North talks would lead to dual representation in the UN: recognition of two Koreas. This may come sooner or later regardless of other desires but he was hoping to delay that time in order to improve Korea’s position in the world as in the case of East and West Germany. He believes that even some officials in the United States speak in these terms. While it is a practical reality and may come about, it would be better if it were delayed until the ROK is in the best possible position. He knows we cannot control the press or criticisms of those who wish to speculate but again he hopes that in matters like this government officials will refrain from getting out ahead of the ROKG.

18. Green asked what would be the most effective way of meeting the question as to whether the present course of events will eventually result in two Koreas. Park said he wanted discussion between the North and South to begin. He does not want to increase the problem at the UN but rather wished to postpone the debate there. As for two Koreas he hoped the U.S. Government would recognize the ROK is the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula and that it will not recognize any other [garble—lawful?] government. After all, the Soviet Union refused to recognize the ROK while characterizing the government in North Korea as the only legitimate government. The U.S. Government might say that when agreement is reached between North and South Korea on dual representation only then would the U.S. be able to support such a concept. At present the U.S. should recognize the ROK as the only lawful government. Green said that he did not see that this would create any issue. The U.S. recognizes the Government of the Republic of Korea alone on the Korean peninsula. As for the postponement of debate on the Korean question at the UN this year, Green read to the President a statement he had made in a press interview a week ago which expressed U.S. support for postponement and noting that with good progress in the bilateral talks between North and South there will be ample grounds to request postponement. This opinion would be reinforced by the latest developments.

19. Green expressed his appreciation for the clear views that had been expressed by President Park which would be most useful to our President and government.

Habib

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL KOR N–KOR S. Secret Exdis. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Green visited the ROK July 5𔃄 as part of a trip to Southeast Asia taken at Nixon’s request in order to gauge reaction to the joint North-South Korean communiqué announced on July 4 concerning opening dialogue between the two countries.

2 Telegram 7140 from Tokyo, July 6, contains a report of Green’s conversation with Kim Yong Shik on July 5. (Ibid.)

3 Green also provided these assurances to Lee Hu Rak on July 6. According to telegram 3939 from Seoul, July 7, Green told Lee that the South Koreans could “count on the moral and material support of the U.S. Government and people” in their South-North initiatives. Lee said the South thought “it might be better at first to exchange people, material, and communications” than to work on the terms of achieving reunification. Green agreed with this and added “that to the extent exchanges can be achieved it will make it more difficult for North Koreans to create incidents.” He commented, “There is no question the South will gain from such exchanges and one can hope North Korean views will be moderated as they are exposed to the outside world rather than remain a closed garrison state.” (Ibid.)
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Persons
Green, MarshallAssistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1, 1969
Habib, Philip C.Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 1969 member, U.S. Delegation to meetings on Vietnam in Paris from May 1968 until October 1971 Ambassador to Korea from September 30, 1971
Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung)Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung), Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of the DPRK until December 28, 1972 President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) of the DPRK from December 28, 1972 and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
Kim Yong Shik (Kim Yong-Sik)Kim Yong Shik (Kim Yong-Sik),ROK Foreign Minister from 1971 until 1972
Lee Hu Rak (Yi Hu-rak)Lee Hu Rak (Yi Hu-rak), Secretary-General to the President of Korea Director Korean Central Intelligence Agency
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Rogers, William P.Secretary of State
Abbreviations & Terms
CINCPACCommander in Chief, Pacific
DPRKDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea
Exdisexclusive distribution
POLADpolitical advisor
RGrecord group
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKGRepublic of Korea Government
SOffice of the Secretary of State
SEATOSoutheast Asia Treaty Organization
UNUnited Nations
UNCURKUnited Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
USUNUnited States Mission to the United Nations



151. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. Holdridge sent this memorandum to Kissinger on July 7 with a recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid.)
Washington, July 27, 1972.

SUBJECT
Preliminary Evaluation of North and South Korea’s Joint Communiqué of July 4
The agreement between North and South Korea embodied in their Joint Communiqué of July 422. See footnote 3, Document 147 and Document 150. represents the first major results of the contacts between the two begun last August. As such, the agreement signifies the interest on both sides in continuing and expanding the contacts, and probably will act as something of an additional deterrent against a return to militancy by North Korea. As you will recall, these contacts were stimulated primarily by your China initiative. They first took the form of discussions between their Red Cross representatives concerning the problem of divided families, and since late March have included secret higher-level, official discussions of political issues.

The following are the highlights that emerge from our preliminary analysis of the Communiqué:

—The document is largely confined to an enunciation of broad principles, which is useful as a demonstration of the two sides’ ability to agree on at least some general language. Wide disagreement in its application to specifics will of course remain, with both sides trying to exploit its propaganda value.

—The Communiqué’s content shows that the South successfully resisted the North’s attemps to move immediately to discussion of basic political issues. (President Park has insisted that measured progress must first be shown on the smaller, easier issues.) In addition, Seoul parried Pyongyang’s pressures for an early summit meeting between Park and Kim Il-song.

—As Kim Il-song has no doubt intended in pursuit of one of his principal objectives, the surfacing of the secret talks and the agreement will at least temporarily exacerbate dissension within South Korea.

• Opposition political leaders already are vociferously objecting that they were not consulted in advance.
• The Park Government must assure conservative elements, particularly in the military, that it is proceeding with due caution and is not being taken in by a tactical shift from the North.
• The Government must tamp down any false expectations of prospects for early or rapid movement toward reunification.
• Park will have to deal with pressures at home and from abroad for a relaxation of his authoritarian political controls. Kim Il-song has always been confident that his tight control in the North will give him a decided advantage on this score.
—The disclosure of the talks may also result in a considerably less militant international image for North Korea. While South Korea will probably also be seen internationally as coming more in line with the “mood of détente,” the North probably has farther to go on this score. Somewhat paradoxically, Pyongyang’s joining Seoul in these talks may thus, viewed relatively, accrue more to its advantage than to Seoul’s. This same objective undoubtedly motivates Kim’s efforts to have the Korean question debated in next fall’s U.N. General Assembly. In the U.N. case, Kim is interested not only in depriving the South of its preferred international status conferred by the complex of U.N. resolutions on Korea, but also is removing the U.N. cloak from our military presence in South Korea.

—As regards the Communiqué’s substantive specifics:

• Pyongyang will undoubtedly use the first of the three principles governing reunification (that reunification is to be achieved through Korean efforts and without “external imposition or interference”) to support its call for the end of the U.N. role in South Korea and for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Seoul has already denied that the phrase has any such meaning.
• The two sides agreed to facilitate “various exchanges in many fields,” and to seek the “early success” of the Red Cross talks on divided families.
• The two sides agreed to establish a Seoul–Pyongyang hot line and a Coordinating Committee chaired by the two principals in the secret political talks. (The Committee’s responsibilities are not defined in the Communiqué, but Seoul has told us it would be used to keep the contacts moving ahead.)
Reaction from Abroad

The PRC and Soviets have reported the Communiqué and the talks factually. The only Asian reaction so far as been first from Japan, where opposition parties have called for Japan to expand ties with North Korea (which has been counter-balanced by the Foreign Office’s call for caution). Taipei’s reaction was expectedly negative, while Saigon urged Hanoi to follow Pyongyang’s example.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. Holdridge sent this memorandum to Kissinger on July 7 with a recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 3, Document 147 and Document 150.
View Image
Page 377
Page 378
Persons
Holdridge, John HerbertDirector, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969 member, National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia) from July 1969
Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung)Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung), Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of the DPRK until December 28, 1972 President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) of the DPRK from December 28, 1972 and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
Kissinger, Henry A.Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Abbreviations & Terms
NSCNational Security Council
PRCPeople’s Republic of China



160. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972, Part 2. Confidential Immediate Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo.
Seoul, October 16, 1972, 1349Z.

5969. Dept pass SecDef immediate: pass CINCPAC priority. Subject: ROKG Declaration of Martial Law and Plans for Fundamental Government Reform. Summary:Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil informed me October 16 of details involving the declaration of martial law throughout ROK at 1900 hours on October 17. At the same time fundamental changes involving constitutional amendments and national referendum will be announced. Proposal involves indirect election of President in December by an electoral group and later reconstitution of the National Assembly, which is being dissolved as of October 17. The Prime Minister said the government was taking these actions in order to maintain firm and stable situation in Korea. End summary.

1. I was called to the office of Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil at 1800 hours on October 16. He said that he had asked to see me because he had some surprising news. Korea is in a difficult situation and in order to cope with its problems it cannot act only in an idealistic way alone. Therefore the ROKG has reached the conclusion that it should perform a constitutional reformation. More than ever the ROK is confronted with difficult circumstances and internal and external challenges. In order to cope with them they have reached certain conclusions. They should not hesitate to adopt whatever measures are necessary to maintain a firm and stable situation. If this means resorting to emergency measures they should not hesitate. They should adapt themselves to cold reality and, as necessary, supplement discrepancies in the existing constitution and correct unreasonable aspects of their system. Thus if this required extreme measures they should proceed.

2. Kim went on to say that in the course of reaching this decision ROKG had given long deliberation as to whether such a decision would affect the U.S. elections. But their own analyses had concluded that President Nixon would be overwhelmingly elected and that their actions would have no effect on U.S. elections. They also believe that these reforms should be taken immediately and completed within this year. He was informing me twenty-four hours in advance as they believed it to be a courtesy to inform us before the action was announced. He hoped for U.S. understanding and asked that the information he was about to divulge be kept secret until made public by his government.

3. Effective 1900 hours October 17 the following actions would be taken: (a) The National Assembly will be dissolved. (b) All political activities will be suspended. (c) Martial law will be declared throughout the land. At the same time a special proclamation would be published by the President in which the reasons behind these actions will be explained as well as the actions to follow. He then handed me a copy of the Presidential proclamation in English. Also adopted were an English translation of the formal proclamation of the martial law and the first proclamation of the martial law commander. Each of these being transmitted in septels.22. Not further identified.

4. Prime Minister Kim said that within ten days, i.e. October 27, a constitutional amendment will be announced and offered in a national referendum on or about November 17. Provided the national referendum is approved, one month later, on or about December 17, a presidential election will be held. This election will be conducted by an electoral group, which will be known as a National Conference for Unification. In other words there would first be an election for electors and they in turn will elect the President. Therefore the presidential election will be completed before Christmas and the constitutional functions normalized before the end of the year, that is to say an amended constitution will be in place. Under this amended constitution a new National Assembly will be elected within six months from the date the national referendum is held and the amendments approved.

5. Martial law will be lifted following the national referendum (assuming approval). Under martial law normal governmental functions will continue except that political assembly and political activity will be prohibited.33. The state of martial law was lifted on December 13, although the ban on political parties continued. All colleges and universities will be closed. Prior censorship will be imposed on all public media. Curfew hours will not change.

6. The Prime Minister said that martial law is being proclaimed in order to prevent the disorder and chaos that may arise as a result of the measures that are planned. The constitutional amendments to be presented are still under study but certain general ideas are being followed. In their view the essence of an open society is to have elections but an electoral system is a vulnerable point particularly in a country like Korea where repeated elections increase the vulnerability of the society. To remedy this, it is agreed that the tenure of the President and the National Assembly should be extended. Therefore they will be elected for a period of six years and for no more than two terms. In the past presidential elections have resulted in a great deal of waste, disorder and confusion, the Prime Minister said. So they have reached the conclusion that it is better to have indirect elections in place of direct elections.

7. The indirect elections would be conducted through an electoral group with one elector to come from each myon, dong and eup.44. District, neighborhood, and town. This would mean about 3,500 electors. This figure is not firm. They consider the ideal number to be somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 persons. At this point I asked if electors would be chosen regardless of population. The Prime Minister replied that this matter was still under study. It was generally favored to do it by administrative unit but some thought was being given to taking population into consideration.

8. The National Conference for Unification (the electoral group) will have three functions: (a) The election of the President. (b) Deliberate and decide the method for reunification of Korea. When it does so it will be presided over by the President. (c) To confirm appointed members of the National Assembly who will be nominated by the President.

9. The new National Assembly will consist of members from each of the present constituencies plus one third to be nominated by the President. This one third replaces the present proportional representation in the Assembly. By this process, the Prime Minister went on, the President will be provided with a stable majority in the National Assembly. In the past, to obtain a stable majority in the National Assembly, the government has had to resort to various undesirable methods. Now, whoever is elected President will have a stable majority. This will eliminate the irregularities that have so often taken place in order to get a majority in the Assembly, he added.

