李明博, 朴槿惠씨에 대한 지지도 조사표를 읽어보면 두 사람이 극단적으로 다른 지지층을 갖고 있음을 알 수 있다.

1. 8월2일자 중앙일보 여론조사에서는 이명박 지지 34.8%, 박근혜 지지 25.8%로 나타났다.
2. 고학력 李지지, 저학력 朴지지: 중졸 이하는 39%가 朴지지, 18.7%가 李지지. 大在 이상은 39.9%가 李지지, 19.6%가 朴지지.
3. 50代 이상은 朴지지 32.6%, 李지지 30.1%. 40대는 41.7%가 李지지, 27.2%가 朴지지.
4. 40代의 반란: 40대는 68.9%가 李와 朴 지지. 13.3%만이 汎여권후보 지지. 40代의 반은 386 세대임.

5. 저소득층은 朴지지, 高소득층은 李지지: 월 150만원 이하는 34.7%가 朴지지, 25.8%가 李지지. 월250만원 이상은 40 對 22로 李지지.
6. 불교는 朴, 기독교는 李: 불교도는 37.9%가 朴지지, 27.1%가 李지지. 新舊 기독교는 40 대 23으로 李지지.

7. 수도권은 압도적으로 李지지: 서울에서 李지지 43, 朴지지 16.9%.
8. 경북-대구 거주자가 비거주 경북-대구출신보다 朴지지 높아: 대구경북 출신자는 李지지 40%, 朴지지 33.6%, 거주자는 李지지 32.8%, 朴지지 42.9%.
9. 보수, 중도의 李지지가 상대적으로 높음: 보수층은 李지지 43%, 朴지지 31.7%, 중도층은 李지지 36.5%, 朴지지 24.1%, 진보층은 李지지 26.6%, 朴지지 18.7%였다.
10. 학생, 화이트 칼라는 압도적으로 李지지: 화이트칼라는 42.7-17.7%로, 학생층은 34.9-17.2%로 李를 더 지지.

*李明博씨는 新舊기독교, 40代 이하, 화이트칼라, 수도권, 고소득-고학력층에서 강하고 朴槿惠씨는 저소득-저학력층, 50대 이상, 대구 경북 거주자, 불교도에서 강하다. 서로 다른 지지층을 갖고 있으므로 결합되면 天下無敵이다.
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2000 No. 4
Table of Contents

POLITICS:
How the Bush Dynasty Almost Wasn’t


By Richard V. Allen

Early in the third evening of the 1980 Republican convention, George W. Bush’s father was scarcely on Ronald Reagan’s mind. By the end of the night, he was Reagan’s vice-presidential nominee. An account from the front lines of the Reagan revolution. By Hoover fellow Richard V. Allen.



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W

hat I remember most about entering Ronald Reagan’s suite early on the third evening of the 1980 Republican convention, the night of his nomination, was the silence. It’s not that there weren’t plenty of people around. William J. Casey, Reagan’s campaign manager; Richard Wirthlin, his pollster; and his advisers Peter Hannaford, Michael Deaver, and Edwin Meese were all there in the candidate’s elegantly appointed rooms on the sixty-ninth floor of the Detroit Plaza Hotel. So, too, was Reagan, dressed in a casual shirt and tan slacks. The entire group was seated on a large U-shaped couch, hushed, as if they were watching some spellbinding movie on TV.

The silence in the room was in marked contrast to the steadily rising noise at the Joe Louis Arena. There, word was spreading that Reagan was going to choose Gerald Ford, the former president and his bitter adversary in the 1976 primaries, to be his running mate.

As Reagan’s foreign policy adviser, I didn’t have much business getting involved in the selection of a vice president. But as someone who signed on with Reagan because I admired his principled criticism of the foreign policy of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, I couldn’t help venturing to the suite to see what was going on. And so, at 5:30 in the evening, before I was to head over to the convention, I walked up the single flight of stairs that separated Reagan’s floor from mine. It didn’t take long for my suspicions to be confirmed. As I stepped into the hallway, there, coming out of Reagan’s rooms and flanked by his Secret Service detail, was a tanned and fit Gerald Ford.

Once the former president and I had exchanged pleasantries, I made my way past security to Reagan’s suite. Alone among those gathered on the couch, the nominee looked up and greeted me. I asked if he needed anything before I left for the arena. “Oh, no,” he replied, “but thanks.”

As I turned to leave, he asked, “What do you think of the Ford deal?”

“What deal?” I responded, genuinely surprised that the two parties were already working out details. In addition to the vice-presidential slot, Reagan said, “Ford wants Kissinger as secretary of state and Greenspan at treasury.” My instant response was, “That is the craziest deal I have ever heard of.” And it was.

This election year, both major presidential candidates conducted highly structured searches for their running mates. Though it was only 20 years ago, the process in 1980 could not have been more different from the one today. It is hard to imagine an unexpected vice-presidential pick at the last minute, like John Kennedy’s selection of Lyndon Johnson in 1960, Richard Nixon’s choice of Spiro Agnew in 1968, or even George Bush Sr.’s elevation of Dan Quayle in 1988—all of which caught the candidates’ advisers by surprise.

As I turned to leave, Reagan asked, “What do you think of the Ford deal?” My instant response was, “That is the craziest deal I have ever heard of.”


But it was Ronald Reagan’s nomination of Governor Bush’s father that bears special telling. Reagan’s selection of Bush in Detroit represented a turnabout within six hours; it came only when the negotiations with Ford, having taken on a life of their own, appeared to have reached an impasse. Had the talks succeeded and had Ford been selected, the Reagan campaign, crippled by infighting, might well have lost to the Carter-Mondale ticket in the fall. Had Reagan and Ford managed to win the election, it’s very likely that their administration would have been hobbled by an unworkable power-sharing arrangement. It’s also possible that the Republicans might have a different candidate today.

There are many plausible versions of how and why Reagan chose George Bush as his running mate, but most are wide of the mark. One conventional view is that Reagan, about to be nominated, recognized that he 'needed a moderate' like Bush to balance the ticket; another version has it that Reagan, supposedly unschooled in foreign affairs, saw the wisdom of naming someone with extensive experience in the field to offset his own shortcomings. Yet another explanation holds that Reagan, a Californian, needed “geographic balance” and got that in Bush, with his Connecticut and Texas lineage.

These explanations are wrong. George Bush was picked at the very last moment and largely by a combination of chance and some behind-the-scenes maneuvering. Many Reagan advisers have claimed a deal was never close. The postconvention media commentary has largely reflected this view. In fact, Meese and Deaver have gone so far as to declare that Bush was their first choice all along. I take exception to their account. I saw a very different story unfold and saw it from a privileged vantage point. From the moment I walked into that suite until the moment Bush was finally selected, I was the only person to remain in Reagan’s presence throughout the adventure. With detailed notes to back up my memory, this is what I saw at the dawn of the Reagan revolution on that long night in Detroit.

George Bush was picked as Ronald Reagan’s running mate at the very last moment and largely by a combination of chance and some behind-the-scenes maneuvering.


Ronald Reagan’s search for a vice president started as soon as he clinched the nomination with a string of primary victories in the spring of 1980. Before long, a short list of prospective running mates had been put together, including Howard Baker, William Simon, Jack Kemp, Richard Lugar, Paul Laxalt, and George Bush.

None of these prospective running mates were actually “vetted” in the way the process works today. Reagan knew all these men in varying degrees, but as was his style, he expected his advisers to do what was necessary to prune the list. The job fell largely to Ed Meese, who knew Reagan’s mind better than anyone except Nancy Reagan.

It wasn’t until several weeks before the convention that Gerald Ford’s name entered into the mix. Although it has never been established how it happened, most attribute it to Bryce Harlow, a respected adviser to Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford. Harlow probably initiated the idea in a discussion with his friend William Casey, who then took it to Reagan and Meese.

As the convention approached, the Ford rumors became stronger. Although Reagan was running even with or behind President Carter in most polls, the idea struck several of us on the senior staff as a highly impractical, if not silly, idea. After all, Reagan and Ford had fought intensely for the nomination in 1976. In 1980, the GOP platform carried Reagan’s conservative message down the line. Its foreign policy planks in particular were, under cover of assailing Carter, a de facto indictment of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Unlike many of his predecessors, Reagan actually believed in the platform and was determined to see it put in place. The platform alone, we thought, would make a Reagan-Ford ticket unthinkable.

In Reagan’s suite, however, the unthinkable had become the possible. In less than 24 hours, Reagan was going to have to go before the convention to announce his vice-presidential nominee. And yet for reasons that to this day remain baffling, not only had Reagan given his political advisers free rein to negotiate with Ford, he had also refrained from initiating conversations with other potential running mates. With no alternate plan in sight, it seemed that Reagan was prepared to embrace the wing of the Republican Party that had ridiculed him, probably disliked him, and would surely do its best to undermine his agenda.

“I can’t take him,” Reagan said of Bush. “That ‘voodoo economic policy’ charge and his stand on abortion are wrong.”


At 5:50 p.m., Casey and Meese, who had left the suite shortly after my arrival, returned. They seemed pensive. Lyn Nofziger, a longtime aide, joined us a few minutes later, asking, “What did Ford want?”

Reagan again described the deal being negotiated, complete with Ford’s demands for Kissinger and Alan Greenspan, adding “I thought that was more than a little sacrifice.” Then Reagan went to his bedroom to take a short nap. He knew it would be a long night.

Shortly after 6:30, Kissinger entered the suite to talk to Meese, evidence that a serious negotiation was indeed in progress. Half an hour later, he emerged; we chatted briefly, but the former secretary of state revealed nothing of the talks. Meese, who was similarly guarded, said that Kissinger wanted to proceed with discussions.