10. The President will also have the power to dissolve the National Assembly. The National Assembly will have the right to vote non-confidence in the Cabinet. The Assembly sessions will be limited to not more than 150 days a year. A regular session of three months and not more than two extraordinary sessions of thirty days each. However, the President can call a special session whenever he pleases, as necessary. Moreover, provisions would be made for “important issues” to be referred to a national referendum instead of as present permitting only constitutional changes to be referred to national referendum.

11. The Prime Minister said that the above were the major [garble] involved. He repeated that further study was still under way particularly on such things as the relationship between the legislative and executive bodies. He said the primary purpose of this reformation was to reorganize the government in order to enable it to carry out “future changes” with “versatility”. During the period before a new National Assembly takes office, necessary legislative action will be taken by the Cabinet.

12. As far as martial law is concerned, he went on, the martial law commander would be the chief of staff of the army. Martial law troops would be under the Capital Security Command. They will remain in their present locations on an alert status.

13. The Prime Minister said thus within the next two months the government would perform the necessary reformation and normalcy would be restored except for the new National Assembly. More thorough studies are still in process as to details on these actions and he will keep me informed as necessary. The Prime Minister ended by saying he looks to us for our understanding. Through this reform his government hopes to cope with the rapidly changing situation around them and to cope with the dialogue with the North. Finally he said that the meetings with the North will go on as scheduled. He asked me if I had any questions. I replied it appeared that the Prime Minister was informing me of the government’s decision and not asking me for our reaction or opinion. He nodded. I said I had a few questions to ask.

14. When he spoke of maintaining a stable situation, did this mean that he thought they did not have a stable situation at present? He replied a stable situation existed but there is always the danger it will be undermined and the government wishes to be prepared for such a chance for some time to come. I asked where the danger he spoke of comes from? He said internally and externally. Internally through the weakness of the present electoral system as he had pointed out above. Externally, through developments surrounding them, such as dealings between big powers which affect them and over which they have no control. And also in order to cope with the North.

15. I noted his statement that political activity would be prohibited after martial law, does this mean there would be no political activities permitted prior to referendum? He said that was correct and that as soon as the constitutional amendment is approved then political activities will be allowed in time for the National Assembly elections. I asked if political activity would be permitted for the elections of the National Conference for Unification. He said political activity by political parties would not be permitted. At this point, without reference to anything else, the Prime Minister said if the national referendum is rejected by the public it will be taken as a sign that the people did not want the government to continue the dialogue with the North and “measures will be taken”. Thus martial law would continue.

16. I said then there would be no political discussion of the referendum permitted. Not by political parties he replied. However, the amendment will be explained to the people who will then be permitted to decide yes or no. They felt the people had enough knowledge, so the government will explain it as it is and let the people decide. I asked if anyone would be able to campaign or explain a position contrary to the amendment, in other words would anyone else be allowed to solicit no votes. He said this would not be possible. Neither the opposition party nor the government party would be able to conduct political activity. Only facts will be given to the people and they can then decide.

17. I asked how presidential candidates would be presented to the National Conference for Unification. He said this had not been decided finally. Whether the conference will choose the President on its own or let the people present themselves as candidates to the electoral body was still under study. I asked him what he expected the reaction in the country would be. He said the immediate reaction would be “shock.” There might be some disturbances but he is certain the stituation will return to normal and the referendum conducted in good order.

18. I asked him what he thought international reaction would be. He said he expected there would be a lot of adverse comment but as the reform would be completed within the year and normalcy restored, the situation would then be better understood. These measures were designed to assure the Koreans a strong and effective system for their own survival. International understanding would be enhanced as the Korean people showed their understanding and cooperated with the government.

19. I asked if this action was taken within or outside the present constitution. He said they intended to amend certain parts of the constitution but leave the rest unchanged. I noted the present constitution does not provide for the process he had outlined. He said this was true and certain measures would have to be taken outside the constitution. I told him this was a very fundamental step and I was not going to give him an off-hand reaction. I would inform Washington immediately. His government had obviously decided to go ahead with these actions. If Washington had any opinion or reaction insofar as these actions affected us, I would be in touch with him. Nevertheless he could expect there will be considerable public comment and the actions taken certainly would have an effect on what people think and do in regard to Korea. I said these were very serious steps being taken by his government and just as he had expressed to me the opinion they would be received with some shock internally, I expected they would also be something of a shock internationally. He replied they expected this but hoped people would understand.

20. He said he would be available to me at any time if I had any further questions. (Country Team comments will follow in septel.)55. Not further identified.

Habib

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972, Part 2. Confidential Immediate Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo.

2 Not further identified.

3 The state of martial law was lifted on December 13, although the ban on political parties continued.

4 District, neighborhood, and town.

5 Not further identified.





161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972. Secret Flash Nodis. Drafted by Kriebel and cleared by Ranard, Green, and in S/S.
Washington, October 17, 1972, 0026Z.

188775. Subject: Secretary’s Conversation with Ambassador Kim on Martial Law. Following is uncleared memcon FYI subject to revision upon review:

1. Secretary called in Ambassador Kim Dong Jo at 1730 October 16 regarding ROKG decision to declare martial law. Green and Ranard present.

2. Secretary asked Ambassador Kim to inform his government that we cannot accept the reasons given for the decision to declare martial law and in particular cannot understand the attack on U.S. policy in Asia contained in the proposed presidential proclamation. Secretary read from text of proclamation and commented it called into question the wisdom and morality of U.S. policy and suggested that U.S. actions would adversely affect ROK security. He said such statements were not acceptable and added that President Nixon would react unfavorably to the language and that the proclamation could cause serious problems between the two countries. We would be obliged to denounce any such statements publicly.

3. Green said that ROK rationale for declaring martial law was erroneous and that its attack on U.S. policy would create dismay in U.S., Asia and elsewhere. It would be interpreted as an attack on U.S. policy by an old and trusted friend. Referring to recent UN vote on Korean question, Green stated ROK action could only embarrass all those countries who had worked to postpone debate on very grounds that inscription would create internal problems for ROKG.

4. Ambassador Kim asked if offensive passages in proclamation were removed would it be possible for U.S. to make positive public statement respecting martial law declaration which was essentially internal ROK matter.

5. Secretary responded that the rationale given by the ROKG was only one aspect of the problem also important was the substance of the proposed constitutional changes. Green added that, for example, there will be difficulties with Congress which has made possible the implementation of the ROK modernization plan and the continued U.S. troop presence.

6. Ambassador Kim was clearly unaware of proposed actions. He said he was uninstructed in this matter but would report the Secretary’s views at the highest levels of his government. He asked that Ambassador Habib be requested to make representations to the ROKG.22. In telegram 188717 to Seoul, October 16, Rogers informed Habib of his forthcoming meeting with Kim. Rogers also instructed Habib to meet with Park and inform him that “while we will seek to avoid public comment on wisdom of Park’s actions, we will be unable to avoid dissociating ourselves from these actions or from commenting on proclamation statement re President Nixon actions.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 23𔃇 KOR S) According to telegram 5976 from Seoul, October 17, Habib was unable to see Park and instead presented the U.S. views to Kim Jong Pil. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972)

Rogers

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972. Secret Flash Nodis. Drafted by Kriebel and cleared by Ranard, Green, and in S/S.

2 In telegram 188717 to Seoul, October 16, Rogers informed Habib of his forthcoming meeting with Kim. Rogers also instructed Habib to meet with Park and inform him that “while we will seek to avoid public comment on wisdom of Park’s actions, we will be unable to avoid dissociating ourselves from these actions or from commenting on proclamation statement re President Nixon actions.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 23𔃇 KOR S) According to telegram 5976 from Seoul, October 17, Habib was unable to see Park and instead presented the U.S. views to Kim Jong Pil. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972)




162. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig initialed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it.
Washington, October 17, 1972.

SUBJECT
South Korean President to Announce Imposition of Martial Law October 17
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil informed Ambassador Habib the evening of October 16 that on October 17 at 7:00 p.m. (6:00 a.m. the same day Washington time) martial law would be imposed throughout the country.22. See Document 160. In addition,

—The National Assembly (the legislature) will be dissolved.
—All political activity will be suspended, all colleges and universities will be closed, and prior censorship will be imposed on all media.
—The Presidential proclamation (of which Ambassador Habib was given a draft) will justify his actions partly in terms of international instability brought on, in part, by your China initiative, and Japan’s recent normalization of relations with the PRC.
On October 27, President Park will proclaim amendments to the Constitution, which will be submitted to a popular referendum on about November 17, after which—assuming approval—martial law will be lifted. The Government will present the case for the amendments to the people, and no public expression of contrary views will be permitted. If the amendments are rejected, the Government will interpret this as disapproval of its dialogue with North Korea. The amendments will provide:

—A new Presidential election on about December 17, to be conducted through an “electoral college” which will be indirectly elected—and hence easier to control—in contrast to the present direct election for President. [Park was elected to a third four-year term in April 1971.]33. All brackets are in the original.

—A new National Assembly election within roughly the next half year. [The present National Assembly was elected in May 1971 for a four-year term.] The new Assembly will have one-third of its members nominated by the President to provide a “stable majority” in the legislature. Both the National Assembly and the President will be elected for six-year terms, with a maximum of two terms permitted. Political activity will be allowed after the referendum, but political parties will not be allowed to campaign. Prime Minister Kim acknowledged that the amending process will be carried on outside the processes provided under the present Constitution.

In the meantime, talks with North Korea will proceed.

Comment:

—We have had no warning of this move, although we have long known that Park was considering whether he should retain power beyond 1975. He now stands to stay on for at least 12 more years.

—Park’s action is unnecessary in terms of domestic political stability. However, we would not succeed in trying to turn it back, according to Embassy Seoul.

—Park’s move is not simply an attempt to perpetuate himself in power beyond 1975—though this is probably a major reason. Park has probably also convinced himself that he needs greater control at home in order to cope with unforeseen contingencies that will be produced by the new, more fluid international context in which South Korea is now operating.

—Park has, at least in the short term, sacrificed a part of the political advantage he recently gained over the North—with no immediately apparent compensating gain for himself.

—Park, in his timing of his action, may want to avoid an appearance of an act of desperation that it might have if he waited until closer to 1975. In this respect, his action parallels that of Philippine President Marcos, but in other respects diverges from that of Marcos—Park has much less in his domestic situation to justify his action.

State is calling in the Korean Ambassador here this afternoon44. Rogers met with Kim on October 16 see Document 161. to express our concern, particularly over references in the proclamation such as the alleged unsettling effect of your China initiative as justifying Park’s action this may cause these offensive clauses to be removed. Publicly, we plan to be neutral, while disassociating ourselves from Park’s action.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig initialed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it.

2 See Document 160.

3 All brackets are in the original.

4 Rogers met with Kim on October 16 see Document 161.






163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972. Confidential Immediate Exdis. Drafted by Kriebel on October 17 cleared by Green, Ranard, Sneider, and in S/S and approved by Johnson.
Washington, October 18, 1972, 1436Z.

189689. Subject: ROK Ambassador’s Call on Under Secretary Johnson.

1. Upon instructions Ambassador Kim Dong Jo requested an appointment October 16 with Under Secretary Johnson for the morning of October 17. Subsequently the Secretary called Ambassador Kim to the Department at 5:30 p.m. October 1622. See Document 161. but Kim still made his presentation to Under Secretary Johnson on October 17 at 8:45 a.m. Assistant Secretary Green was present.

2. Ambassador Kim said he had talked to CIA Director Yi Hu Rak twice the previous evening to convey the concern of President Nixon as expressed by the Secretary and had requested that the offensive portions of the proclamation be removed. He noted that the proclamation had been modified.33. In telegram 5988 from Seoul, October 17, Habib reported that the Prime Minister’s private secretary had delivered a revised version of the presidential declaration. Habib also reported that, upon questioning Han Sang-Kuk, he had found that Prime Minister Kim was opposed to the martial law declaration and that he had considered resigning over the issues involved. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 15 KOR S) In a memorandum to Kissinger, dated October 30, Helms reported similar information that Kim Jong Pil “had urged President Pak Chong-hui not to declare martial law until after the U.S. elections.” According to Kim the “primary reason” for President Park’s drive to complete his plan before the end of the year was his belief that “the U.S. is ‘selling out’ the Thieu government.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry DCI Files, Job 80–B01086A, Subject Files, Box 12 of 16, Korea) During the course of the conversation he made the following points:

A. References to the “great powers” in the proclamation were not directed at the U.S., but were a warning to the Korean people to remind them that their historic experience had been one of having been sacrificed to the interests of the great powers.

B. The measures taken by the Korean Government were intended to further the process of peaceful unification.

C. While martial law would be difficult for the US to accept there was to be a national referendum. The intention of the Korean Government was not to establish a dictatorship but to provide for more efficient government. The basic posture of the Korean Government was democratic and the US should judge Korea by the results of the national referendum.

D. He assured the Under Secretary that analogies with 1961 were not appropriate, that the period of martial law was definitely limited to the time required to implement the constitutional amendment.

3. Kim repeated the request he had made to the Secretary the previous day that he hoped the US would not in its public statements say anything which would disturb US-Korean relations.

4. Kim’s composure slipped only once when, in response to questioning about the future of representative government in Korea, he said that he was not a politician, that he was conveying the instructions of his government, and that he had done his best to ameliorate the government’s decision.

5. Under Secretary Johnson made a strong “more in sorrow than in anger” representation to Kim. He said the proclamation, even with the changes, remained unsatisfactory and that he could only interpret it—and the President would so interpret it—as a direct criticism of US policy in Asia. He said he was shocked by the ROKG decision and that he and all those in the US Government who had been closely associated with Korea were deeply disappointed. While it was not for the US to tell Korea how to run its affairs, he was apprehensive over the future and sorry for Korea. He noted that questions would be asked about what practical difference there now was between the governments in the South and the North. He added that Korea had been an example of representative government in Asia. The steps the government took in implementing its decisions would be important. He hoped the ROKG would reexamine its present plans. He reminded Kim that President Rhee had tightened controls on the Korean people until there had been an explosion and he was fearful that history was repeating itself.

6. Johnson warned that it would be impossible for the USG to keep silent in response to press questions and that, while we did not wish to complicate matters for the Korean Government, we could not associate ourselves with the decision or give any indication that we approved it or considered it justified. He reiterated to Kim that we could not understand how the Korean Government could base its drastic internal actions on a presentation of external events that was not justified and was counter to the position the Korean Government itself had taken.

7. Assistant Secretary Green noted that there would be no political opposition permitted [prior] to the referendum. He underlined the views of the [Under] Secretary and made these additional points.

A. The Korean success story had projected to the US public a favorable picture of US Asian policy which was helpful in countering neo-isolationist trends in the US. The ROKG action now cast doubt on this policy.

B. The supplemental military assistance bill in 1970 for Korea had had no opposition in the Congress, in part because of Korea’s favorable image. Now Congressional support would be more difficult to obtain.

C. His primary concern was reaction in Korea. Colleges were to be closed. Korea possessed a sophisticated intellectual element and, while the government might have no internal problems in the beginning, we were apprehensive about the reaction over the longer term.

D. The implementation of the government’s decision would be watched by the press here and they would watch in particular for arrests of political leaders or other evidence of repression. He noted that during the days of the military government the Cabinet had been jailed and he hoped there would be none of this kind of activity. We were not reassured by the Ambassador’s statement to the contrary, nor by the information we had received from our Ambassador in Seoul.

E. Green reminded Kim that he had called on President Park and the Prime Minister twice since March and that he had had no impression of their undue concern over developments in East Asia, and reiterated that only recently the Foreign Minister had unequivocally stated the government’s support for US Government policy.

8. Under Secretary Johnson referred to that portion of the President’s proclamation which stated that the referendum would be a vote of confidence in the government’s approach to North Korea. According to the statement, if the referendum were rejected, he would take a new approach to reunification. Johnson said he was confused as to what that meant. He thought it sounded ominously like Rhee’s statements about a march North, but he could not believe this was so. Ambassador Kim said he was unable to clarify the statement.44. In telegram 6115 from Seoul, October 23, Habib summarized a conversation with Kim Jong Pil: “Prime Minister confirmed to Ambassador constitutional changes he had earlier described. Referendum would be conducted without political debate, and held probably on Nov. 21 despite presence of North Korean Red Cross delegation. Ambassador restated our dissociation with move and our belief it was unnecessary.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 72)

Rogers

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 1972. Confidential Immediate Exdis. Drafted by Kriebel on October 17 cleared by Green, Ranard, Sneider, and in S/S and approved by Johnson.

2 See Document 161.

3 In telegram 5988 from Seoul, October 17, Habib reported that the Prime Minister’s private secretary had delivered a revised version of the presidential declaration. Habib also reported that, upon questioning Han Sang-Kuk, he had found that Prime Minister Kim was opposed to the martial law declaration and that he had considered resigning over the issues involved. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 15 KOR S) In a memorandum to Kissinger, dated October 30, Helms reported similar information that Kim Jong Pil “had urged President Pak Chong-hui not to declare martial law until after the U.S. elections.” According to Kim the “primary reason” for President Park’s drive to complete his plan before the end of the year was his belief that “the U.S. is ‘selling out’ the Thieu government.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry DCI Files, Job 80–B01086A, Subject Files, Box 12 of 16, Korea)

4 In telegram 6115 from Seoul, October 23, Habib summarized a conversation with Kim Jong Pil: “Prime Minister confirmed to Ambassador constitutional changes he had earlier described. Referendum would be conducted without political debate, and held probably on Nov. 21 despite presence of North Korean Red Cross delegation. Ambassador restated our dissociation with move and our belief it was unnecessary.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan󈞋 Dec 72)





Seoul, December 10, 1972.

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy in Korea—Country Team Message
A?

Summary

This is a three part paper containing the Country Team assessment of the Korean situation, recommended objectives and supporting policies in a PARA context and conclusions, alternatives and tactics. In the light of developments during 1972, the Country Team recommends review and modification of U.S. objectives and policies in Korea.

I. Assessment of Situation and Implications of Policy

1. In 1972, events have set in motion changes which profoundly affect the Korean peninsula. The July 4 Communiqué between the North and South and President Park’s “October Revitalization” program have changed completely the context of the South-North relationship and the structure of government in the Republic of Korea. Coupled with the developing new relationships between Korea’s great power neighbors and the U.S., these changes affect not only Korea but the U.S. role and policies here.

A. South-North Relations.

1. The ROKG and the DPRK have moved rapidly in establishing a substantive dialogue and the intergovernmental mechanisms for continued coordination and future joint actions (e.g., exchanges, economic relations, political discussions). The July 4 Communiqué provided a framework within which future negotiations between the two sides will be conducted.

2. While major substantive matters are being approached cautiously, the process now in motion is not expected to cease and we expect more measured, but still visible movement towards broader dialogue and greater contacts between the South and the North. For the foreseeable future, it is our assessment that neither side has as its target organic unification but rather a level of accommodation that does not threaten absolute control over their respective areas. Each will seek to further its own short term objectives while biding time on the larger issue of reunification.

3. As this process continues, it inevitably affects U.S. policy for Korea. It affects assessments of the security threat and our policies regarding the Korean question at the UN and the problem of international recognition of the DPRK. At the same time we must avoid actions which would threaten progress in the South-North dialogue or give the impression that we are precipitately abandoning the ROK. In sum, our policy and programs need to be modified to reflect the new situation in Korea.

B. The Threat of War.

1. As a result of the South-North meetings and the international environment in which they have occurred, the danger of major hostilities is less now than at any time since the 1953 Armistice. There have been no reported incidents along the DMZ in a year. Militant threats and bitter exchanges between the two sides have receded. In their bilateral contacts, including the hotline, the ROKG and DPRK have reduced the importance of the Military Armistice Commission.

2. Nevertheless, formidable military forces face each other. In ground forces, the ROK has an advantage, and the navies are at a standoff. However, the North maintains an advantage in air power if the U.S. air forces availiable are not taken into account. This latter imbalance is not serious in the current situation and the present and projected deterrent power in total forces available to the ROK is sufficient for its needs. If the modernization plan for ROK forces is essentially achieved in terms of equipment, we have no doubt that the bilateral military stand-off can be maintained.

C. The ROK Domestic Scene.

1. Domestically, President Park has abandoned a political course which has served him and his nation well and which we have encouraged in Korea for 25 years. With the “October Revitalization” he has deliberately embarked on a program of highly personal, authoritarian rule. There is now established a governmental structure based essentially on tight executive control. We have commented on Park’s reasons in other messages. They involve a complex of factors including primarily his ambition to remain in power and his long-standing unhappiness with the constraints and political frustrations inherent under the former constitution. Park is also convinced that in a changing international environment, and in dealing with North Korea, his country’s national interest demands his strong, unchallenged leadership.

2. We cannot now predict the future train of events. Stability in the near future rests on Park’s ability, for the present unquestioned, to maintain control through the traditional instruments of a dictatorship—the bureaucracy, the police agencies and the Army. The “October Revitalization” will go far beyond the political institutions in establishing firm, positive government control over South Korean society. Measures now under consideration would affect education, labor, the press and economic life. The government speaks of exercising authority with restraint, but there is little question that control will be firm and dissent forbidden. However, disquiet exists, particularly among the educated and students.

3. These changes will cause problems for us and may well affect certain of our programs. Considering our substantial military presence and long-term support for Korea, the USG will be faced with the continuing question of what our policy stance should be towards unpalatable domestic actions of the Park Government.

4. The ROKG hopes that we can be induced to appear to positively support its domestic political plans. At a minimum it expects that we will do or say nothing to jar its control of the situation and that key elements of U.S. policy (MAP, AID, PL 480, U.S. forces) will not be seriously affected in the short term. We should not support or approve Park’s repressive domestic political actions or be associated with them publicly or privately. Indeed, we believe they were unnecessary and in the long run unwise. However, our long-term presence here and continuing relationship with the ROK associate us, at least tacitly, with the ROKG. It is clear that no mere wrist slapping will deter Park from his political designs. He and those around him are committed to establishing a severely controlled society. This we can deter only by direct and drastic intervention which would threaten Park’s hold on power, create instability and deepen our involvement in the ROK internally.

D. The International Situation.

1. The South-North dialogue and President Park’s “October Revitalization” should be viewed in the context of the international scene. Korea is no longer the frontier for East-West confrontation and the interests of the four great powers in Northeast Asia transcend Korea. The evolving web of contact between the great powers has lessened greatly the possibility of a conflagration in Korea involving, or directly supported by, the USSR and PRC.

2. The Koreans have recognized this. On both sides of the DMZ, they have made their own hard-headed appraisal of the situation. The ROKG expresses concern that it can no longer rely completely on the U.S. commitment despite our frequent reaffirmations. It is deeply conscious of the increasingly dominant economic role being played by Japan, and asserts a desire for a continuing U.S. economic presence as a counterweight. Koreans also fear that Korea’s future may be caught up and decided in some great power permutations over which they have no control.

3. In this situation, President Park is determined to move toward a policy of greater “self-reliance,” diplomatically, economically and militarily. Concern over the great powers, including the U.S., is a clear theme in Park’s justification for his domestic political actions as well as the South-North dialogue. However, Park’s view of self-reliance, paradoxically, includes a desire and an expressed need for the U.S. presence and assistance to continue—at least in the short run. His concern that we will reduce our aid program, withdraw our troops sooner than he would like, and his doubt over the firmness of our treaty commitment, come to the surface from time to time. Generally speaking, he wishes to hold on to these elements of strength for as long as he can, expecting they will diminish as time goes on.

II. Recommended PARA Objectives and Supporting Policies and Programs

Based on the assessment contained in Part I, there follow the Country Team recommended PARA objectives and summary recommendations regarding supporting policies and programs:

A. Recommended Objectives:

1. Deter hostilities on the Korean peninsula.

2. Maintain a stable compromise of interests bearing upon Korea among major powers in Northeast Asia. For Japan, in particular, this would mean continued availabilities to the U.S. of bases to support our security commitment and a major economic role in Korea.

3. Support the South-North dialogue in a manner consonant with U.S. interests.

4. Increase ROK self-reliance and reduce ROK dependence on U.S. military support for its own defense.

5. Avoid U.S. actions with regard to North Korea which interfere with the development of South-North accommodation.

6. Support the continued presence of a government in the ROK whose foreign policies and outlooks are favorable to the U.S.

7. Maintain our long-term interest in the growth of political maturity in the ROK and of institutions responsive to the needs of the Korean people.

8. Increase U.S. exports to Korea and expand private investment in support of U.S. balance of payments while maintaining our interest in sound economic growth in the ROK.