This was serious. And so I did something rash: I decided to try to contact George Bush. Until that moment, the campaign inner circle had treated important issues in a collegial manner; there had been no secrets among us. But on this issue, Casey, Meese, Wirthlin, and Deaver were keeping the lid on. If my colleagues could play it close to the vest on such a crucial issue, it was a game that could be played by others as well.

Although nominally still on a list of frequently mentioned running mates, George Bush was not really on Reagan’s radar screen. Since the primaries, the two men had barely spoken, and they certainly hadn’t discussed the vice presidency. Apart from serious policy differences, Bush had refused to admit defeat in the primary battles despite being vanquished by Reagan in 29 of 33 primaries and did not withdraw from the race until just before the California primary in June. Reagan considered the belated departure willful and unnecessary and was offended by it. Still, I thought Bush a viable alternative to Ford; he had the best credentials of the possible running mates mentioned. If not for the unsettled relations between the two, Bush could bring more to the ticket to help Reagan than anyone on the list of choices.

There was no question that a Bush candidacy would be a hard sell. Among Reagan’s advisers, Nofziger and Casey viewed Bush as a liberal, and others were almost unanimously against him, some even contemptuous. I considered Bush a capable man whose positions were actually much closer to Reagan’s than were Ford’s, especially on foreign policy and defense matters. In 1978, Bush had requested my assistance on his campaign, but my commitment to Reagan was firm. Of the Reagan inner circle, I had the clearest channel to Bush and knew him the best.

Shortly before 7:30, I reached Stefan Halper, a Bush aide. Talking to him from the nearly empty suite, I asked him, in as circumspect a manner as possible, to seek Bush’s assurance that he could support the platform “with no exceptions.” Halper knew what I meant: Was Bush interested in the job? Would he implicitly abandon his support for abortion and his opposition to supply-side economics by embracing the platform? I then called an old friend, Richard Fairbanks, to ask him to approach Bush with the same questions. I wanted two sources of independent confirmation and knew Fairbanks was close to Bush.

At this point, Reagan emerged from his bedroom refreshed by the catnap and sat down in front of three muted television sets in the suite. Within moments, Gerald Ford appeared on CBS with Walter Cronkite, and Reagan asked that the volume be turned up. Cronkite wasted no time asking Ford if he and Reagan were discussing a “copresidency,” which Ford affirmed by not disagreeing. Reagan looked appalled.

After the broadcast, the room cleared out. Reagan and I were alone. Reluctant to question him, but knowing that another track could never be started unless he agreed to it, I asked Reagan why he would not simply issue a statement denying that he had agreed to a copresidency. There was a sense of resignation in his voice when he said, “I can’t.” After a few seconds, he said aloud, almost rhetorically, 'Who else is there?'

“There’s Bush,” I suggested, half expecting him to close off the discussion. Instead, he paused and then said, “I can’t take him; that ‘voodoo economic policy’ charge and his stand on abortion are wrong.”

Sensing an opportunity, I reached for a copy of the platform lying on the coffee table, passed it to him, and said, “Governor, this is your platform, every word of it.” I added that Martin Anderson, Reagan’s chief domestic policy adviser, Peter Hannaford, and I had scrutinized it carefully. “If you could be assured that George Bush would support this platform in every detail,” I asked, “would you reconsider Bush?”

Reagan mulled this over for a moment and then said, deliberately, “Well, if you put it that way, I would agree to reconsider.” The opening emerged.

At 7:50 Fairbanks called to say that Bush could indeed embrace the platform; soon thereafter, Halper phoned with the same message. Meanwhile, negotiations with Ford continued upstairs on the seventieth floor, with Casey, Meese, Deaver, and Wirthlin representing Reagan, and Greenspan, Kissinger, and the Ford advisers John O. Marsh and Robert Barrett representing the former president.

Reagan continued to sit before the televisions, snacking on his favorite jelly beans. Senator Bob Dole appeared with the television commentator Max Robinson and declared that “Ford and Reagan can work it out.” Reagan commented, softly: “No, Bob. I cannot give him what he wants.”

Seeing another opening, I then informed Reagan that Bush had given unequivocal assurances that he could embrace and defend the entire platform, emphasizing “with no exceptions.” He listened carefully, but did not respond. I simply could not read his reaction, and the thought crossed my mind that he was angry that I had opened a channel to Bush.

At 8:05, Reagan announced to no one in particular, doesn’t Ford “realize there is no way in the world I can accept? What kind of presidential candidate would I be in the eyes of the world if I were to give in to such demands?” It seemed odd that despite his instincts, Reagan did not call a halt to the talks. It seemed odd, too, that so many of those who felt uncomfortable about the deal remained quiet.

Just before 8:30, Meese reported progress: Ford had modified his demands and now wanted to be “chairman” of the National Security Council. The notion should have been rejected outright, as the president is the head of the NSC. A few minutes later, Anderson and Deaver rejoined the group in the suite, and Deaver told Reagan that Ford would like to speak to him on the phone. At 8:55, Reagan went into his bedroom to call Ford. He returned five minutes later, reporting that Ford had told him that Kissinger “now takes himself out” of the running for secretary of state. It was clear that Ford and Greenspan had not taken themselves out of anything.

By 9:30, Sam Donaldson was reporting that Reagan would go to the arena with Ford in a matter of hours, reinforcing speculation about the “dream ticket,” and at 9:45, Cronkite announced that Ford and Kissinger were meeting with Reagan operatives. At 9:50, Meese came into the room: “We’re wanted upstairs” in Ford’s suite.

At 10:05, former treasury secretary William Simon entered, and Reagan and I sat with him in a corner. Simon, who had been mentioned as a vice-presidential candidate, was determined to stop the deal in its tracks, which was surprising since he had served in Ford’s cabinet. “Ron, take me out of this,” he told Reagan. “But under no circumstances take Ford. If you did that, you’d be totally compromised, and you know it.” Simon, never a man to mince words, left; he had made a deep impression on Reagan.

By 10:45, Casey and Meese had returned to the suite to present the latest version of the deal. “It’s kind of hard to describe how it would work in practice,” Meese began. “The president will nominate the secretaries of state and treasury, with the veto of the vice president. The vice president will name the director of the Office of Management and Budget and the national security adviser with the veto of the president. It boils down to a mutual veto power.” In this version, Kissinger, “taken out” as secretary of state, would run foreign policy from the vice president’s office.

At that late hour, despite its obvious and fundamental flaws and without any sort of backup plan, our side seemed determined to try to make this constantly changing arrangement work. It was almost surreal: How could a president limit his constitutional powers and prerogatives by allowing a vice president to veto his choices?

Just before 11, Nancy Reagan and the Reagan children came in to watch the convention roll call. At 11:13, Montana put Reagan over the top, and there was jubilation. At the moment of triumph, though, the negotiators were not present; they remained upstairs, locked in discussions. Meanwhile, the convention was drawing to a close—if the Ford talks went on much longer, and failed, there would be no way to heal the disappointment. Over the course of the preceding hour, I had told Hannaford, Anderson, and Nofziger that a channel had been opened to Bush and that Bush was on board with the platform. Hannaford then began to argue that the logjam had to be broken. He collected Deaver and Nofziger at the entrance to the suite and mounted the stairs to tell the negotiators that a decision was needed.

At 11:25, the negotiators returned; Casey reported that “the answer is probably no.” Five minutes later, Ford, accompanied by Barrett, entered the suite to talk with Reagan, and we left the room. The two men spent a few minutes alone, and at 11:35, Ford departed. We rushed back into the room, and Reagan said: 'I have to say the answer is no. All this time, my gut instinct has been that this is not the right thing. I have affection and respect for Ford. He said he would go all out to help.' There was complete silence.

Reagan glanced around and asked those assembled—a group that included Casey, Meese, Wirthlin, Hannaford, Deaver, and me—'Well, what do we do now?' There was no immediate response. No one offered an alternate plan. No one tossed out a name. Expecting instant opposition, I ventured, 'We call Bush.' Once more, silence. Reagan again looked at each of us; hearing no objection, he said, 'Well, let’s get Bush on the phone.'

At precisely 11:38, the phone was in Reagan’s hand; though they barely knew each other, Reagan dove right in. 'George,' he said warmly, 'I would like to go over there and tell them that I am recommending you for vice president. Could I ask you one thing—do I have your permission to make an announcement that you support the platform across the board?' We could hear Bush agreeing at the other end. Reagan then left for the convention center where, shortly after midnight, he took the podium to praise Ford and then to announce his running mate, George Bush.

And so it came to pass that Ronald Reagan averted what would have been a disaster for his candidacy and the Republican Party. The following morning, Ed Meese called us together and declared the official line should be that the process of selecting a running mate had been orderly and measured and that there 'never was a deal with Ford' for the vice presidency. Technically, he’s right, since no deal was ever consummated.

Months later, while on the campaign plane, I asked Deaver what was in his mind as he sat in those discussions. He thought for a moment and said, 'Look, I’m a guy from Sacramento, California, and there I was sitting at a negotiating table with Henry Kissinger, and Kissinger had negotiated with Mao.' Astonished, I waited for something more, then asked, 'And so, that’s it?' He looked at me as if I didn’t understand and said, sharply: 'Of course that’s it. I was sitting right there!'

For his part, Kissinger, no stranger to balky negotiations, later told the Washington Post that 'if it had been possible for both the principals to go to bed, sleep on it, meet again in the morning, we could have wrapped up this thing in two hours in the morning,' adding, 'that’s how close it was.' And I believe him.


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Reprinted from the New York Times Magazine, July 30, 2000. Copyright 2000 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

Available from the Hoover Press is The Ten Causes of the Reagan Boom, 1982-1997, by Martin Anderson, part of the Hoover Essays in Public Policy series. Also available is Barbarians inside the Gates and Other Controversial Essays, by Thomas Sowell. To order, call 800-935-2882.
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The holder of a master’s degree in political science from the University of Notre Dame, Richard Allen was a senior staff member at Hoover from 1966 to 1968, at which time he took a leave of absence to serve as Richard Nixon’s foreign policy coordinator. He subsequently served twice in the Nixon White House. He was Ronald Reagan’s chief foreign policy adviser from 1977 to 1980 and served as President Reagan’s first national security adviser from 1981 to 1982. A Hoover fellow since 1983, he is currently a member of the U.S. Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee.