9. Further cultural relations between the United States and Korea.

10. Maintain access to such military bases in Korea as needed.

B. Supporting Policies and Programs:

1. Domestic.

a. Recognize that the Park Government is embarked on an independent course based on a domestic foundation of highly personal, authoritarian rule.

b. Maintain normal, friendly governmental relations with the Park Government but seek to avoid associating ourselves with Park’s domestic authoritarian political plans and actions.

c. Maintain normal contacts with elements of Korean society outside the Korean Government, to include any responsible political opposition that may exist.

d. Continue our public and private support for the ROKG in the South-North dialogue.

2. International.

a. While not rejecting postponement as a tactic, accept the extension of unconditional invitations to both sides to participate in discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Leave the question of membership for either one or two Koreas to be decided by the ROKG and DPRK themselves. In this regard the manner in which resolutions by the opposing sides would be dealt with at the UNGA require special consideration.

b. Accept the early end of UNCURK in an appropriate and dignified fashion.

c. Quietly work to move the question of Korean unification out of the UN context leaving it as an issue for the two Korean regimes to settle—not as an international responsibility.

d. Accept that the problem of third country diplomatic relations with the ROKG and the DPRK is a matter for the individual governments to decide. We should no longer feel required to expend major diplomatic capital trying to block diplomatic recognition of the North by other governments.

e. Begin to review our policy with regard to North Korea while avoiding any actions which could complicate the development of South-North relations. At this time we should approach any bilateral dealings with the North most cautiously and only after full consultation with the ROKG.

3. Military.

a. Maintain the Mutual Defense Treaty.

b. Begin reducing ground combat forces in the ROK in FY 74. Inform the ROKG of the size of the reduction in the spring of 1973 and after the National Assembly elections.

c. Study internally the possibility of complete withdrawal of ground combat forces from the ROK in the FY 75󈞸 period. At the same time, recognize that South-North developments or other events will affect timing.

d. Continue to transfer the cost of the ROK military defense to the Koreans themselves:

i. Proceed to reduce MAP “Operations and Maintenance” costs through FY 75 as proposed in Seoul 6679 and examine the need for any residual O&M thereafter.
ii. Attempt to substantially meet the MOD Plan “investment” objectives with FY 75 as the target terminal year. This would involve significant increases in “I” levels above those currently projected. Then consider seriously phasing out all grant assistance in the FY 76󈞹 period.
e. Review the utility of the UNC in the current Korean situation, particularly as it relates to operational control, the armistice and likely UN developments. We should also begin to talk to the ROKG about possible ways of transferring the UNC armistice responsibilities to the ROKG since the two Korean regimes are already in de facto fashion dealing directly on the maintenance of the peace.

4. Economic.

a. Continue our PL 480 program at levels appropriate to Korea’s needs and in support of U.S. objectives including trade development.

b. Continue our vigorous, expanded support for U.S. commercial interests. This requires a more active campaign to interest U.S. exporters in the Korean market, improving EX–IM and other credit and guarantee facilities for trade, and when necessary, the use of official “leverage” to the advantage of U.S. commercial interests.

c. Continue the phasedown of AID technical assistance programs. The ROK is a successful AID “graduate” country. In its present stage of economic growth, the ROK does not need the kinds of technical assistance we provided in the past.

d. Terminate U.S. development loans by the end of FY 75 consistent with our understandings under the Textile Quota Agreement.

5. Other Programs.

a. USIS

Continue the U.S. informational and cultural program in support of U.S. objectives as set forth above.

b. Peace Corps

Review ongoing Peace Corps activities in the light of likely ROKG restructuring of social institutions. Do not increase the program above present levels and assure continuation of a low profile, non-political stance on the part of Peace Corps volunteers in a new, restrictive political environment. Recognize that the Peace Corps program is marginally useful to Korean development but in selected areas its contribution has been valuable and appreciated. It also provides a good environment for American youth for service and self-development.

III. Conclusions, Alternatives and Tactics

A. Early Action:

In major program terms, the recommended policies and program changes listed in Part II would involve early decisions on the following matters. These decisions should be made soon and would be communicated to the Koreans in the first half of 1973.

a. Modification of our UN policy concerning Korea.
b. Level of U.S. ground forces in Korea in FY 1974.
c. Increase of MAP “I” to allow substantial fulfillment of MOD Plan “I” objectives by the end of FY 75.
d. Approval of the MAP “O” cost transfer schedule previously recommended.
B. The Longer Term:

1. Other recommended actions will be considered in more detail in future messages if the general policy direction as envisaged is approved. This involves such things as the future of the United Nations Command, U.S. policy regarding North Korea, U.S. force levels and MAP programs beyond FY 1974, and economic and commercial programs. Some of the simpler recommended actions can be accomplished within existing policy guidelines.

2. It should be noted that, if our recommendations are accepted, there still will be a major U.S. presence in Korea in the foreseeable future. Our PL 480 program would continue MAP levels would be high through FY 75 and would substantially meet the joint U.S./ROK modernization goals over 30,000 U.S. military personnel, including the air component, would still be in ROK at the end of FY 74. Most importantly, the basic U.S. security commitment in the Mutual Defense Treaty would remain. Given our current assessment of the security situation, the strength of the ROK forces, and the ability of the Korean economy to bear increased defense costs, we believe it entirely feasible that a carefully calculated phasedown in our present high level of military support can begin in FY 73󈞶.

3. Our recommendations are in great measure a recognition of trends and decisions already clearly in train. Our recommended course of action would only begin, not complete, the process of establishing a new U.S. relationship to Korea. Our recommendations are sufficiently considered and flexible to avoid a major increase in tensions and to avoid compromise of other important U.S. objectives in Korea and in Northeast Asia. For instance, they should not unduly upset valid Japanese concerns about the security of the area. Nor should they jeopardize the further development of the dialogue between South and North Korea.

C. The Alternatives:

1. The most obvious alternative to our recommendations is to maintain our programs, support and commitments at present levels and let events determine our policy. There are disadvantages in this. They are:

a. The likelihood that events in Korea, the UN and internationally will continue to outpace our expectations. Instead of adopting a prudent course reflecting our assessment of the situation, we would be faced with a series of discrete decisions made on an ad hoc basis, which we suspect would be more, not less, unpalatable to the ROK and more destabilizing in their impact.
b. A lessened justification for our present high levels of support in terms of the security threat. We would, therefore, be mis-using resources and our programs should be brought into closer alignment with desirable U.S. objectives.
c. The clear danger that maintenance of the status quo in policy terms would not only be inappropriate but also unresponsive to our interests as the situation in Korea and Northeast Asia changes.
2. Another alternative would be a policy of active intervention to force the Park Government to back down from its authoritarian political plans and to reinstitute representative government. As we have noted earlier, we can only deter Park by drastic intervention which would create major internal instability and involve us deeply in Korean domestic affairs. This alternative was rejected by the Embassy and the Department at the time martial law was declared and the new Constitution announced. There are those in Korea, and elsewhere, who will be disappointed if the U.S. does not use what leverage it has to try to force the ROKG to reinstitute democracy in Korea. However, it remains our view that the costs of trying to coerce Park to retreat are too great in terms of our objectives and our interests here and, in any event, might fail.

3. Internationally and at the UN, we could also stand pat on our past positions trying to preserve the special status of the ROK. However, the South-North dialogue and other developments, including the imminent international acceptance of two Germanies, make it unlikely that we can successfully accomplish this. Similarly UNCURK, which is of marginal utility, appears to be nearing the end of its road with even the Australians considering how to end the Commission. Because of these considerations, we believe that our past UN policy will not long stand up and that 1973 should be used as a transition year to a policy more in keeping with the realities of the situation.

D. Tactics and ROK Reaction:

1. We would expect a strongly negative reaction by the ROKG to any apparent diminution of our support. The ROKG wishes to preserve as long as possible the benefits of their relationship with the U.S., whatever the actual requirements of the situation are.

2. For obvious tactical reasons, the ROKG would insist that there be no reduction of U.S. troop levels through at least FY 1975, that the MOD plan be fulfilled completely and that UN strategy be unchanged. They might accuse us of weakening our basic commitment at a time when they need it to deal with the North. They might also interpret any U.S. actions as manifestations of U.S. political displeasure with President Park’s domestic policies.

3. At the same time, the Koreans are tough and cynical realists. They have already made their own appraisal of the situation and are anticipating changes in their relationship with the U.S. Prime Minister Kim’s public statements predicting U.S. troop withdrawals by 1975 reflect a private conviction that a fundamental change in ROK/US relationship is inevitable, and eventually desirable, as soon as the ROK can manage it. The ROKG will not be surprised by the fact we would consider scaling down our material support. However, they want to delay our actions as long as possible.

4. Tactically, we would not present as a package our proposals regarding UN policy, U.S. force levels and MAP. Rather we envisage the following scenario in 1973:

a. February–March: Inform ROKG of our firm decision on transfer of more “O and M” costs. At the same time assure them in concrete terms of USG determination to seek sufficient “I” to assure substantial completion of MOD plan objectives by FY 75.
b. March–April: Inform ROKG of our view that our UN strategy and policies must be modified in the light of developments in peninsula and internationally. Give them our views on policy changes and the future of UNCURK.
c. May–June: Inform the ROKG of a scheduled reduction of U.S. ground forces in FY 74.
5. In our approaches we would assure the ROK of our continued commitment to ROK security, pointing to remaining U.S. forces and our commitment to MOD plan “I” levels. At the same time we would also frankly point out that our MAP and U.S. force levels are not immutable. They are based on ongoing assessments of the threat and on the ability of ROK to bear the costs of its defense. We would tell the ROKG that modernization of the ROK armed forces and the impressive growth of the Korean economy mean that U.S. military resource allocations will continue to change, while our basic treaty commitment remains firm.

E. Conclusion:

In conclusion, we believe that the changed international environment, the South-North developments and President Park’s “October Revitalization” force a review and modification of our objectives in Korea and our supporting policies. The year 1972 has been a watershed year for Korea, and U.S. policies should reflect a new reality and a changing U.S. role. Therefore, we request early consideration of the recommended policies and programs and the proposed tactics.

H

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. VI, Jan 73–Oct 73. Secret Exdis. Drafted by Habib and by D. O’Donohue (POL) cleared in POL, USIS, SAA, COMM, and by Underhill, COMUSK, and Adler and approved by Habib. Richard Kennedy forwarded the airgram to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 16, 1973, which reads: “Much to our amazement, Habib has drafted a proposed policy paper which, among other things, proposes that we be planning a reduction of US forces in FY 1974 and an internal study looking to their total withdrawal in the FY 75󈞸 period.” He continued: “We think this should be turned off firmly now before it leaks out (which it most certainly will—given the wishful thinking on the part of some elements in State). Otherwise, we are headed for a disaster in our relations with the ROK at this critical juncture.” Kissinger initialed his approval of Kennedy’s proposed message to Habib that countered the Ambassador’s suggestions. (Ibid.)
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Persons
Habib, Philip C.Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 1969 member, U.S. Delegation to meetings on Vietnam in Paris from May 1968 until October 1971 Ambassador to Korea from September 30, 1971
Kennedy, Richard T.Colonel, member, National Security Council Staff from 1970 until 1972 Director, National Security Council Planning Group from 1971 until 1972
Kim Jong Pil (Kim Chong-p’il)Kim Jong Pil (Kim Chong-p’il), Prime Minister of the ROK from June 3, 1971
Kissinger, Henry A.Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Abbreviations & Terms
AIDAgency for International Development
COMUSKCommander, U.S. Forces, Korea
DMZDemilitarized Zone
DPRKDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea
Ex-ImExport-Import Bank
Exdisexclusive distribution
FYfiscal year
MAPMilitary Assistance Program
MODMinister of Defense Ministry of Defense
NSCNational Security Council
O&Moperations and maintenance
PARAPolicy Analysis and Resource Allocation paragraph
PLPublic Law
PRCPeople’s Republic of China
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKGRepublic of Korea Government
UNUnited Nations
UNCUnited Nations Command
UNCURKUnited Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNGAUnited Nations General Assembly
USUnited States
USGUnited States Government
USISUnited States Information Service
USSRUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics



244. Telegram 5409 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, August 15, 1973, 0326Z.11. Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret Priority Exdis. Repeated for information to Tokyo. On August 8, Republic of Korea intelligence agents kidnapped opposition politician Kim Dae-jung from a hotel in Tokyo, allegedly with plans to assassinate him.
TELEGRAM
Department of State
SEOUL 5409

P 150326Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9498
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

SEOUL 5409

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, KS, JA

SUBJECT: KIM TAE CHUNG CASE

1. AS CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ABDUCTION OF KIM TAE CHUNG CONTINUE TO EMERGE, MY EARLIER OPINION THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY AN ROKG-MANAGED OPERATION IS INCREASINGLY CONFIRMED. I NOW VIEW IT AS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF STUPID GOVERNMENTAL THUGGERY.