===========================
Face to face with Ford
Mike Lloyd / THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESSSunday, January 07, 2007

Ronald Reagan couldnt manage. Jimmy Carter was a domestic disaster. Richard Nixon, forced from office by treachery and lies, was the best foreign policy president of the 20th century.

Those are among the revelations in exclusive Press interviews with Gerald R. Ford.

For more than 25 years, Ford allowed his hometown newspaper historic access to ask him anything, with one condition -- his answers were not to be reported until after his death.

Ronald Reagan couldnt manage. Jimmy Carter was a domestic disaster. Richard Nixon, forced from office by treachery and lies, was the best foreign policy president of the 20th century.

Those are among the revelations in exclusive Press interviews with Gerald R. Ford.

For more than 25 years, Ford allowed his hometown newspaper historic access to ask him anything, with one condition -- his answers were not to be reported until after his death.


Lyndon Johnson: 'If you agreed with his domestic philosophy, you'd give a high rating. I just didn't agree with many of his domestic programs.'


Richard Nixon: 'On foreign policy, he was the best. ... He was very intelligent and strong. He made a few, very serious mistakes.'


Jimmy Carter: 'He didn't have the feel for the nation's capital syndrome. The result was he had all kinds of political and other problems as occupant of the White House.'


Ronald Reagan was 'a great spokesman for attractive, political objectives. ... His record never matched his words.'


George H.W. Bush: 'He did an excellent job in the Gulf War. He acted promptly and affirmatively.' But, Ford added, 'When the economy started to falter, he didn't recognize it quickly enough.'


Bill Clinton: 'On substance, I would rate him a 5 (out of 10). To hear him talk about it, he should have gotten a 10-plus.'


And Gerald Ford on Gerald Ford: If Warren Harding is a 1 and Abraham Lincoln a 10, where does President Ford fit in? 'I would say somewhere between 5 and 7 ... In retrospect, our record looks better and better.'

Opinion of Carter improved

Including 13 terms in Congress, his short time as vice president, his 28 months as president and as an elder statesmen advising subsequent presidents, Ford had a panoramic view of 50 years of U.S. commanders in chief. Some assessments changed with time.

Take Jimmy Carter.

In 1981, Ford said, 'I think Jimmy Carter would be very close to Warren G. Harding. I feel very strongly that Jimmy Carter was a disaster, particularly domestically and economically. I have said more than once that he was certainly the poorest president in my lifetime.'

Two years later, Ford said, 'I think you have to evaluate someone on domestic policy and someone on foreign policy. On domestic policy, particularly the management of the economy, Jimmy Carter was about a 2 or a 3. On foreign policy, he had the courage to move ahead on the Panama Canal Treaty. He opened the doors to the People's Republic of China, and he was able to get the Camp David agreement on the Middle East. So I would have to give Jimmy Carter a 7 1/2, maybe an 8.'

But after Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat was assassinated, Ford and Carter were asked by President Reagan to attend the funeral. Both men have acknowledged many times that the time together on that diplomatic mission began a reconciliation that grew into a strong friendship.

In 1998, Ford said of his successor, 'Jimmy Carter, in retrospect, will be looked on as a better president than some comments we hear today. His transition from governor of Georgia to the White House was not as productive as I think the public wanted it to be. He was a very decent, fine individual. There were no major mistakes. There just weren't a lot of exciting results.'

Later, when Carter was rated abysmally in a book on bad presidents, Ford said, 'Have you seen the book 'America's 10 Worst Presidents?' I'm lucky I'm not in there, but Jimmy Carter is Number One. I think it's very unfair -- William Howard Taft, Harrison, Coolidge, Grant, (Andrew) Johnson, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Harding, Nixon. I think it's unfair to Carter.'

Reagan legend irritated him

With Ronald Reagan, Ford's evaluations stayed steady; a nice guy, poor manager, a superb salesman. But Ford clearly did not like the way Reagan took credit for winning the Cold War.

Ford called Reagan 'a great spokesman for attractive political objectives. The American people liked to hear him talk about a balanced budget. They liked to hear him talk about how good America was and how bad communism was but, when it came to implementation, his record never matched his words.'

In one interview, he said Reagan was 'probably one of the most popular presidents' and 'was probably the least well informed on the details of running the government of any president I knew.'

In another interview, Ford said, 'He was just a poor manager, and you can't be president and do a good job unless you manage.'

But the Reagan 'cold warrior' legend is what really got his goat.

'It makes me very irritated when Reagan's people pound their chests and say that because we had this big military buildup, the Kremlin collapsed. I feel strongly about this and made speeches all over the country on it.'

There are three reasons communism collapsed, Ford argued: The Marshall Plan, the establishment of NATO and the Helsinki Accord on human rights (which Ford negotiated).

'When you put peace, prosperity and human rights against poverty, a massive unsuccessful military program and a lack of human rights, communism was bound to collapse. And it did. No president, no Democrat or Republican, can claim credit for those programs. I'll tell you who deserves the credit -- the American people.'

Clinton 'an average president'

Ford saw similarities between Reagan and Bill Clinton.

'Bill Clinton is probably as skillful an articulator of politics since Franklin D. Roosevelt,' Ford said. 'I have grave reservations about his convictions but, when you come to being a salesman, he's about as good as anyone.'

Better than Reagan?

'Oh, I think so,' Ford said. 'In a different way. Reagan would never be as active as Clinton is. Clinton is a hard-working, articulate, smart individual. Reagan was as articulate, but you didn't see him during his eight years moving around, juggling so many issues. Clinton is a master of ability to handle politics. You have to be careful of what he says because it's so skillfully said.'

Looking back after Clinton left office, Ford reflected, 'Clinton did many good things. ... He made some stupid mistakes, (Monica) Lewinsky being one. The (fugitive financier Marc) Rich pardon is another. ... In many ways, he did a good job. But there were some sad illustrations of political and character mistakes. I think historians can't avoid balancing the bad with the good. I think he will come out as an average president, overall.'

Then, three years ago, Ford said, 'On substance, I would rate Clinton about a 5. To hear him talk about it, he should have gotten a 10 plus. I never felt that, when the chips were down, in a tough crisis, he would make the right decision. He never had the substance, the willpower to face up to a crisis. ... You could never give Clinton a high mark on integrity.'

Nixon 'best' on foreign policy

Even though Richard Nixon was forced from office in disgrace, Ford consistently showered praise on his predecessor. 'On foreign policy, he was the best of (the 20th) century,' Ford said. 'He was very intelligent and very strong.'

White House tapes from the Nixon years eventually became public. They revealed a nasty Nixon, saying obnoxious, bigoted things about Jews, blacks and some fellow Republicans. Ford was surprised.

'In all my experiences with Dick Nixon, in the Oval Office, Cabinet meetings, (National Security Council) meetings, social gatherings and so forth, I never heard him say those kind of comments. Never,' Ford said.

Ford asked former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger if he had heard Nixon use that kind of language.

'Henry said absolutely not. Haldeman (H.R. Haldeman, chief of staff), Ehrlichman (John Ehrlichman, domestic affairs adviser) and Colson (Charles Colson, White House special counsel) are the people he was with when he made those kind of comments and that kind of language,' Ford said. 'Based on my own experience and on what Henry Kissinger affirmed, it was the environment that brought out the bad character in Nixon. In the presence of people like myself and others, he never talked that way. That's the paradox of the man.'

On one hand, Nixon said amazingly insulting things. On the other, he was sophisticated at world diplomacy.

'Dick Nixon, on foreign policy, probably was the best president during my time,' Ford said. 'His China initiative, negotiations with the Soviet Union, progress in the Middle East. Nixon was a bad president when it came to picking some of his top people -- Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson -- individuals he relied on and who were not good choices. But foreign policy, no one that I ever dealt with in the White House was as good as he was.'

A saddened Ford once reflected, 'Nixon made a few, very serious mistakes. He was so stubborn that he would never concede or admit that he had made them. And they steam-rolled.'

Johnson's domestic policies irked him

Of Lyndon Johnson, whom Nixon succeeded, Ford said, 'We had our differences. And at times, while he was president and I was minority leader, he was unfair and too tough on me as Republican leader. ... After the 1968 election (Nixon defeated Johnson's vice president Hubert Humphrey), I had a long talk with Lyndon at his request. We forgot all the conflicts of the past and started a new era of friendship.'

Ford felt Johnson's domestic policies 'were not well thought out and too expensive. ... If you agreed with his domestic philosophy, you'd give a high rating. I just didn't agree with many of his domestic programs.'

On foreign policy, Ford said, 'LBJ tried very hard. He was caught up in the worst aspects of the Vietnam syndrome. He inherited a policy that started with Kennedy, and he didn't want to break it off. And it kept getting worse. So LBJ will be known, primarily, in foreign policy for the tragedy and trauma of Vietnam.'

Kennedy achievements limited

John F. Kennedy was 'an exciting president,' Ford said, 'who started out with a great flourish but ... some of his glitter was starting to erode.'

Ford's assessment: 'When you look at the substance of Jack Kennedy, his two and a half to three years were not great producers of successful domestic or foreign policy achievements. He had a tremendous following, but I think the substance of his presidency was not as good as it was professed to be. ... With all due respect for my friendship with Jack Kennedy, he was not as good a president as most of the press thinks. Lyndon, despite his personal eccentricities, did a lot of good things. He pushed through a lot of landmark legislation that Kennedy never got through and never would have. Kennedy would never have gotten the civil rights legislation through. Lyndon did.'