2. FULL CONSEQUENCES WILL PROBABLY EMERGE SEQUENTIALLY OVER TIME. THERE WILL BE DOMESTIC REVERBERATIONS AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES. AT THIS STAGE KIM HAS WIDESPREAD SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT IN KOREAN CIRCLES FOR THE EXPERIENCE HE UNDERWENT. GOVERNMENT HAS IN EFFECT INCREASED THE STATURE OF ITS ONLY SERIOUS POLITICAL OPPONENT. WE BELIEVE THAT NO ONE WITH ANY SENSE OF INDEPENDENT THOUGHT ACCEPTS THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATIONS OF ITS INNOCENCE. THE SO-CALLED QUOTE SAVE THE NATION UNION UNQUOTE AND QUOTE PATRIOTIC YOUTH FEDERATION UNQUOTE WHICH ALLEGEDLY CARRIED OUT THE OPERATION ARE TYPICAL OF THE SORT OF APPARATUS CONTRIVED BY THE ROK/CIA.

3. WE DEFER TO EMBASSY TOKYO'S APPRAISAL OF THE REACTION IN JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, DIET AND PRESS CIRCLES. ROKG APPARENTLY INTENDS TO STICK BY ITS DECISION NOT TO LET KIM RETURN TO JAPAN FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES. TO DO SO WOULD ONLY TURN HIM LOOSE WITH GREATLY HEIGHTENED PRESTIGE TO CONTINUE HIS ATTACKS ABROAD AGAINST THE PARK GOVERNMENT.

4. AT THE PRESENT TIME THE GOVERNMENT IS ALLOWING EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE CASE IN LOCAL PRESS AND INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES ARE MAKING A GREAT SHOW OF TRYING TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THE AFFAIR. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THEY WERE FORCED TO TURN UP SOME OF THE GUILTY PARTIES WHO WILL GO TO JAIL PROTESTING THEIR PATRIOTISM AND THE FACT THEY ACTED ON THEIR OWN AND NOT ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS HAS OCCURRED BEFORE IN KOREAN HISTORY WITH ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT VALIDITY.

5. KIM TAE CHUNG WILL NOW SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION, TRY TO GO ABROAD, AND MAY EVEN BE BOLD ENOUGH TO TRY TO MOUNT SOME DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT. AT THAT POINT I SUSPECT THE PRESS COVERAGE IN KOREA WILL DIMINISH SHARPLY AND HIS ACTIVITIES WOULD BE RESTRICTED. THERE STILL HANGS OVER HIM AN OLD CHARGE OF VIOLATING ELECTION LAWS IN 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY, BUT IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD RESURRECT THEM EXCEPT IN THE MOST DESPERATE CIRCUMSTANCES. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY.

HABIB

1 Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret Priority Exdis. Repeated for information to Tokyo. On August 8, Republic of Korea intelligence agents kidnapped opposition politician Kim Dae-jung from a hotel in Tokyo, allegedly with plans to assassinate him.




246. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, November 16, 1973.11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970? (TS Files), Box 24, Misc Refiles [No Folder Title], POL 7 US/Kissinger. Top Secret Nodis. Drafted by Hummel. The meeting was held in the Blue House.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: November 16, 1973
PLACE: Blue House, Seoul, Korea

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Discussion with President Park

PARTICIPANTS:
President Park Chung Hee
Presidential Secretary General Kim Chong Yom
Acting Foreign Minister Yun Suk Heun
Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu Hah
Interpreter Cho Sang Ho
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Philip Habib
Acting Assistant Secretary Hummel
The following Korean officials joined the discussions during the lunch:
Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil
National Assembly Speaker Chung Il Kwon
President Park: You must be very tired from your journey.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I am not tired yet but it will probably catch up with me later.

Park: I want to offer to you our wholehearted welcome. I know you have had a very busy schedule and we very much appreciate your taking the time to visit Korea.

Secretary: I have always had a very warm feeling for Korea. I visited Korea during the war and I have acquired the highest admiration for the Korean people. It is amazing and admirable what has been accomplished here.

Park: It is 22 years since your last visit?

Secretary: Yes, it has been too long.

Park: I would like to congratulate you on your glorious and successful efforts in bringing peace in the Middle East.

Secretary: The Middle East is still a long way from peace but we have been successful in relieving the immediate tension.

Park: Concerning your recent visit to Peking, I would appreciate your giving me your impressions.

Secretary: First in general—whenever I go to Peking and then visit other countries I find that they expect that I will have solved all their problems. I have not talked to you before so I don't know if you have this expectation.

I will make some general comments first and then to the Peking visit. You can count on the fact that we will not make any prior decisions without consulting you. Therefore whenever I go to Peking—and I expect such trips to be frequent—if we have not told you in advance you can count on the fact that Korea will not be an item on the agenda. That was the case this time. On each of my visits the Chinese make their standard speech on Korea but we do not pursue the subject. You know the sort of speech they made yesterday in the UN. On this occasion on my visit to Peking they didn't even make their standard speech. The only context in which Korea came up was in connection with the compromise we are trying to develop in the UN, and it came up because I have the impression that the Chinese are having difficulty in arranging with their co-sponsors the achievement of a compromise. The Soviets may very well be playing a role in these difficulties. So we had to spend time just discussing the technical situation in New York and how to give them more time to consult their co-sponsors. Except for that the issue of Korea never came up.

I have seen press stories that the withdrawal of US troops from Korea was discussed in Peking, but the fact is that the presence of US troops was not discussed in any form.

Park: On your visit to Peking, I would appreciate your own assessment of Peking's position toward a settlement in Korea. Of course they must give support to North Korea and on the basis of your previous visits and your knowledge of their previous position what assessment can you make of the Chinese attitude toward the Korean question?

Secretary: You know I talked to Chiao Kuan-hua in New York about the fact that we are willing to talk to the North Koreans if the Chinese are prepared to talk to you. They said they could not talk to you in New York because the North Koreans would find out and they also said they could not talk in Washington for other reasons that are not clear to me, but they never absolutely said that the principle was unacceptable. The Chinese position has many elements. On the one hand they must be sure that Pyongyang does not come under the influence of Moscow. On this trip Chou En-lai made a special point of this. Peking has the dominant influence in Pyongyang.

Before going further, I assume that this conversation is on a very confidential basis and it will not be spread to other parts of your government. The Chinese are very sensitive. In fact, I am very sensitive.

On the other hand quite candidly—although I can't prove this—the Chinese are not eager to have any powerful unified countries on their borders. So I do not believe that the unification of Korea has the same priority for the Chinese that it has for Pyongyang or for you. I think the Chinese, strangely, do not mind the US presence in Korea, particularly if they think that Japanese influence would rise if ours declined. I think the Chinese would be violently opposed to any military aggression by North Korea at this point, because they would be afraid if we become involved with North Korea it would isolate them from Pyongyang because the Soviet Union would support North Korea. Also if China supported North Korea in a military confrontation, that would drive Japan away from China. If the North Koreans attack and the Japanese supported the South Koreans then the Chinese would become more and more isolated. I personally think that the greater likelihood—in terms of outside support—for an attack by North Korea would come from the Soviets rather than from the Chinese, but this could change in five years or so.

Park: That is the prevailing opinion on Korean affairs and on the international and internal situation on the Korean Peninsula. We share the same view, that the overall Korean situation is related to Moscow and Peking. However more recently it seems possible that North Korea may try the same tactics as in the Middle East, influenced by the notion that it can do the same thing on the Korean Peninsula. If they find the opportune moment they may take military action and then they could claim that unification is an established fact. The big powers would come in to stop the fighting, but the North Koreans would be in a better negotiating position because of their territorial gains. What is your opinion?

Secretary: Although I have been given the Nobel Prize for peace, I assure you our policy is not characterized by an excess of sentimentality. I want to characterize the situation in the Middle East. Mr. President, you should watch our actions and not our statements. What do we expect to happen? After Egypt and Syria made their attacks our strategy has been to demonstrate that the side that is supported with Soviet arms could not win. And since it is impossible for Israel with a population of only 3 million to destroy the Arabs who have populations totaling 100 million, it was always necessary for the war to end in a negotiation. So what we wanted was a defeat for the Arabs so severe that they would turn to us, but not so severe as to drive them to the Soviets. And this is exactly what we brought about. In terms of the positions on the map rather than in rhetoric, Syria has been badly hurt and Egypt has had one army trapped and has suffered total defeat. Perfectly frankly—and we need to keep this very secret—it was on a Friday when I went to Moscow. If a ceasefire resolution had been offered at that time in the Security Council we would have had to accept. There would have been no way of avoiding a ceasefire. My going to Moscow permitted military operations to continue for 48 more hours. By that point both Syria and Egypt had been defeated. We didn't want the war to continue beyond that because the dangers would have been too great. For one thing the more moderate Arab leaders would have been thrown out by extremists. So the lesson of the Middle East is not that one can gain territory and get the UN to approve it. The best you can say is that the UN prevented a complete catastrophe. So the lesson of counter attack in such a war is that the international environment might permit you to take Wonsan but not to take Pyongyang. And a second lesson is that if the action goes as it did in Bangladesh the whole matter is finished. The temporary defeat can be handled, but a basic and near-total defeat could be used by North Korea to solidify its gains. Another thing to remember is that we got 22,000 tons of supplies into Israel by air in 48 hours. Here in Korea such supplies would be easier because in Israel we had only one intermediate base we could use, in the Azores.

Park: I consider your remarks are common sense among peace-loving people, but the leaders in Pyongyang are not common-sense people or peace-loving either.

Secretary: I agree you should guard yourself and keep your position strong for a quick counter-attack, and don't panic. As long as this Administration is in office we would give you strong support so as to return to the status quo ante.

Park: You must have received a report on the North Korean's one and a half hour speech in New York, claiming that the Korean War was instigated by South Korea with U.S. inspiration. Before over 100 members of the UN they made this brazen claim without any sense of guilt. What they are trying to do is re-write history that is known to everybody in the world. They think they can do anything and get away with it. Kim Il Sung is still pretending.

Secretary: I did not say you should not keep yourself alert and cautious. My assessment is that the Chinese will try to prevent a North Korean attack but if it happens anyway Kim Il Song would run a very major risk. We strongly believe that in a few years you will be able to defend yourself. The Korean soldiers I have seen so far look very good to me.

Park: During your Peking visit the North Koreans intensified their propaganda offense against the ROK.

Secretary: Possibly they don't need much encouragement, and probably the Chinese cannot restrain them, at least as far as propaganda is concerned. Also it is possible that the North Koreans are as suspicious of the Chinese as some of our friends are of Washington and therefore they make a big noise so as not to be overlooked.

Park: In reviewing past Korean history the 1950 attack occurred with the support of the Soviets. We believe that Soviet support of the invasion was based on an assessment that the U.S. would not enter in and support us. That was a miscalculation. In fact we must be very cautious and prudent. I am very pleased and am made more confident by hearing your remarks and by your keen interest and detailed knowledge. However we are very close to the problem and we know the history. We are trying to be alert to cope with any changing situation. As I understand your statements, it is that we should take measures to cope with a reckless attack and should stay alert so as to demonstrate strength so that the North Koreans convince themselves that aggression would not be prudent.

Secretary: I agree.

Park: Mr. Secretary, in meeting with Chou En-lai and talking about our proposal for the admission of two Koreas—we know that they are ostensibly against this but what is their true attitude? Is it possible that under certain conditions the Chinese would not oppose the proposal? I would appreciate your assessment.

Secretary: My strong impression is that their attitude on dual admission is significantly affected because of Taiwan. They are genuinely not in favor. You will see in the Peking Communiqué an interesting evolution in their position on normalization. In the past the Chinese demanded that we break with Taiwan. However the Communiqué says only that we must recognize the principle of one China. This might open the possibility of normalization without our breaking with Taiwan. If something is accomplished along these lines, the Chinese could begin to think of a similar thing in the Korean case but I don't think they can consider that now.

Park: However we understand that in the case of dual admission of East and West Germany the Chinese were in favor. Is that true?