Gulf War 'high point' for Bush

George H.W. Bush, who Ford appointed as director of the CIA, 'was a good president.' The 'high point' of his administration was the first Gulf War, Ford said.

'He handled the Saddam Hussein conflict very skillfully,' Ford said. 'He got 30-some nations to join us at the United Nations in confronting Saddam Hussein. In retrospect, many Monday-morning quarterbacks say he should have clobbered the Iraqi army, that he should have thrown Saddam Hussein out.'

Bush made a big mistake, though, 'after the euphoria of the Iraq War, when his popularity was 75 to 80 percent. He didn't realize, or his people didn't realize, that the economy was in trouble. The net result was that the Democrats moved in and took advantage of it. By the time the Bush administration woke up, the Democrats had the issue and Bush never got it back. That was a serious tactical error.'

Truman 'deserves high marks'

Harry Truman was elected the year Ford first went to Congress.

'I personally dealt with Truman,' Ford said. 'He would get very high marks from me.'

Ford said he agreed with Truman 'almost 100 percent on foreign policy. I had differences with him on domestic policy. Historians are now recognizing that Harry Truman was a good president.'

'Look at what he faced. There was the challenge of Korea in 1951. He had no hesitancy using atomic weapons, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He came up with the Marshall Plan, which saved Europe after World War II. He proposed Greek/Turkish aid, which was important to save those two allies. He deserves high marks.'

High praise for Eisenhower

But Truman did not rank as high as Dwight Eisenhower, 'the best president of my lifetime.' In Ford's view, 'Eisenhower was the father of NATO, which was a good military complement to the Marshall Plan. NATO kept the Soviet Union and its allies from militarily overrunning Western Europe.'

'The Soviets under Stalin were an aggressive formidable military operation. NATO, under Ike, stopped them. He had a good economic record, as I recall. He had one recession. Overall, the economy under him was in pretty good shape for eight years.'

Ford said, 'Historians are now saying he was a much better president than the public impression at the time. I agree with that. He was not a person who did a lot of evident things, but he ran the country in a very responsible way. When you look at the economic results, the foreign policy results, I think he was a good president.'

Ford on Ford: 'We calmed things down'

And finally, Ford on Ford:

'I assumed the presidency in a very traumatic period in American history. We had a terrible distrust by the American people of their government because of Watergate and Vietnam. This was reflected in riots in major cities, campus disturbances and bitter disputes between members of families. It was a very unhappy time in our history. Because of my background, my reputation, we calmed things down and restored confidence in the federal government. That doesn't mean people agreed with me. At least they trusted me.'

============================
February 26, 1976
Ford edges Reagan by 1,250 votes in New Hampshire primary, taking 17 of 21 delegates. This begins a string of primary victories for Ford which include Florida and Illinois before a series of losses to challenger Reagan in North Carolina, Texas, Georgia, Alabama, and Indiana.

March 25, 1976
Ford sends a message to Congress requesting a special appropriation for the National Swine Flu Immunization Program. He signs the measure into law on August 12, 1976.

June 20, 1976
Ford orders the evacuation of the US embassy in Beirut, Lebanon following the assassination of embassy officials on June 16.

July 4, 1976
America’s Bicentennial of independence. The year is marked by numerous head of state visits and state gifts to the United States. On July 4, President Ford attends events at Valley Forge, PA; Operation Sail in New York City; and in Philadelphia, PA.

July 7, 1976
President and Mrs. Ford welcome Queen Elizabeth II to the White House for a state dinner as part of the Bicentennial celebration.

August 18, 1976
When North Korean soldiers axe-murder two U.S. soldiers on a tree-pruning mission in the Demilitarized Zone, Ford weighs strong military action but decides on other measures.

August 19, 1976
Ford is nominated at the Republican Convention edging out former California Governor Ronald Reagan. Ford names Senator Robert Dole of Kansas as his running mate. Public opinion polls following the convention have Ford trailing the Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter by wide margins. The Gallup poll favors Carter 56% to 33% and the Harris poll favors Carter 61% to 32%.

September 13, 1976
Ford signs the Government in the Sunshine Act requiring that many government regulatory agencies must give advance notice of meetings and hold open meetings. The new law also amends the Freedom of Information Act “by narrowing the authority of agencies to withhold information from the public.”

September 15, 1976
Ford kicks off his general election campaign at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.

September 23, 1976
First presidential candidate debate between President Ford and Governor Jimmy Carter in Philadelphia. This is the first presidential candidate debate since the Nixon-Kennedy debates in 1960.

October 6, 1976
Second presidential candidate debate, on foreign policy and defense issues, in San Francisco. During the debate Ford comments that, “there is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford administration.” This misstatement is fodder for the press and public for the next several days.

October 22, 1976
Third and final presidential candidate debate in Williamsburg, Virginia.

November 1-2, 1976
President Ford attends his final campaign rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan at the Pantlind Hotel. He casts his vote on November 2 and attends the unveiling of the Gerald R. Ford mural by artist Paul Collins at the Kent County Airport before returning to Washington.

November 3, 1976
Ford concedes the Presidential election to Jimmy Carter of Georgia. Ford loses the Electoral College 297-240 and receives 39,147,793 votes (48% of the votes cast) to Carter’s 40,830,763 (50.1% of the votes cast).

December 14, 1976
Ford sends a letter to the Archivist of the United States and the President of the University of Michigan offering to deposit his papers in a Presidential Library to be built on the University of Michigan campus.

January 12, 1977
In his final State of the Union Address, Ford tells Congress and the American People, “I can report that the state of the union is good. There is room for improvement, as always, but today we have a more perfect Union than when my stewardship began.”

January 20, 1977
Carter is sworn in as the 39th President of the United States. In his inaugural address, Carter states, “For myself and for our Nation, I want to thank my predecessor for all he has done to heal our land.” Ford retires to Palm Springs, California and Vail, Colorado. During his retirement, Ford serves on various corporate boards, participates in many charitable causes, remains involved in many national and international causes and issues, participates in many Republican Party functions, and is called to service several times by later Presidents.

레이건1 ; '우리는 아직 패배하지 않았다'


페기 누난

1997년 중앙M&B에서 번역 출간된 <국민을 살리는 대통령 죽이는 대통령>이라는 책이 있다. 미국의 베스트셀러 전기작가, 퓰리처상 수상자, 대통령 공보보좌관, 대통령학 연구자 등이 필자로 참여한 이 책은 原題 'Character Above All'에서 보듯 프랭클린 루즈벨트에서 조시 부시(現 조지W.부시의 父)에 이르는 열 명의 미국 대통령들의 리더십을 '품성'이라는 측면에서 고찰한 책이다.
무엇보다도 이 책을 읽으면서 부러웠던 것은 20세기 중-후반 미국을 이끌었던 역대 대통령들을 한결같이 따뜻한 눈길로 긍정적으로 평가하고 있다는 점이다. 워터게이트 사건으로 역사에 오점을 남긴 리처드 닉슨, 닉슨에서 카터로 이어지는 과도기 역할에 그친 제럴드 포드, 이상적 대외정책을 추진하다가 실패를 거듭했던 지미 카터 등에 대해서도 필자들은 그들의 공적과 긍정적인 품성을 강조하고 있다.
이 책 가운데서 6월 5일 서거한 로널드 레이건과 관련된 부분을 발췌해 소개한다. 레이건에 대해 쓴 페기 누난은 전기작가로 레이건의 특별보좌관을 지냈다. <배진영>

<레이건은 1976년에도 대통령 선거에 도전했었다. 당시 현직 대통령이었던 제럴드 포드를 상대로 후보 지명 경선을 벌였었다. 포드는 온건한 진보주의적 공화당원이었다. 그리고 레이건은 포드가 '문제의 일부'라고 생각했다. 그래서 그는 후보지명 경선을 선언했다.

후보 지명 경선은 힘든 과정이었다. 1976년 3월까지 레이건은 다섯 번의 예비선거에서 잇따라 패배했다.
그는 이제 곤경에 처해 있었다. 12명의 공화당 전국위원회 위원장 가운데 11명이 경선 포기를 주장했다. 공화당 시장협의회에서도 경선 포기를 촉구했다. 공화당 주지사 협의회도 같은 얘기를 했다. 레이건 진영은 300만 달러 가량의 빚을 지고 있었다.

그해 3월23일, 레이건의 선거운동 참모들은 위스콘신주의 한 허름한 호텔 방에 모여 경선포기를 의논하고 있었다. 다음날 노스 캐롤라이나에서 또 한 번의 예비선거가 있을 예정이었다.
방에 있는 대부분의 사람들은 이렇게 얘기했다.
'우리는 끝났어. 우리에게는 돈도 없고, 지지자도 없어.지금까지 다섯 번을 졌는데, 내일이면 여섯 번째야.'

선거 운동 책임자였던 존 시어스가 '국방문제에 대해 포드와 키신저를 혼내 주었던 그 연설을 다시 한 번 한다면, 10만 달러를 빌려주겠다'는 한 공화당 지지자의 제안을 전해왔다.
레이건은 그 제안을 받아들였다. 그리고 말했다.
'캔자스 시티에서 전당대회가 열릴 때까지 경선을 포기하지 않겠소. 그리고 그 망할 놈의 예비선거에서 몽땅 진다고 해도 상관하지 않겠소.'
참모 가운데 한 사람이었던 마티 앤더슨은 혼자서 이렇게 생각했다.
'오, 하나님! 결국 스물 한 번이 되는군요....'

다음날 노스 캐롤라이나 예비선거에서 레이건은 승리했다. 그는 24시간 전만 해도 '돈도 없고 지지자도 없는 확실한 패배자'이면서도 경선을 포기하지 않았다 그리고 결국에는 포드와 간발의 차이로 아슬아슬한 경쟁을 벌였다. 레이건은 47.5%의 지지를 받고 경선에서 탈락했다.

경선이 끝났을 때, 레이건은 지지자들 앞에서 이렇게 말했다.