Secretary: Yes, but in that case both Germanys were in agreement. In this case both Koreas do not agree. My experience with the Chinese is that they move very slow and supplely. My impression is they have a mortal fear of making a proposal and being rejected. First they make a general statement and the maybe repeat it if I have not understood them the first time. Then when I do understand, and if I indicate approval, they actually make the proposal. You know the Chinese think they are cleverer than anyone else in the world, and that maybe true. I was once asked by Chou if Americans consider me to be clever. I said I hoped that the Chinese would consider me to be only average clever, for a Chinese, which would be the highest compliment anyone could pay. (laughter)

Park: It has been our constant position that in the present atmosphere unification of Korea is difficult or impossible. So at the present stage there can be no early unification. So our belief is we should put our efforts on a durable peace. First we should bring peace, then unification. Therefore for some time we do not foresee the possibility of reunification. This summer I made a statement on unification. Presently the North Koreans advocate a peace treaty but they propose that US forces should get out and that we should reduce our military strength to 100,000. In reality they are trying to achieve a goal of weakening our defense capability and neutralizing the US Defense Pact. The North continues to try to make propaganda capital by pushing a peace treaty, and some countries feel that the North is proposing peace and the South is not willing to respond. We have been thinking of this and we have a certain proposal to try to deal with it. Our proposal would first be a matter of careful consultation with the US, but I will now give you the rough idea of it to get your reaction. The essence of our proposition would be to offer a nonaggression pact between North and South to try to make sure there is no aggressive action by either party. We would also jointly assert the validity of the armistice agreement. The other side might demand that the UNC be abolished and we would then reply that the UNC authorizes should be handed over to the South Korean Armed Forces. What do you think?

Secretary: First in terms of overall strategy, I was very impressed with your June proposal. I did not believe it had the slightest chance of being effective but it put the other side on the defensive. I think, and this is the strategy we used in our Viet-Nam negotiations, we made many proposals some knowing they had no chance of acceptance. We made them so that there was always a US proposal on the table that the North Vietnamese would have to reject, so that the North Vietnamese could not fully develop a propaganda line since we would constantly make proposals that forced them to redevelop their lines. Occasionally we would make proposals in secret and then they could not be sure whether we would make them public. This was a difficult problem for them. I know those negotiations are not exactly parallel to your situation but there are some similarities.

The strategy you proposed is to make a proposal that keeps the initiative in your hands or at a minimum keeps the other side off balance. Such initiatives should always be proposals that you could live with. They should be serious, and not just maneuvers, and that of course was the case in your June proposal. My first impression is favorable, in that you could afford to have it accepted.

We must study together how to dissolve the UNC. This is certainly the initiative they will take next year and we should pre-empt the subject. It would be good if you took the initiative whether your proposal is best, or some other might be better, with your permission I want to think this over for a couple of weeks and then reply. I have no better idea now, I just want to think it over. We should think about what counter-proposal they could make, so that we have thought the results through. But your basic approach I like very much.

Park: This is just a thought, and not fully formed, and requires serious study. We know the North would not accept it. As to whom and when it would be presented needs more careful study between us. It would be possible to announce as a South Korean initiative. Another way would be to consult the Soviets, the Chinese and Japanese to see if we could jointly come up with a formula that the North Koreans could be asked to accept, and then our other friends could consider. The way of doing this needs further consideration.

Secretary: My instinct is whatever proposal is agreed, it would be better to come from your government. If we discuss it, with the Chinese and the Soviets the Soviets have a vested interest in embarrassing the Chinese and they might not agree to it. What might work is that after we have worked out a proposal you let me announce it to the Chinese about two weeks in advance as a message from you and ask their help with the North Koreans. This would be a contact from you to the Chinese. The risk would be slight because they are too afraid of breaking a confidence from me to leak it out.

Park: I certainly appreciate your valuable advice on such proposals and there will be thorough discussions between our Foreign Ministry and Ambassador Habib.

Secretary: I will personally pay close attention to this matter.

(The meeting then broke up and was resumed again at the lunch table, where the Prime Minister and the Speaker joined the group.)

(There was some discussion of the flight route of the Secretary's aircraft from Peking to Tokyo, in which the PRC insisted that the flight had to go over Shanghai rather than on the direct route over Korea. The Secretary discussed the fact that his former colleagues at Harvard disagree strongly with his policies. President Park mentioned that he had been in China for about five years during the Pacific War.)

Secretary: I think the Chinese do not have a completely closed mind to relations with South Korea. Also I think they are so afraid of the Soviets that they will not challenge the United States during the next few years.

Park: What about the realities of the Sino-Soviet confrontation?

Secretary: There is very real hostility. In the first place the Chinese do not like the Soviets as people—but of course the Chinese don't really like anyone. In the second place the Chinese are very worried that the Soviets might attack them. Thirdly, the Soviets are concerned that if the Chinese are this aggressive while still weak, how will they behave when they have a secure nuclear capability?

Park: It seems to me that it would suit the Soviet style to strike when the opponent is weak.

Secretary: I think there is a 50-50 chance that the Soviets may seriously consider an attack before the Chinese are fully nuclear capable.

Park: When I saw President Nixon in 1969 in San Francisco I asked him the same question and got the same 50-50 answer. May I ask whether your estimate is a guess or whether there is evidence.

Secretary: It is now based on some evidence. In 1969 we knew nothing at all about the Chinese.

(There was some banter about rumors there are many Kissingers flying to many different capitals simultaneously. The Secretary then told the story of the time when Ambassador Habib kicked him out of his office in Saigon when the Secretary, at that time not in government, was visiting Viet-Nam for the first time. There were also ironic complaints by the Secretary that State Department officers refuse to show him interesting telegrams, and have a secret desire to handle everything in the regional bureaus.)

Park: Do you think there will be a North Viet-Nam offensive this dry season?

Secretary: I have the greatest respect for President Thieu. He has done a remarkable job. A North Viet-Nam offensive depends upon being sure of getting the same flow of equipment from the USSR and China. We have the impression it is unlikely the Chinese are maintaining the same flow. There will be attacks in the dry season but the chance is about 55-45 against an all out offensive. We have recently sent a message to the North Vietnamese—this has not been made pubic—that an offensive would have very serious consequences, and we pointed out they have miscalculated us on other occasions. We have recently sent reconnaissance aircraft over North Viet-Nam and recently a carrier has moved into the Tonkin Gulf—this is only for your private information. We take the position that the recent war powers legislation by the U.S. Congress lifts the restrictions on our acts in Indochina so we would have 60 days in which to conduct military operations including mining their harbors again.

Park: How is Mao's health?

Secretary: Of course he is very old, I believe he is 79, and he could die anytime regardless of health factors. When I first saw him two years ago I thought he couldn't last very long. In February 1972 it was hard for him to walk without people holding him. Then in February 1973 he was much better and could walk without help. On this visit he was even better than February 1973, conducting a conversation for nearly three hours, covering every topic in US-China relations and many other subjects, without referring to any notes. In the past this is the sort of conversation that Chou En-lai has undertaken. This time he put on a very impressive performance intellectually. Still, he is an old man. Chou En-lai himself is very active at the age of 74.

Park: I saw a picture of your discussions with Chou and it seemed that Chou was taking a very vigorous attitude.

Secretary: Yes, he has made it a point to identify himself with China's policy toward the United States. Of course Mao has also identified himself with it.

Park: Will you go to Norway to receive the Nobel Prize?

Secretary: No I do not plan to go but I will have the American Ambassador there accept it for me. Le Duc Tho refused the prize, possibly because he wants to maintain the freedom to attack South Viet-Nam and also probably because he does not want to associate with me. He did send me a nice letter in connection with the Nobel Prize. You might be interested that once during our negotiations he looked me squarely in the eye and he said, "Let me say frankly, open-heartedly, sincerely and with the best intentions, you are a liar." (laughter)

Park: We have some appreciation of the difficulties of negotiations with Communists.

Secretary: I may say that the Israelis are about as tough as the Communists. The Arabs are relatively UN- disciplined. A problem with the Arabs is that they will proceed from one unjustified assumption to another. They will begin by hoping you have accepted something, and then pretend you have accepted, and then assume that there has been a firm agreement, and will later on claim that you have gone back on some understanding. However, up to now the Arabs have not been as nasty in negotiations as has been my experience with the Communists. For four years I negotiated with Le Duc Tho, without achieving any progress whatsoever.

Ambassador Habib: In your North/South talks you should keep in mind our experience in the Viet-Nam negotiations. The other side will continue over a long period to say "absolutely no." Then suddenly they may change their minds. I advise you to keep on with the discussions, not be discouraged, and wait for a shift in their position.

Secretary: Every time you make a proposal it will take a few months for them to analyze it.

Park: Despite the fact that we have a common Korean language to use in our negotiations there are very significant differences of meaning that they attach to Korean words. For instance, they insist that the word "freedom" must include their freedom to conduct espionage and subversion in South Korea.

Secretary: We had similar problems of terminology when U.S. Congressmen visited Hanoi. Time after time North Vietnamese officials would use language in talking to the Congressmen that would give them the impression that there had been a major change in Hanoi's positions. Then the Congressmen would talk to our newspapers and the Administration would be accused of failing to respond to the shift. In 1971 the North Vietnamese made public seven points but proposed nine points to us secretly for negotiation. Every week they publicly demanded an answer to their seven points that they had said privately to us they did not wish to discuss. After two months of this we gave them some secret counter proposals to their secret nine points. Then we published the whole thing and demanded a reply. We never heard from them for seven months after that.

Park: Last year we agreed with the North to stop all slander and abuse between us. The North at first honored this, then they started some slander over their central broadcasting. We taxed them with this and at first they said it was only a certain political party making the broadcast. But later they tried to claim that the broadcast came from a clandestine radio in South Korea. Of course we used direction finding and found out they were lying.

Ambassador Habib: What is the status of your proposal to the North?

Park: There was a Secretaries meeting at 10:00 a.m. today at Panmunjom. We propose that the next Red Cross meeting should be in Seoul. As for the coordinating committee, the other side has called it off, refusing to deal with certain members of our side. We are contacting them to find out if those talks could be restarted if there are changes of personnel on both sides.

Ambassador Habib: I have not been impressed up to now with North Korean diplomacy. The North Vietnamese are much more skillful.

Park: The North Vietnamese perhaps have adopted some elements of their style from the French. On the other hand the North Koreans are unique, and one could call it a Kim Il Sung style.

Secretary: I want you to know we will be making it increasingly costly for the third world to be freely in opposition to us. In the case of Yugoslavia we have cancelled their Foreign Minister's visit and we have cancelled other visits by Americans to them. We will make sure it is no longer free and easy to oppose the United States. I suppose that the North Koreans are probably the most difficult country in the world now. I expected that there might be a North Korean approach to us in New York but there has not been one. Of course if there is one we will tell you about it before we do anything.

Park: Mr. Secretary, you should meet with them to get your own assessment.

Secretary: I meet with them myself?

Park: Well perhaps not necessarily.

Secretary: We will not take the initiative. If they suggest it, we will get your advice. If we were to initiate contact they would think they could deal with us, excluding you. I can assure you there will be no meetings with North Koreans that are kept secret from you.

Park: Newspapers have reported that if the Chinese make contacts with us, the United States similarly will contact North Korea.

Secretary: We thought this was your position. We have no overwhelming desire to contact the North Koreans. For instance, we are in contact with the Soviets and the Chinese for entirely cold-blooded reasons. Thus any contacts we have with the North Koreans that we jointly agree upon would be for equally cold-blooded purposes.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970? (TS Files), Box 24, Misc Refiles [No Folder Title], POL 7 US/Kissinger. Top Secret Nodis. Drafted by Hummel. The meeting was held in the Blue House.


272. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, August 27, 1975.11. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. The meeting time is unrecorded. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Park Chung Hee
Senior Protocol Secretary, Choi Kwan-soo
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Ambassador Richard L. Sneider
NUCLEAR MATTERS

Noting that he had discussed the problem with President Ford, Secretary Schlesinger said that the U.S. attached extreme importance to the NPT. This entirely underscored the wisdom of the ROK adherence to the treaty which we warmly welcomed. The ROK action avoided a very serious political problem in the U.S. where major elements attached particular importance to NPT. The Secretary stressed that the only thing that could undermine the political relationship between the U.S. and the ROK would be the Korean effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

The Secretary added that substantively the ROK adherence to the NPT is a sound policy. The problem is not only in the U.S., but elsewhere. We wish to preclude [text not declassified] ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. [text not declassified] Furthermore, in the complementarity between the U.S. and ROK forces, the U.S. is best suited to provide nuclear deterrence on behalf of its allies. We can deal with nuclear threats against a central power in a way that smaller nuclear powers cannot. We can deter Soviet nuclear threats while the ROK could not and a ROK effort to develop its own nuclear weapons would end up providing the Soviets with justification for threatening the ROK with nuclear weapons. In conclusion, the Secretary offered to explain the logic to nuclear deterrence policy in the next SCM.