'우리는 아직 패배하지 않았다.그것은 긴 전쟁에서 하나의 전투에 불과하다. 우리는 살아있는 동안 우리의 정치 신념을 전파할 것이다. 낸시와 나는 흔들의자에 앉아 '그것으로 우리 일은 끝났다'고 얘기하지 않을 것이다.'

'여러분도 지금 하고 있는 일을 하게 만든 바로 그 믿음과 신념들을 갖고 그곳에 있기 바란다.
무대 위의 배우들은 바뀔지도 모른다. 하지만 우리의 정치 신념은 바뀌지 않고 계속해서 나아갈 것이다. 그리고 우리는 결국 승리할 것이다.'

'여러분들의 이상을 포기하지 말라.절대로 타협하지 말라. 편법에 의지하지 말라. 그리고, 제발 부탁하건대, 냉소적인 태도를 갖지 말라.'

'절대로 냉소적이 되지 말라. 여러분 자신을 보고, 여러분이 하고자 하는 일을 보라. 그리고 여러분과 뜻이 같은 수많은 미국인들이 있음을 인식하라. 그들은 우리의 이상을 지지한다. 그들은 우리와 같은 길을 갈 것이다.'

바로 19년 전이었다. 당시 그곳에 있던 많은 사람들이 눈물을 흘렸다. 그리고 그것은 1980년의 선거운동으로 이어졌다. 그렇게 해서 레이건 대통령의 시대가 시작되었다. 그렇게 해서 지금도 진행 중인 미국 정치의 혁명이 시작됐다.>

===========================
大選 정국의 李會昌, 趙舜衡 변수


한나라당의 핀치 히터 또는 방패論, 개인적 인기로 민주당 지켜낸다면 汎여권 후보도 가능.
趙甲濟

이번 대통령 선거에서 李會昌, 趙舜衡 두 사람은 중요한 변수이다. 李會昌씨는 요사이 한나라당 경선, 새 對北정책, 방송 정상화를 주제로 하여 작심한 듯 따끔한 논평과 연설을 하고 있다. 내용도 핵심을 찌르고 다수 한국인들이 듣고싶어하는 것들이다. 특히 李會昌씨가 김대업 사기폭로, 방송의 편파보도를 지적할 때는 설득력이 아주 크다. 자신이 희생자이고 피해자였기 때문이다.

두 차례 대통령 선거에 나와서 근소한 차이로 졌고 도합 2000만 표를 받은 李會昌씨의 영향력은 무시할 수 없다. 김대중, 노무현의 失政에 대한 반작용으로 이회창씨를 보는 시각도 많이 好轉되었고 좌파들의 선동에 속은 것에 대해서 미안하게 생각하는 이들도 많다.

이런 李會昌씨가 한나라당 후보가 결정된 이후, 예상되는 제2의 김대업 사태, 방송의 편파보도를 적극적으로 지적하고 나서면 하나의 방패 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 이명박, 박근혜 두 사람이 경선 이후에도 단합하지 못하고 泥田鬪狗를 계속할 경우, 그리하여 공멸의 길을 가는 것이 확실하게 될 경우 이회창씨를 핀치 히터로 내세우려는 움직임이 일어날지도 모른다.

테러에 의해 한나라당 후보가 有故상태가 될 경우에도 이회창씨가 代案으로 등장할 가능성이 있다.

민주당 趙舜衡 의원이 대통령 경선에 출마하기로 한 것도 汎여권에 큰 변수이다. 그에 대한 여론조사 지지율이 손학규씨를 능가하게 될 경우 汎여권의 후보단일화나 통합 작업에도 영향을 끼칠 것이다. 조순형씨의 개인적 인기가 여론의 힘이 되어 박상천, 조순형 두 사람이 김대중-노무현 세력에 맞서 민주당을 지켜내도록 할 수 있기 때문이다.

한나라당 경선에서 진 사람의 지지층이 趙舜衡 지지로 돌 경우 그가 汎여권 1위 후보감이 되어 민주당내 경선에선 물론이고 汎여권 단일화 과정에서 최종勝者가 되지 못한다는 보장도 없다.

이회창, 조순형 두 사람의 이미지는 원칙주의자이다. 원칙파괴가 한국 정치의 고질병이 되고 있는 가운데서 할 말을 하는 정치인이 大選, 總選 政局에서 局外者로 노는 것보다는 참여자가 되어 긍정적 기여를 할 수 있다면 반대할 이유가 없을 것이다.
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정치와 신뢰-시오도어 루즈벨트의 경우


조갑제

정치와 신뢰

한자로 믿을 信자는 사람 人변 옆에 말씀 言변으로 구성되어 있습니다. 사람을 신뢰한다는 것은 인간의 말을 믿는다는 뜻입니다. 역으로 어떤 사람의 말을 믿을 수가 없게 되면 그 사람은 이미 사람이라고 할 수가 없다는 뜻도 함축되어 있습니다. 정치는 말로 하는 것입니다. 모든 정치적 행위는 말로써 이루어지고 말로써 평가되고 말로써 해야 합니다. 정치에서 이 말이 신뢰를 받지 못하게 되면 정치가 성립이 되지 않는 것입니다.
19세기 말에 미국 대통령이 되었던 그로버 클리블랜드는 「公職은 公信이다」는 것을 행정부의 구호로 내걸었습니다. 이때의 공신이란 말은 공적인 신뢰란 뜻입니다. 영어로는 Public Trust라고 합니다. 공직자, 즉 공무원 언론인 정치인처럼 공공의 이익을 대표하는 사람들은 公衆과의 신뢰관계를 기초로 해서만 일할 수 있다는 뜻입니다.
인간과 인간 사이에 신뢰관계가 없다면 산속에서 사람을 만났을 때 마치 맹수를 만난 것처럼 긴장하게 될 것입니다. 저 사람이 나를 죽이고 내 호주머니에 든 돈을 가져가지 않으리란 보장이 없기 때문입니다. 국민과 공직자 사이에 신뢰가 없으면 국민들은 공직자를 도둑이나 사기꾼으로 보고 공직자들은 국민들을 폭도로 보게 될 것입니다. 예산을 공무원이 빼돌리지 않는다는 보장이 없고 이해관계에 따라서 국민들이 폭동을 일으키지 않는다는 보장이 없기 때문입니다. 이처럼 신뢰라는 것은 개인과 개인, 국민과 정부를 연결해주는 끈인 것입니다. 이 끈이 끊어지면 우리 사회는 개인 단위로 모래알처럼 흩어지고 정부와 국민은 물과 기름처럼 따로 놀아 국가로서의 기능을 하지 못하게 됩니다. 국민과 정부 사이에 신뢰관계가 사라지면 약탈국가가 되든지 무정부상태가 되든지 둘 중의 하나입니다.
그리하여 정상적인 국가는 이 정부와 국민 사이의 신뢰 관계를 깨는 사람들을 엄중하게 다스립니다. 정부와 국민 사이의 약속 중에서 가장 중요한 것이 헌법입니다. 이 헌법을 깨는 쿠데타나 내란은 어느 나라나 실패할 경우 사형이나 무기징역으로 다스려집니다. 어느 나라나 간첩을 重刑으로 다스리는 이유도 이것이 헌법적 질서와 체제에 반역하는, 국가를 배신하는 행위이기 때문입니다. 헌법이나 한 사회의 규칙을 깨는 사람을 처벌하거나 통제할 수 없는 나라는 自衛 능력이 없는 사회가 됩니다. 이런 사회에서 양식 있는 사람은 악한과 위선자와 거짓말쟁이들의 눈치를 보면서 죽어 지내야 합니다.

동서양 어디나 정치인들이 거짓말을 하고 약속을 어기는 일은 다반사입니다. 정치인들은 그러나 자신이 왜 거짓말을 할 수밖에 없었는지를 설명하고 설득할 필요가 있습니다. 이 설득에 실패하면 그는 국민들의 외면속에서 정치인의 생명이 끝나게 됩니다. 우리나라에서는 약속을 깨는 이유로서 국민의 부름을 말하는 정치인들이 많습니다. 1997년에 이인제씨도 국민들이 자신을 불러냈기 때문에 당원으로서의 도리에 구애받지 않고 출마를 강행한다는 취지의 말을 하면서 경선불복 출마를 강행했습니다.
미국에서도 이인제씨와 비슷한 경선불복의 사례가 있었습니다. 미국에서 가장 대중적 인기가 높았던 시어도어 루즈벨트 대통령은 2기에 걸쳐 공화당 대통령으로 있으면서 적극적인 대외정책으로서 미국을 세계열강의 반열에 올려놓았습니다. 등산, 모험, 전쟁, 탐험 등 야외 활동을 찬양하고 남자다움의 소중함을 강조했던 그는 세계에서 처음으로 국립공원제도를 만들었습니다. 미국 서부에 있는 옐로우스톤 파크는 이렇게 해서 생긴 국립공원1호입니다. 그는 자신이 총애하던 하워드 태프트를 후계자로 지명하고 물러난 뒤에 다시는 대통령으로 출마하지 않겠다고 선언합니다. 그런데 태프트는 대통령이 되자 루즈벨트가 추진했던 정책을 뒤집는 등 전임자를 무시하는 언동을 하기 시작합니다. 이게 불만이었던 시어도어 루즈벨트는 1912년 공화당 후보경선에 다시 출마합니다. 전당대회에서 태프트 측이 공정하지 못한 방법으로써 자신을 물리치자 진보당이란 신당을 만들어 별도로 출마를 하게 되었습니다. 이로써 1912년 大選은 공화당 후보 태프트, 진보당 후보 루즈벨트, 민주당 후보 우드로우 윌슨 이 세 사람이 대결하게 되었습니다.
선거유세 도중 루즈벨트 후보는 연설장으로 가는 승용차에 오르는 순간 한 광신자에 의해서 저격을 받았습니다. 권총 탄환은 오버코트와 안경집과 연설문을 뚫고 가슴속으로 파고들어 갈비뼈 하나를 부순 뒤에 허파 바로 앞에서 멈추었습니다.
두둑한 배짱으로 유명한 루즈벨트는 군중이 이 범인을 붙잡아 몰매를 가하자 『저 자를 상하게 하지말라』고 소리쳤다고 합니다. 그는 총알이 가슴에 박혀 있는 데도 연설장에 나가서 연설을 했습니다. 피묻은 셔츠를 흔들면서 『이 정도로는 이 황소를 죽이지 못한다』고 큰 소리쳤습니다. 연설을 끝내고야 그는 총알 제거 수술을 받았습니다. 그러나 이런 영웅적인 행동에도 불구하고 그는 이 대선에서 우드로우 윌슨에게 참패했습니다. 프린세턴 대학총장출신인 윌슨은 선거인단 기준으로 4백35표, 루즈벨트는 88표, 태프트는 여덟표를 얻었을 뿐입니다. 공화당의 분렬로 민주당 후보가 그 50년 전의 남북전쟁 뒤에 처음으로 당선되었던 것입니다. 미국 국민들은 경선에 승복하지 않은 한때의 영웅 루즈벨트를 버린 것입니다.
많은 정치평론가들은 1997년 이인제씨에게 있어서 당과 국민과의 약속을 깨고 출마한 것은 영원히 원죄처럼 따라다닐 것이라고 예언하였는데 그것이 5년 뒤 입증된 셈입니다.
이인제씨의 문제는 약속깨기가 불가피했다는 점을 납득할 만하게 설명하는 데 실패했다는 점입니다. 승부에 승복하지 않는 것은 우리나라 문민정치의 한 결점입니다. 지식인들은 그 지식을 이용하여 변명의 논리를 항상 만들어 낼 수 있습니다. 군인들 사이에서 승부는 패전과 승리로 갈라지니 변명이 통할 여지가 없습니다. 기업활동에서도 승패는 적자와 흑자로 수치화되니 변명이 통할 리가 없습니다.
주자학을 신봉한 지식인들이 다스렸던 조선조 5백년 동안 이 지배층은 국가 안보에는 실패를 거듭하여 백성들을 도탄에 빠뜨렸습니다. 그런데 문제는 이런 실패에 대한 반성이 없고 변명으로 일관하다가 보니 역사의 교훈을 얻지도 못하고 꼭 같은 실수를 되풀이했다는 점입니다.
임진왜란이 나기 2년 전인 1590년에 선조는 황윤길을 정사, 김성일을 부사로 하는 통신사를 일본으로 보내 도요토미 히데요시의 일본이 조선을 침략할 것인지에 대하여 정보를 수집하고 오라고 했습니다. 두 사람은 돌아와서 상반된 보고를 합니다. 西人 출신인 황윤길은 전쟁의 위험이 있다고 하고 김성일은 西人과 라이벌 관계인 東人으로서 전쟁이 없을 것이라고 합니다. 김성일의 이 잘못된 보고는 서인 출신인 황윤길과 무조건 반대되는 생각을 펴야 한다는 당파적 이해관계 때문이었다는 것이 역사학자들의 견해입니다. 이때 조선조 조정은 결국 김성일의 전쟁 없다는 판단을 받아들여 일본의 침략에 대한 방비를 하지 않았습니다.
우리가 군인 이순신을 존경하는 것은 그가 홀로 전쟁의 가능성에 대비하여 거북선을 만드는 등 준비를 하고 있었다는 점입니다. 글을 아는 지식인들이 당파적 이해관계에 따라 망국적인 행동을 한 데 비해서 군인은 有備無患의 정신으로써 전쟁에 대비하고 있었습니다. 만약 그때 군인들이 집권을 하고 있었더라면 황윤길과 김성일의 상반된 판단을 검증하기 위하여 재조사단을 보냈을 것입니다. 중대한 문제에 대하여 정보가 엇갈 릴 때는 제3자를 투입하여 보다 객관적인 판단을 구해본다는 것은 상식에 속하는 일입니다.
조선조의 주자학자들은 이 임진왜란의 실패를 제대로 반성하지도 않고서 그 직후에는 또 정묘호란과 병자호란을 자초했습니다. 이때도 아무런 방비 없이 당했던 것입니다. 지식인의 자기 합리화는 변명의 논리로 쓰여지면서 진정한 반성의 기회를 빼앗아갑니다. 변명이 있는 곳에서 반성이 없고 반성이 없는 곳에서 발전이 없습니다. 조선조 지식인들이 임진왜란 정묘호란 병자호란, 그리고 일제식민지화라는 네번의 실수를 되풀이 했던 것은 이 지식인들이 모두 자기합리화와 변명의 전문가들이었기 때문입니다.

국가지도자가 될 사람들이 이런 식의 거짓말과 변명을 일삼으면 첫째 교육에 문제가 생깁니다. 며칠전 어떤 교사가 한 이야기입니다만 초등학교어린이의 반장선거에서 진 학생이 정치인들을 본받아 타당한 이유도 없이 반장선거를 부정하고 재선거를 주장하고 나서면 교사가 무엇이라고 설명하겠습니까. 둘째, 국가지도자가 약속을 지키지 않으면 정치 지도자로서 존경을 받지 못하게 됩니다. 존경이 따르지 않으면 권위가 생기지 않습니다. 현대 민주정치제도하에서 대통령의 힘은 권력에서 나온다기보다는 권위에서 나오고 있습니다. 이 권위는 도덕성의 뒷받침을 받아야 하는데 그런 뒷받침이 없으면 권위도 안생기고 그런 권위를 기초로 한 국민설득력도 사라지게 됩니다. 국민들을 설득할 수 있는 힘을 잃은 정치지도자는 선동이나 사기에 의존하게 됩니다. 셋째 약속을 안지키는 지도자가 나타나면 공권력이 먹히지 않게 됩니다. 대통령도 저렇게 거짓말을 하는데 불상한 시민이 법을 좀 위반하는 것이 무슨 대수인가 하는 생각이 확산되면 법이나 질서는 무너지게 되어 있습니다. 시민윤리도 제대로 설 수 없게 됩니다. 학생들에게 가장 중요한 행동의 기준은 교사이고 아들에게는 아버지 어머니이듯이 국민들은 정치지도자의 행동을 살펴보고서는 자신의 행동을 결정하게 됩니다.
김대중 총재는 1987년12월 대선에서 金泳三후보와 함께 동시출마하여 노태우 후보에게 패배하자 개표에 컴퓨터 부정이 있었다고 문제를 제기했습니다. 그런데 이상한 것은 재개표를 요구하지도 않았다는 사실입니다. 컴퓨터의 생리를 조금이라도 이해하는 사람들은 이런 컴퓨터 부정설이 허구라는 것을 알 수 있을터인데 당시에 언론들은 양비론 양시론으로 이 문제를 보도하다가 보니 지금도 그때 컴퓨터 부정이 있었다고 생각하는 사람들이 있을 것입니다.
그러한 김대중 대통령은 집권기간에 정보화를 내세웠습니다. 컴퓨터에 대한 초보적인 이해도 없는 사람이 외친 정보화였다는 이야기가 됩니다. 1987년 대통령 선거에서 김대중, 김영삼 두 후보가 진 것은 동시 출마를 강행하여 민주화를 열망하던 표가 분산되었기 때문입니다. 이 잘못에 대한 반성을 제대로 하지 않고 컴퓨터에 책임을 떠넘기는 자세는 전형적인 지식인의 변명논리인 것입니다.
지금 선진국이 된 나라는 한 가지 공통점이 있습니다. 기사나 무사들의 통치를 오랫동안 받은 적이 있고 많은 전쟁을 경험해보았다는 점이 그것입니다. 왜 군인들이 다스린 적이 있는 나라에서만 민주주의가 가능했는가, 지식인이나 종교인들이 다스린 나라는 왜 선진국이 되지 못했는가 하는 데 대한 진지한 연구가 필요합니다. 미국 하버드 대학의 샤무엘 헌팅턴 교수가 쓴 유명한 책으로 「국가와 군인」이란 책이 있습니다. 이 책에서 헌팅턴 교수는 서양 직업군인들의 사고방식을 분석하고 있습니다. 헌팅턴 교수에 따르면 군인들은 인간의 본성을 부정적으로 본다는 것입니다. 예컨대 군인은 전장에서 혼자 있을 때는 절대로 영웅이 될 수 없다고 생각한다는 것입니다. 원래 허약하고 겁이 많은 사람들을 어떻게 조직하고 훈련을 통해서 단련시켜야 용감한 군인으로 만들 수 있을까 하고 생각하는 것이 군인들의 인간관이란 것입니다. 따라서 군인들은 이런 사람들을 용감하게 만들려면 반복적인 훈련과 엄격한 규칙이 있어야 한다고 생각합니다.
인간본성에 대한 이런 비관적인 생각을 가진 사람들이 미국의 건국을 주도했다는 이야기가 있습니다. 인간들이 가진 약점들을 직시한 바탕에서 어떻게 하면 제도를 통해서 이런 약점을 바로잡고 보완하느냐를 연구한 끝에 만들어낸 것이 민주주의의 기본틀인 균형과 견제의 장치였습니다. 직업군인들의 인간관과 민주주의의 인간관은 인간의 약점을 직시하고 제도적인 보완책을 강구한다는 점에서 공통점이 있습니다. 이 제도적인 보완책으로서 가장 핵심이 되는 것이 바로 규칙을 만들고 이를 준수하도록 강제하는 것입니다. 직업군인의 인간관과 민주주의자들의 인간관이 이처럼 같았기 때문에 군인들의 통치를 받았던 나라에서 민주주의가 정착되었다고 봅니다. 우리는 민주주의를 받아들일 때 권리로서의 민주주의만을 기억하도록 교육을 받았습니다. 민주주의의 이름으로 나의 권리만 주장하였지, 민주주의가 요구하고 있는 법과 규칙의 준수라는 의무에 대해서는 아무도 가르쳐주지 않았던 것입니다.
우리나라 사람들의 약40%가 1997년에 한 이인제씨의 약속위반에 대해서 「그럴 수도 있다」고 말했다는 것은 그 동안의 민주주의 교육이 실패하였음을 말해줍니다. 민주주의의 기본조건은 자기수정능력입니다. 민주주의의 원칙을 부정하는 사람이나 집단을 국민들이 단속할 수 있는 능력이 없으면 악한과 사기꾼과 선동꾼과 거짓말쟁이들이 국민의 이름을 빌어 정권을 잡는 것을 방치하게 되는 것입니다. 우리나라 국민들의 민주주의 수호능력이 어느 정도인지는 오는 대통령 선거에서 결판 날 것입니다.