President Park assured the Secretary that ROK had every intention of living up to the NPT. He explained the comments reported by Bob Novak. Novak had questioned him on what the ROK would do in case the U.S. nuclear protection was removed. Park had replied that he did not think the U.S. would remove its nuclear umbrella. But Novak persisted and asked whether in such a case the ROK would give consideration to developing nuclear weapons. Park had responded that the ROK did have the capabilities to start research but had no intention to do so under the present circumstances. Park said that his comments to Novak had been misinterpreted, and there had been misunderstanding on the part of the Canadian Government during negotiations for a nuclear reactor. On the other hand if he said nothing, it would be a blow to the morale of the Korean people. He again assured the Secretary that the ROK would live up to its Treaty obligations.

Secretary Schlesinger commented that it would be best if nuclear weapons were not involved in Korea. If a weapon were used against Pyongyang perhaps 20-30,000 people would be killed. On the other hand, if the Soviets launched a nuclear attack on Seoul 3 million people would be killed since Seoul's vulnerability is far greater than Pyongyang. While the U.S. is prepared to view the Soviet nuclear threat, we would plan to be exceedingly cautious on employment of nuclear weapons due to the vulnerability of South Korea.

President Park expressed agreement with the Secretary's views. The Secretary's statements on tactical nuclear weapons had boosted Korean morale, but we should cope with a North Korean attack without the use of nuclear weapons.

[text not declassified]

U.S. COMMITMENT

Secretary Schlesinger said that President Ford is unequivocal in his support of Korea. This view goes back to 1950 when President Ford was angered by the previous withdrawal of U.S. forces. In fact, pressures to reduce the U.S. overseas deployment in Congress have weakened. There was no effort during the 1975 Congress nor is one expected in 1976. The next effort to legislate reduction of overseas deployment, he expects, would be in 1977. The secretary said he is not concerned either about such efforts. He expects President Ford to be re-elected, but if not the Democrats are not likely to eliminate U.S. support for South Korea. As an example of the change of opinion in the left of the U.S., he cited Senator Eagleton's recent statement.

One of the lessons of Vietnam is that the left now understands the illusion of U.S. withdrawal and that the Paris Peace Accords would bring peace. They now understand that if the balance of power shifts the Communists will act aggressively. This lesson is specifically relevant to Korea.

U.S. COMMANDERS

President Park asked as a special personal favor from President Ford that General Stilwell and General Hollingsworth be retained for another year in Korea. He praised their contribution to Korea's defense and urged that they not be shifted during the next year which could be critical. Secretary Schlesinger said we have no intention of moving General Stilwell until his age of retirement at sixty and took note of the President's request with respect to General Hollingsworth.

NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

The Secretary, referring to the Ambassador's approaches on this question, said acquisition of a nuclear reprocessing plant also affects the efficiency of the broader nuclear issue he had discussed previously. As a former Chairman of the AEC, he could tell President Park that the economics of Plutonium reprocessing are difficult and involve high risk. General Electric has abandoned its plant and the cost of the Barnwell Plant have gone out of sight.

In his closing remarks, Secretary Schlesinger praised the political will he had found in Korea for defense of its country. This will was needed in Vietnam and Europe, but there is no need to instill it in Koreans. It is the ultimate source of strength for the Republic of Korea.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. The meeting time is unrecorded. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.



85. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential Limdis.
Seoul, January 27, 1971, 0927Z.

505. Subj: ROKG Concern about Opposition Nominee’s Trip to U.S.

1. Luncheon with Prime Minister today was almost entirely taken up by his recital of ROKG fears that Kim Tae Chung will see important people in United States. He said that there are many rumors in Seoul that Americans were paying for Kim Tae Chung’s trip and were pledging to support him. He reached peak of this remarkable statement by urging me to issue public statement to effect that U.S. is absolutely neutral in matter of ROK elections “despite rumors that we are supporting opposition.” I tried to deal lightly with his fears but he would not change subject. I urged him to get a briefing on my statement to President Park last November22. See Document 75. and our comments to Lee Hu-rak to effect that if they had facts to discuss, we would be willing to hear them. As to his request for “statement of neutrality” in response to rumors, I commented that would not be practical measure, because anyone could start new rumors that presumably would require another statement, etc.

2. We would make appropriate appointments for Mr. Kim as we do for other ROK Assemblymen who visit U.S. He said we should guarantee that Kim did not see “important people,” that Kim is only ordinary Assemblyman.33. As reported in a memorandum of conversation, December 28, 1970, Korean Ambassador Kim Dong Jo pursued the same subject with Under Secretary Johnson. Ambassador Kim stated that if Kim Dae Jung was to call on the President, Vice President, or the Secretary of State, “it would be very embarrassing for the Korean Government. Other legislators in Korea have not been granted audiences at such official levels in the U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S) I inquired why ROKG feels so intensely worried about Kim’s trip. Was it because govt feared that Kim would receive great publicity here? Only time Paek Tu Chin laughed during interview was at that point. He said “That will never happen.”

3. Contacts between American and ROK officials here, in which latter have raised their worries about American support for Kim Tae Chung, indicate that concerted effort is under way to put us in defensive frame of mind.

Porter

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential Limdis.

2 See Document 75.

3 As reported in a memorandum of conversation, December 28, 1970, Korean Ambassador Kim Dong Jo pursued the same subject with Under Secretary Johnson. Ambassador Kim stated that if Kim Dae Jung was to call on the President, Vice President, or the Secretary of State, “it would be very embarrassing for the Korean Government. Other legislators in Korea have not been granted audiences at such official levels in the U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S)
View Image
Page 223
Persons
Johnson, U. AlexisUnder Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 7, 1969
Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung)Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung), Korean opposition leader and New Democratic Party presidential candidate
Kim Dong Jo (Kim Dong-jo)Kim Dong Jo (Kim Dong-jo),ROK Ambassador to the United States
Lee Hu Rak (Yi Hu-rak)Lee Hu Rak (Yi Hu-rak), Secretary-General to the President of Korea Director Korean Central Intelligence Agency
Paik Too Jin (Paek Tu-jin)Paik Too Jin (Paek Tu-jin), Prime Minster of the ROK from December 19, 1970, until June 3, 1971
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Porter, William J.Ambassador to the ROK until August 18, 1971
Abbreviations & Terms
Limdislimited distribution
RGrecord group
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKGRepublic of Korea Government
SOffice of the Secretary of State
govtgovernment

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Drafted by Ranard, cleared in S/S–O, and approved by Green.
Washington, February 3, 1971, 0125Z.

18192. Subject: Kim Tae-chung in Washington. Ref: State 17347.22. Dated February 1, it reported on a meeting between Rogers and Kim Dae Jung. According to the telegram, Kim presented a summary of his domestic and foreign platform proposals. Rogers assured him that the United States “favors free, fair and impartial elections and intends to follow a policy of non-intervention.” Kim asked what the U.S. role would be if he were elected and there was a coup. Rogers replied that it would be inappropriate for him to comment on the question “inasmuch as it highly speculative.” (Ibid.)

1. Kim Tae-chung and party met with Green for second discussion following courtesy call on Secretary (reftel). Meeting came at request of Kim for follow-on discussion to earlier one with Green on January 30,33. Telegram 16424 to Seoul, January 29, reported Kim Dae Jung’s first meeting with Green and Brown. Kim stated that based on Park’s broken pledge of not running for a third term and his recent appointment to government positions of Lee Hu Rak and Paik Tu Chin, who were known as rough political in-fighters, “the signs are clear government is gearing up for a rigged election.” (Ibid.) and lasted about hour and quarter.

2. Kim opened discussion on foreign affairs with brief comment regarding his plan for a four-power security pact, which he reported he had discussed with Reischauer last weekend. He reported Reischauer skeptical regarding willingness of China to become involved, but Kim commented that notwithstanding he believed pact a reasonable “political goal”. Green responded that China’s course of action would probably depend at least in part on North Korean reactions. Kim took no initiative to expand topic further.

3. Turning to question of China’s entrance to UN, Kim raised variety of questions regarding U.S. position, probability of entrance, likely conduct in UN, impact on Taiwan, etc. Green made clear we support GRC and will oppose any move to unseat her from UN but that at same time we are seeking better relationship with Peking. We have not yet established position as to ChiRep tactics this year and are re-examining question and will be consulting with friends. During discussion this topic Kim raised question of universality. He said that NDP would find unversality impossible to accept “because it would perpetuate the division of Korea.” Kim implied, however, he has not reached final judgment but is rather “polishing up his thought”. Prospect of universality, he said, is a painful problem and experience for ROK.

4. On two separate occasions Kim veered away from foreign affairs focus to refer to DRP-inspired rumors of military opposition to his candidacy and possibility of military coup. As in meeting with Secretary, Kim’s question was pointed: “What would U.S. do?” Green declined direct response, indicating, however, that USG deeply interested in government that represents the will of the people.

5. Comment: Prior to initial meeting with Green, Kim requested opportunity to have few minutes alone with Green and Brown with no Koreans except interpreter present. While private meeting did not transpire, it would appear that what Kim had in mind was question of U.S. role in event of coup.

Rogers

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Drafted by Ranard, cleared in S/S–O, and approved by Green.

2 Dated February 1, it reported on a meeting between Rogers and Kim Dae Jung. According to the telegram, Kim presented a summary of his domestic and foreign platform proposals. Rogers assured him that the United States “favors free, fair and impartial elections and intends to follow a policy of non-intervention.” Kim asked what the U.S. role would be if he were elected and there was a coup. Rogers replied that it would be inappropriate for him to comment on the question “inasmuch as it highly speculative.” (Ibid.)

3 Telegram 16424 to Seoul, January 29, reported Kim Dae Jung’s first meeting with Green and Brown. Kim stated that based on Park’s broken pledge of not running for a third term and his recent appointment to government positions of Lee Hu Rak and Paik Tu Chin, who were known as rough political in-fighters, “the signs are clear government is gearing up for a rigged election.” (Ibid.)




169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Drafted by Kriebel and approved by Green and in S/S. Repeated to Tokyo.
Washington, November 25, 1972, 0120Z.

214182. Ref: State 211818.22. In telegram 211818 to Seoul, November 21, the Department reported that Kim had previously met with Ranard on November 20. In this meeting, Ranard observed that “ROK Embassy here has shown great interest in Kim’s movement and appointments, and apparently is moving to block appointments Kim hopes to be able to make.” Nevertheless, Ranard set up Kim’s appointment with Green for November 21. (Ibid.) Subj: Assistant Secretary Green Conversation with ROK Opposition Leader Kim Tae Chung.

1. Summary. Kim said even though he saw little hope of peaceful transfer of power in Korea, he intended to return there and do what he could to further the cause of democracy regardless of personal consequences. Speaking with restraint, Kim said that Park had capitalized on a US tendency to accept accomplished facts and that, despite its unhappiness with events in Korea, USG did not seem to want to complicate situation for ROK in its dealings with the North. Kim thought the Nixon Doctrine implied less US forces and influence in Asia, implying that there was therefore all the less hope for freedom in that part of the world. Green responded that Kim had many in this country and abroad who sympathized with his cause and believed he had a responsible role to play in Korean affairs, though cautioning that violence was not to anyone’s advantage. Green expressed personal view that the trend of history was on the side of forces which recognized the free spirit of man and he was hopeful that there would be a return to normal political activity in the ROK. He emphasized USG desire to maintain good relations with ROKG and that we would not intervene in Korea’s internal affairs. He added that the Nixon Doctrine in no way implied US withdrawal from the Western Pacific. US is a Pacific power with deep interests in Asia and in the Asian people. End summary.

2. Kim Tae Chung met with Assistant Secretary Green November 21. EA/K Director Ranard present. Accompanying Kim were Lee Sang-ho (Kim’s brother-in-law) and Yu Ki-young.

3. Conversation was lengthy and cordial. Kim began by apologizing that as an opposition leader he had been unable to prevent the arbitrary changes in the Korean Government. In response to questions, he said he would probably go to Japan in early December and return to Korea at the end of December or early January according to the situation. He thought there would be some personal danger and, in response to Green’s concern for his safety, Kim said he hoped there was nothing to fear but the situation under Park could not be predicted.