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Republican Party Nomination

The 1976 Republican National Convention at Kemper Arena in Kansas City. Vice-Presidential Candidate Bob Dole is on the far left, then Nancy Reagan, Governor Ronald Reagan is at the center shaking hands with President Ford, Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller is just to the right of Ford, followed by Susan Ford and First Lady Betty Ford.The contest for the Republican Party's presidential nomination in 1976 was between just two candidates: Gerald Ford, the incumbent President of the United States; and Ronald Reagan, the popular leader of the GOP's conservative wing and the former governor of California.

Incumbent President Ford, appointed to the vice-presidency after the resignation of Spiro Agnew in 1973 and then elevated to the presidency by the resignation of Richard Nixon in August 1974, was the only U.S. president never to have been elected president or vice president. His policy goals were often frustrated by Congress, which was heavily Democratic after the 1974 mid-term election. Liberal Democrats were especially infuriated by President Ford's decision to pardon Nixon for any criminal acts he committed or may have committed as part of the Watergate Scandal. Because Ford had not won a national election as President or Vice-President, he was seen by many politicians as being unusually vulnerable for an incumbent President, and as not having a strong nationwide base of support.

Reagan and the conservative wing of the Republican Party faulted Ford for failing to do more to assist South Vietnam (which finally collapsed in April 1975 with the fall of Saigon) and for his signing of the Helsinki Accords, which they took as implicit U.S. acceptance of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Conservatives were also infuriated by Ford's negotiations with Panama to hand over the Panama Canal.

Reagan began to criticize Ford openly starting in the summer of 1975, and formally launched his campaign in the autumn. At first it appeared as though Ford would easily win the GOP nomination. Defying expectations, Ford narrowly defeated Reagan in the New Hampshire primary, and then proceeded to best Reagan in the Florida and Illinois primaries by comfortable margins. By the time of the North Carolina primary in March 1976, Reagan's campaign was nearly out of money, and it was widely believed that another defeat would force Reagan to quit the race. However, assisted by the powerful political organization of right-wing U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, Reagan upset Ford in North Carolina and then proceeded to win a string of impressive victories, including Texas, where he won all 100 delegates. Ford bounced back to win in his native Michigan, and from there the two candidates engaged in an increasingly bitter nip-and-tuck contest for delegates. By the time the Republican Convention opened in August 1976 the race for the nomination was still too close to call.


[edit] Republican National Convention
The 1976 Republican National Convention was held in Kansas City. As the convention began Ford was seen as having a slight lead in delegate votes, but still shy of the 1130 delegates he needed to win. Reagan and Ford both competed for the votes of individual delegates and state delegations. In a bid to woo moderate Northern Republicans, Reagan shocked the convention by announcing that if he won the nomination, Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania, a moderate, would be his running mate. The move backfired, however, as few moderates switched to Reagan, while many conservative delegates were outraged. The key state of Mississippi, which Reagan needed, narrowly voted to support Ford; it was believed that Reagan's choice of Schweiker had led Clarke Reed, Mississippi's Chairman, to switch to Ford. Ford then won the nomination, narrowly, on the first ballot. He chose Senator Robert Dole of Kansas as his running mate. After giving his acceptance speech, President Ford asked Reagan to come and say a few words to the convention; Reagan proceeded to give an eloquent address which virtually overshadowed Ford's speech. The 1976 Republican National Convention was the last time a presidential convention opened without the nominee having already been decided in the primaries.

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Online Newshour Interview with Historian Michael Beschloss


Great Speeches and Platform Fights


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Topics covered include: the effects of television, great floor speeches by John F. Kennedy, Mario Cuomo, Herbert Humphrey, Anne Richards, Ronald Reagan (1976), and Governor Bill Clinton (1988). Also, memorable acceptance speeches by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Gerald Ford. Finally, Beschloss tells the amusing story of Jimmy Carter's unsuccessful attempt at a show of party unity in 1980.
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The origins of the convention process
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The role of third parties in Presidential elections
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Bob Dole and the Presidential election of 1980
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June 4, 1979:
The MacNeil/Lehrer Report profiles Senator Bob Dole
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LEAH CLAPMAN, Online Newshour: Let's shift topics and talk about platform fights. Ever since conventions began, there have been issues that threatened to disrupt the procedures. Slavery is one, prohibition, the Vietnam War. What are some of the great platform fights in history?
MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: 1860, within the Democratic Party there was a big platform fight over slavery. The result of the fight was the Democrats decided to let the Supreme Court of the United States decide what would be the fate of slavery. The result of this was that southern Democrats walked out of the convention, and this ultimately hastened the war between the states.

1932, there was a big controversy on the floor of the Republican convention over whether you would repeal prohibition and restore the right to drink liquor. Finally, the Republicans felt that there should be no repeal. That was a very divisive issue. 1948, there was an enormous fracas in the Democratic Party in Philadelphia over whether the Democrats would support an aggressive stand to extend civil rights to black Americans. They did take that aggressive stand. But the result was that there was a walk-out by southern delegates led by Strom Thurmond, who at that point was the governor of South Carolina. Thurmond started his own party, which he called the Dixiecrats, which ran in the general election that fall. There was a very great feeling that by dislodging the rather large number of southern Democrats that Thurmond could cost Harry Truman the election. That, as it turned out, did not happen. Then 1968, that was a convention in Chicago that took place two months after the assassination of Robert Kennedy against the backdrop of Lyndon Johnson withdrawing from the race because he was embroiled in the war in Vietnam. The Democratic Party was absolutely divided over whether he would press on with the War in Vietnam or whether he would try to negotiate withdrawal and a coalition government, especially the Robert Kennedy delegates, who lost their leader, were passionately in favor of an anti-war platform plank. Lyndon Johnson, although he was not running, was in control of that convention. He managed to swat that down. The result was that a platform was passed supporting LBJ on the war in Vietnam but in a way, it sowed the seeds of defeat for Hubert Humphrey that fall.

LEAH CLAPMAN: The Republicans are facing the abortion issue in San Diego. Are there any history lessons to be learned? Were there any conventions where the party handled the platform fight well?

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: In a way, platforms demonstrate the paradox of conventions because one thing that conventions still do even in 1996 is they do write platforms, and they do commit the party, and the party's nominees to a certain kind of behavior if those nominees win the presidency and the vice-presidency. That's a good thing. The bad part of that is that the process by which that platform is hammered out may be so contentious and divisive as to make those nominees unelectable. So you have situations in the past where you had really excellent debates, such as over civil rights among the Democrats in '48, over Vietnam among the Democrats in 1968. In Chicago, these were debates where the oratory was actually of very high quality, and you saw these differences really exposed and argued about. The problem is that, particularly in the television age, when Americans see a bloody battle taking place on the convention floor, even if it's over very high-minded principles, they tend to think that this is a party that is divided and not really ready to govern. One of the most powerful arguments that Richard Nixon made in 1968 running against Hubert Humphrey and the Democrats was to say, as he said in his--in many of his speeches--a party divided against itself cannot govern America. And many people we now know from the polls agreed and actually voted for Nixon not because they loved Nixon but because they felt that the Democrats couldn't get their act together.

LEAH CLAPMAN: How has television changed the convention process?

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: Nowadays, the planners of a political convention are very motivated to make the convention as television-friendly as possible: short speeches by exciting speakers, a minimum of conflict, and to sort of use the four days as a big pageant to sort of present your party to the viewers almost as if it's a four-day infomercial. And that leads planners to try to control and package the convention beforehand as much as possible. So the result is that you see a convention that is much more bloodless and devoid of life than the conventions before the television age. Planners of conventions, for instance, in 1996, would look back on Democrats in Chicago in 1968 with horror because not only did you see these big differences among Democrats over Vietnam being aired on the convention floor, you also remembered a lot of anti-war protesters having their heads beaten in on the streets of Chicago by Chicago police, all of which was on television. All of this suggested that the Democrats had a problem that year and were not equipped to be a governing party. The result is that you see planners looking a year like 1968 and saying, let's do the opposite, let's have a convention that is perfectly organized, with short speeches, perfectly planned, so that Americans will look at this pageant on TV and say that this is the united party, this is a pageant that is not boring, and this is something that really appeals to me. That doesn't lead to really a very spontaneous political event.

LEAH CLAPMAN: And when the proceedings were not scripted and more spontaneous, a politician could come up and make a speech and wow the floor, and make a career for himself or herself. Do conventions have long-term effects on political careers?