4. Kim said the great defect of Korean democracy was that it had not been deeply rooted through the efforts of the Korean people. He returned several times to the theme that Koreans must fight for democracy themselves and that he wanted to be in Korea during this politically difficult period. He had concluded that it was now almost impossible to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power in Korea and that the choice was between unconditional acceptance of the government or its violent overthrow. Several times he asked in rhetorical fashion if there were any other way. Kim said that whatever style Park affected and whatever terminology he used, there was no democracy if there was no freedom of expression or criticism.

5. Kim said he understood the limitations on the US and Japanese Governments in influencing Park but that unfortunately democratic forces in Korea were oppressed by arms and money supplied by these two governments, both of which were the friends of the Korean people. Kim said US and Japanese journalists had told him that while the US was not happy with events in Korea, it would generally be willing to accept what was an accomplished fact primarily because it did not want to weaken the ROK in its confrontation with the North. He thought Park had deliberately capitalized on this tendency. Kim concluded that there was a tendency toward dictatorship in Asia. He said his understanding of the Nixon Doctrine was that it implied less US forces and influence in Asia and he wondered what the future of US policy in Asia was to be.

6. Throughout conversation Kim responded warmly and with appreciation to Green’s remarks of personal esteem and sympathy.

7. On this last point Green responded that the Nixon Doctrine does not mean the withdrawal of the US from the Western Pacific but takes the position that other countries should be more responsible for their own affairs. The Nixon Doctrine did not imply US withdrawal, retreat or isolation. On the question of dictatorship, Green thought authoritarian trends in Asia were not permanent and that people like Kim were on the side of history.

8. Green said he was pleased to see Kim both because of his position as a distinguished leader of the opposition and because he considers him a friend.

9. Commenting on Kim’s remarks about the lack of democratic roots in Korea Green said he recognized the validity of these remarks. He added that the US was not interested in seeing American style democracy in Korea as is sometimes alleged but it does believe the essence of democracy relates to the fundamental nature of man: that he is a free spirit and wishes to participate in the formulation of his own destiny. He thought that countries seeking progress also sought stability and that most had no democratic tradition to guide them. Nonetheless, the trend was towards self-expression and authoritarianism could not last long where people could think for themselves. Those peoples who strive for institutions of this sort will find sympathy among the American people. In the case of Korea, the search for democratic institutions had been uneven but there was no doubt that it would be successful or that Mr. Kim would have a constructive role to play.

10. Green emphasized that the US wished to maintain close relations with the ROKG and to give the government our support. He noted particularly the past close relations between the US Congress and the ROK National Assembly and thought the Congress would follow events in Korea closely. He hoped martial law would soon give way to normalcy and that there would be a return to normal political activity. He emphasized that the US would not take actions which could harm the Korean people that as Kim knew we thought the extraordinary measures taken by Park were unnecessary but we did not intend to intervene in Korea’s affairs nor create difficulties for the ROKG. He did not think that violent reaction would be to anyone’s advantage and reiterated that in the long run governments must tolerate criticism and opposition. He thought the international community could play some role in encouraging this process in the ROK. For our part we would as appropriate counsel moderation on the part of the ROKG.

11. Ranard suggested Kim make his presence known to the American Embassy in Tokyo after his arrival and said the US Embassy in Seoul would be interested in maintaining contact with him to the extent Mr. Kim thought prudent in terms of his personal safety. Mr. Kim understood that his conversation with Assistant Secretary Green was privileged and that it was not to be discussed with the press.33. Printed from an unsigned copy.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Drafted by Kriebel and approved by Green and in S/S. Repeated to Tokyo.

2 In telegram 211818 to Seoul, November 21, the Department reported that Kim had previously met with Ranard on November 20. In this meeting, Ranard observed that “ROK Embassy here has shown great interest in Kim’s movement and appointments, and apparently is moving to block appointments Kim hopes to be able to make.” Nevertheless, Ranard set up Kim’s appointment with Green for November 21. (Ibid.)

3 Printed from an unsigned copy.
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Persons
Green, MarshallAssistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1, 1969
Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung)Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung), Korean opposition leader and New Democratic Party presidential candidate
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Ranard, Donald L.Country Officer for Korea, Department of State, from July 1970
Abbreviations & Terms
EA/KOfficer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Exdisexclusive distribution
RGrecord group
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKGRepublic of Korea Government
SOffice of the Secretary of State
S/SExecutive Secretariat, Department of State
USUnited States
USGUnited States Government



166. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 23𔃆 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo.
Seoul, November 18, 1972, 1052Z.

6685. Subj: Martial Law and Government Changes—Discussion With Chong Il Kwon. Summary: Over Lunch Nov. 18, Chong Il Kwon told me of the President’s decision that day that universities will reopen from Dec 1 to 20 then go into the usual winter recess until March. Armored vehicles and troops will be removed from the streets of Seoul late Nov 18, but martial law will not be lifted until after the presidential election. Chong disclosed a number of other major aspects of the changes to come. I used the occasion to emphasize to Chong in strong terms my concern over the government’s resort to brutality in a number of recent cases and the certainty that its continuation would alienate the U.S. He said it would stop. I advised Chong that a ROK mission to the U.S. to present the ROKG’s case for government changes could be counterproductive. End summary.

1. Former Prime Minister Chong Il Kwon had a number of interesting things to say when he came to lunch at my request on Nov 18. It is now clear that Chong is one of a five or six member inner council consulting regularly with the President on governmental changes. He said at the outset that he had a long drinking session with the President two nights ago and that the President is appreciative that the Embassy here and the USG in Washington have exercised restraint in public comments about martial law and the constitutional changes. Chong seemed to be saying at the same time that Park remains concerned about USG reactions to these changes. (We have heard the same thing from other sources.) Main points of interest in the conversation were:

A. The President and a small group of advisers made a decision on the morning of Nov 18 to reopen all universities Dec 1. University presidents will be informed immediately and public announcement is [garble]. The intention would be that students return mainly for final examinations. Universities would then close at the normal school year-end about Dec 20 and as usual remain in winter recess until March. Military units will be stationed near the universities, perhaps out of public view, but will not be placed on the campuses. Chong said this is extremely sensitive and asked us to hold it closely. Comment: This seems to represent a conclusion by President Park that student opposition to government changes, if any, can be handled, or that if there is to be a confrontation with the students he will have it and get it over now rather than later.

B. During the late night of Nov 18, armored vehicles and all troops will be withdrawn from public places in Seoul. Military units will, however, remain out of sight in an alert status at strategic points throughout the city. He said martial law would not be lifted before the presidential election.

C. The latest dates for next steps, which Chong said are firm, are Dec 15 for Unification Council elections, Dec 27 for inauguration. Two methods of electing the president are being considered. Under one scheme, a candidate would be nominated if proposed by 50 or more members of the Unification Council and the Council would choose in secret ballot from among candidates so nominated. Under the other scheme, no nominations would be made and instead each Council member would simply write the name of a person he would like to have as President on his ballot the person getting a majority vote would be elected.

D. It is almost certain that National Assembly elections will be held in February in order to complete government changes as rapidly as possible. It is now expected that the National Assembly will consist of about 210 members. Chong expects that 50 to 70 of these will be opposition representatives elected mainly from the cities. He candidly acknowledged that the one-third selected by the President would be entirely pro government people who could be counted upon to vote with the government.

E. Cabinet changes after the presidential election will not, in Chong’s view, be extensive and will not affect the Prime Minister. President Park is keeping his own counsel, but Chong thought changes would affect only the economic ministries and perhaps defense. He thought retired General Sun Son Chul a likely candidate for Defense Minister, but said there are also others. Ambassador to Tokyo Yi Ho, former Justice Minister, is a strong candidate to replace the present chief justice.

2. I used the occasion of this luncheon to let Chong know that I am aware of the disturbing number of cases in which the government has employed brutality against prominent persons who have opposed the government. Chong acknowledged that six former Assemblymen of the NDP have been beaten up, Kim Han Su having been treated worse than others. Kim Tae Chung’s secretary had also been badly mauled. In the process, Chong said the secretary had finally disclosed the secret sources of Kim Tae Chung’s funds. These were said by Chong to be Korean companies who were threatened by Kim Tae Chung with anti-company speeches on the National Assembly floor if they failed to pay. I reminded Chong that I had told the Prime Minister and him, among others, from the beginning that use of brutality is never justified. I urged him to make clear to the President that news of the government’s use of these methods is bound to get out and that, as the Greek experience had shown, nothing would be more likely to alienate the American people. Chong predictably said he agreed and that he personally had opposed this sort of thing. He said it would stop. I am reasonably sure he will carry my message to the President.

3. Chong said that the government is considering sending a team of former National Assemblymen to the U.S. “to explain” the steps that the ROK is taking, not in Washington but in outlying areas around the U.S. I replied that at this juncture Washington is more important than the outlying areas but that in both the ROK will find the government changes not well received. The mission therefore would not have good prospects for success. He nodded to indicate that this also was his view.

4. I asked Chong about reports the government was thinking of limiting the number of newspapers to four in Seoul and one in each province. He said there was no such plan.

Habib

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 23𔃆 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo.




84. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 15𔂿 KOR S. Secret No Foreign Dissem Controlled Dissem. Drafted by Joseph E. Lake (INR/REA) and approved by Evelyn S. Colbert (INR/REA).
Washington, December 28, 1970.

REAN󈞽

Republic of Korea: Park Girds for Election Battle

In preparation for what he must now expect to be a rough campaign prior to the presidential election in the spring of 1971, President Park has brought Yi Hu-rak back into his inner circle as head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and appears to be seeking to bring Kim Chong P’il back into active politics on his team. At the same time Park has attempted to improve his administration’s image through new Blue House appointments and by replacing Prime Minister Chong Il-Kwon, whose name was linked with a murder–sex scandal earlier this year.

Yi Hu-rak to CIA. Yi Hu-rak, the highly effective but scandal-ridden and unscrupulous former Blue House Secretary General, will return from an eleven-month sojourn as Ambassador to Japan to replace CIA Director Kim Kye-won, who is in Park’s bad graces. Park expects the CIA to play a key role in his election campaign this year and has been dissatisfied with Kim. The latter was not only unable to arrange the nomination of the opposition candidate Park wanted to run against, but even failed to predict the nominee correctly.

Yi is extremely competent and reputedly one of the few persons willing to confront the President with unpalatable truths. Although he was sent to Japan after extensive and well-documented corruption charges made his presence in the Blue House a political liability, Park appears to believe that the benefits of improved CIA operations and better advice during the elections are worth the political price he may have to pay.

Kim Chong-p’il to Party? It is rumored that Kim Chong-p’il was offered the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) vice presidency in order to bring him back to Park’s side for the rough election period ahead. Kim, however, may not accept the appointment since he is reputedly disappointed with the post he has been offered and the appointment given Yi Hu-rak, an old, bitter adversary.

A New Prime Minister. The one major shift in the cabinet was the appointment of Paek Tu-chin as Prime Minister replacing Chong Il-Kwon who reportedly plans to seek a National Assembly seat and has his eye on the speaker’s chair. Paek has been in and out of the government since 1945, serving under Syngman Rhee as Finance Minister and Prime Minister.

It is not clear why Park chose to replace Chong at this time. Chong’s alleged mistress was murdered earlier this year, and Park may have seen him as a liability however, Paek has been linked with various financial scandals over the years and seems to be little improvement. In any case as a northerner and proportional representation member of the National Assembly, Paek does not have as strong a political base as Chong and will probably be more dependent on Park than Chong.

Blue House Changes. In an effort to add a fresh quality to his administration, Park on December 9 appointed eight new special assistants, over half of whom are under 50 and have no previous governmental experience. The new men are to look at long-range policy interests. Although they will find it difficult to contend with Park’s proclivity to concentrate on programs rather than long-range policies, their impressive credentials and the new office will reflect favorably on Park between now and the 1971 elections.

Outlook a Dirty Campaign. Park obviously expects Yi Hu-rak and the CIA to play a major role in his campaign strategy however, his efforts to improve his image and strengthen his team are not wholly consistent. If forced to choose, Park would rather have tough infighters at his side than look clean and progressive to the voters. Judging from his appointments, Park expects a long and dirty campaign.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 15𔂿 KOR S. Secret No Foreign Dissem Controlled Dissem. Drafted by Joseph E. Lake (INR/REA) and approved by Evelyn S. Colbert (INR/REA).