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: In the pre-television age, convention speakers were, if anything, inclined to speak long because if you gave a short speech, that was a sign of lack of respect for the delegates. So you saw a lot of speakers who would speak at great length, the delegates would listen, and this was a scene that, needless to say, you don't see nowadays. Alvin Barkley, for instance, was the keynote speaker in 1948. He was the Democratic minority leader, Senator from Kentucky. He gave a speech that began, 'What is a bureaucrat?'. He said, 'What is a bureaucrat? A bureaucrat is a Democrat who has a job that some Republican wants.' And he spoke in this vein and spoke in such an appealing way that by the end of the convention Harry Truman decided to make him vice-president. One thing to look at in these conventions is you will see the stars in both parties of the future. You will probably see some possible future presidents giving speech at both of these conventions. A number of examples from the past: John Kennedy in 1956 ran for the vice-presidency in an open ballot. Stevenson, the nominee for president, for the first and last time, said, rather than dictate the nominee, I'm going to let the delegates choose who will be vice-president from the floor. Kennedy ran and lost but he gave a very graceful speech that really made him a national figure for the first time, set him up to run for president in 1960.

You saw other cases in which political leaders have really made their futures. 1984, Mario Cuomo had been governor of New York for only a year and a half, was not terribly well known outside of New York State, he gave a keynote address that had such an impact that instantly made him a presidential candidate of the future. That was the year in which Ronald Reagan was running for re-election. He was wildly popular. Many Democrats felt that it would be almost impossible to make a cogent case against Reagan. Cuomo did that in a very liberal speech, and he set himself up for a decade of national leadership thereafter.

Ann Richards, 1988, was the treasurer of the state of Texas, completely unknown outside of the state of Texas, but gave a funny, very memorable speech lampooning George Bush saying, 'Poor George, he can't help it; he was born with a silver foot in his mouth.' And a result of this was that she became a national figure. It also allowed her to be poised to run for governor of Texas two years later.

LEAH CLAPMAN: What about acceptance speeches, have any either won or lost an election?

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: Almost every acceptance speech is important. The first acceptance speech most Americans would be surprised to hear was in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt in Chicago. Conventions had taken place for a whole century, but in the old days, it was the style that if you were nominated for president at a convention, it was considered much too aggressive for you to show up at the convention and accept the nomination in person. Instead, you would stay at your home and office and a committee of delegates would be appointed to come to see you and officially notify you of your nomination, and you would say, thank you.

FDR by 1932 thought that that was a little bit unfair. On his nomination in Chicago, he got into an airplane in Albany, New York--he was governor at the time--flew to Chicago, and appeared on the convention floor. He said, 'I know that this is breaking precedent to appear before you on this floor, but we're in a middle of a Great Depression, and I intend to break a lot of precedents this year and also as President.' And that was really a forerunner of the entire 12 years of the Roosevelt presidency, where throughout you saw what Roosevelt called--in 1936, Roosevelt accepted renomination by the Democrats at Philadelphia. He said that 'This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny.' That was a very memorable line. But in a way, looking back, that event was more important for something else. One of the braces on his crippled legs buckled, and he fell to the ground. Now, if this had taken place in the modern day, that would have been seen on television, and that would have been probably the memorable event of that convention. In 1936, photographers did not take pictures of the President in a wheelchair or on crutches, or anything that would suggest that Roosevelt was crippled. Even the fact that he fell to the ground before delivering this perhaps most important speech of that campaign went entirely unreported and is only known now by historians.

In 1948, Democrats in Philadelphia assumed that Harry Truman was going to lose. This was before the Republicans seized back control of Congress for the first time in 16 years. And so Truman came to a convention that was very demoralized. He stepped up to the lectern, and he said about himself and his running mate, 'Senator Barkley and I will win this election and make those Republicans like it. Don't you forget that. We'll do that because they're wrong, and we're right, and I'm going to prove that to you in just a few minutes.' With those lines and with the speech that followed, Truman was able to communicate a sense that he was up for winning and that this was an election that could be won. It really dispelled the feeling of depression that was in that convention hall, and just in terms of morale, it sent Democrats out of that hall back to all areas of the country, determined that this was a campaign that could be win. And finally, Truman did win it.

In 1952, the Democrats were divided over whom to choose. Adlai Stevenson, governor of Illinois, had many times said that he didn't want the Democratic nomination that year but was a little bit ambivalent. And he showed that ambivalence in the welcoming address he gave to Democrats in Chicago, giving that speech as governor of Illinois. He gave a speech that was so eloquent that it actually refueled the Stevenson boom. And the result was that Stevenson was nominated on the third ballot.

John Kennedy gave a speech on the final night of the 1960 convention in Los Angeles in the open air Los Angeles forum. He was thought to be very effective, but not so much on television. We nowadays think of Kennedy as this great orator, but in those days people really didn't. He tended to speak too fast, his hands were very choppy, and he also had an accent from Massachusetts that we all remember now, but in 1960, American ears were not very used to. One of the people who watched Kennedy giving his acceptance speech on television was Richard Nixon, his opponent. Nixon thought that Kennedy gave such a bad speech, spoke so fast, with an accent that people couldn't understand, that the best thing that Nixon could do for himself was to join Kennedy in a presidential debate on television, the first in history, because he thought that Kennedy spoke so badly that Nixon would surely win. In retrospect, we now know that perhaps the decisive or one of the decisive factors in this very close election in 1960 in Nixon losing was the fact that Nixon was thought to have lost that first debate on television. Had he not had such a low judgment of Kennedy's acceptance speech, he would not have chosen to debate and he might have become President.

One thing you always look forward to in the acceptance speech on the final night is the nominee trying to resolve a lot of the differences in his party that may have arisen that week, especially over issues in the platform. That happened in 1964. Barry Goldwater, a very conservative Senator from Arizona, was nominated. They thought Goldwater, who was far to the right, would come at least to the center of the Republican Party. He didn't. Instead he said, 'I must remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice, and moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.' He then went on to say essentially that people who are not conservatives in the Republican Party should essentially get out. And the result was that Goldwater was defeated by the largest landslide in history, which went for Lyndon Johnson that fall largely because Americans decided that Goldwater was someone who was too divisive and too far to the right, at least in the spectrum of those times, to seriously serve as President.

Herbert Humphrey hoped to use the final night of the convention to unify Democrats after the enormous divisions over Vietnam on the convention floor and in the battle in the streets of Chicago. The problem was that so overpowering were those television images of kids getting their heads beaten by the night sticks of Chicago cops that people did not listen very much to what Humphrey had to say, and he lost an enormous opportunity. In 1972, George McGovern delivered perhaps the best speech of his life. The theme of the speech was 'come home America,' and the idea was that after a decade of division over the Kennedy assassination in Vietnam, it was time to come home to old American ideals. The problem was that battles among Democrats on the convention floor even on the final night of the convention took such a long time that McGovern did not get to deliver his speech until almost before dawn Eastern Time, and the result was he gave this great speech but the only Americans who heard it in prime time were Americans who lived in Guam.

In 1976, Gerald Ford, nominated for President in his own right by Republicans in Kansas City, gave probably the best speech of his career. The problem was he gave it at the end of a convention that was almost equally divided between Ford and his chief opponent, Ronald Reagan. The result was on the final night Ford gave this great speech, but then there was a big demonstration for Reagan. Ford had to call Reagan down to the platform. And this was fascinating, because Reagan gave what was essentially to be the acceptance speech that he had intended to give if he had been nominated in 1976. And Reagan was such a better speaker than Ford that the address that everyone remembered that evening was not Ford's, the nominee, but Reagan's, and he tended to overshadow the person who had just gotten the Republican's nomination.

LEAH CLAPMAN: And it helped him get the nomination in 1980.

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: Reagan's speech that evening really set the stage for him to come back and win the new Republican nomination overwhelmingly four years later. Nominees like to use that closing night as a tableau to show that all of their opponents have fallen in line and decided to support the nominee--perhaps none more so than Jimmy Carter renominated for President in New York in 1980. He had been given a big run for his money by Ted Kennedy, in the spring of 1980; Kennedy brought his fight to the convention, did not pull out until that second night at New York. And so the result was that there were a lot of Kennedy delegates on the floor, support Carter wanted for the fall. He wanted that picture on closing night after his speech of himself holding up Kennedy's hand in the air. Kennedy had pulled out, but he was not very happy with Carter and not very enthusiastic about supporting him. He did come to the hall. He did come up on the podium, but he refused to hold Carter's hand in the air, much as Carter tried, and the result was that on all networks you saw this image of Carter almost chasing Kennedy around the podium trying to get him to hold up his arm, and Kennedy politely shaking hands and trying to leave.

LEAH CLAPMAN: Did Carter catch him?

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: He did not catch him, and the result was there was a dramatic display of Democratic disunity that caused a lot of Kennedy supporters to sit on their hands that fall.

LEAH CLAPMAN: You mention Reagan's speech in 1976 and how it projected him into the 1980 race. There was a similar situation in 1988 when Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton gave a speech that some called the most boring speech in convention history. And he, again, was nominated four years later. How did he overcome that? Do people forget the boring speeches?

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS: Bill Clinton, Governor of Arkansas in 1988, was chosen by the nominee, Michael Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts, to deliver the nominating speech for Dukakis, which is usually considered to be a great honor. There are different stories about what happened next. Bill Clinton says that the Dukakis people gave him this long speech to read that bored the convention; the Dukakis people say that Clinton, not wanting to waste his big opportunity, wrote his own speech, which lasted about a half hour and did not achieve a very enthusiastic reception, so much that Democrats wanted him off the podium by the end of this thing that when Clinton said--it just destroyed his political career on national television. Clinton shrewdly later by appearing on the Tonight Show with Johnny Carson, playing his saxophone and making fun of his appearance in Atlanta, Americans saw that Clinton had a sense of humor, and that tended to neutralize the damage.

In 1988, George Bush in New Orleans was thought of as not a very good speaker but delivered what, in retrospect, was probably the most powerful speech of his career, remembered, above all, for the statement, 'Read my lips.' The push to turn around a deficit against Mike Dukakis with 17 points helped to win the election, but that acceptance speech which was considered to be so successfully timed in a way doomed the Bush presidency. Two years later, Bush had to raised taxes. He infuriated conservatives and other Americans who said he made a sacred promise in that speech that he could not keep.