지난 3월3일 애국단체총협의회 주최 自衛的 핵무장 관련 심포지움에서 朴定洙 전 해병대 준장(워게임 전문가, 前 연합사 대항군 사령관)은 북한의 核무장은 이런 질문을 던진다고 지적하였다.

1. 한국이 武力위협을 받지 않고 영토와 영해를 지킬 수 있는가?
2. 核을 보유한 북한을 상대로 한국 주도의 자유통일이 가능한가?
3. 한국이 방해를 받지 않고 자유를 누리고 번역을 지속하며 선진국가로 도약할 수 있는가?

朴 장군은 세 질문에 대한 답은 '아니다'라고 했다. 그는 미국이 제공하기로 한 '核우산'은 北核에 대한 억지력이 되지 못한다고 했다.

<核우산은 韓美상호방위조약에 근거하고 있으나, 조약의 실행은 미국의 헌법절차, 즉 국회의 동의가 필요한 불완전한 약속이다. 유사시 미국의 개입을 자동적으로 유발하던 韓美연합사는 2015년에 해체될 것이다. 북한의 끈질긴 주한미군 철수 공작이 성공할 가능성은 높아지고 있다. 북한이, 핵우산을 억지력이라고 생각하지 않으면 억지력이 되지 못한다. 북한이 미국 본토에 도달하는 장거리 미사일을 개발하면 미국이 한반도에 개입하는 것을 억지하는 역할을 할 것이다. 그렇게 되면 미국 국민과 의회는 핵 戰場에 아들 딸들을 보내지 않으려 할 것이고, 남북한 문제에 개입하지 않을 것이라고 북한측이 판단할 것이다. 核과 같은 국가안보의 치명적인 위협에 대한 억지는 스스로 확보해야 한다>


28 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
he us government’s plan to lift the nuclear embargo on India runs
counter to global efforts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The acceptance of India into the circle of recognized nuclear weapon
states would prove that universal and generally binding principles no
longer form the basis of global non-proliferation efforts but rather that
Western countries are increasingly deciding between good and bad proliferation.
India has isolated itself through its pursuit of nuclear weapons and is
still not prepared to observe global non-proliferation rules. Nevertheless,
the Bush administration wants to cultivate New Delhi as a long-term
partner in Asia, above all as a counterweight to China. The lifting of nuclear
sanctions is the core of this policy.
India’s nuclear weapons policy has challenged the international community
for more than 30 years and paradoxically has led to a strengthening
and consolidation of the very multilateral non-proliferation efforts
that are now being put in jeopardy by the us-India nuclear deal. A loosening
or even lifting of existing nuclear restrictions in supplies would cement
India’s special position outside the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
known as the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (npt)
and would serve as a signal that the pursuit of nuclear weapons can pay
politically. Against the background of international efforts to persuade
Iran to voluntarily refrain from nuclear activities this is the wrong message.
It goes against the European approach to non-proliferation, universalizing
global norms and making them more binding. In the unstable
triangle of nuclear powers China, India, and Pakistan support for the Indian
nuclear program could also trigger a new round of the regional arms
race.
It has still not been decided whether the American government will go
through with its intention to lift the nuclear sanctions. In both Washington
and New Delhi there is opposition to the nuclear deal. Internationally,
the participants in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (nsg) have to
T
The US-India Nuclear Deal:
The End of Universal Non-Proliferation Efforts?
OLIVER MEIER
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 29
sanction the deal. In addition, India has to negotiate with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) on the arrangements for international
inspection of civil atomic reactors.
The us-Indian initiative has revived the question of how the three nuclear
powers now outside the npt – India, Israel, and Pakistan – can be
brought closer to the global non-proliferation system. Germany should
actively help to shape a solution to this problem and insist that India at
least enter into the same arms control obligations as the five recognized
nuclear weapon states before the nuclear deal is sanctioned. Binding
pledges on India’s part to permanently and verifiably limit and make
more transparent its atomic program could limit the damage to international
non-proliferation efforts.
The Nuclear Deal: A Setback for Non-Proliferation
The world reacted to India’s policy of developing its own nuclear weapons
potential outside international control mechanisms by terminating
nuclear cooperation with India across the board. German restrictions on
nuclear exports to India rest on the provisions of the npt, un Security
Council resolutions, guidelines of the nuclear supply countries, eu joint
positions and decisions, and the Foreign Trade and Payments Law. Similar
restrictions also apply to the two other atomic powers outside the
npt, Israel and Pakistan.
India’s first nuclear test in 1974, four years after npt came into force,
triggered the formation of modern export controls on nuclear goods. India
broke international agreements and misapplied a Canadian heavy water
reactor supplied explicitly for civil purposes, as well as American
nuclear materials for the production of weapons grade plutonium. (India
declared cynically that the nuclear explosion was of a »peaceful« nature
and therefore it had not broken its promises – cf. Perkovich 1999: 178󈞻.)
In order to prevent a repetition of such rule breaking the major nuclear
supply countries agreed to make iaea checks a condition of nuclear exports.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group which emerged from these efforts is
today one of the most important instruments in preventing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons technology.
When New Delhi carried out five more nuclear tests in May 1998 and
declared itself a nuclear power this was two years after the conclusion of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and three years after the unlimited
30 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
prolongation of the npt – another slap in the face for the international
community, therefore. The un Security Council unanimously condemned
the Indian tests (and the corresponding nuclear explosions in Pakistan
a few days later) in no uncertain terms. Security Council
Resolution 1172 of June 6, 1998 encouraged »all States to prevent the export
of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist
programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons.«
The eu also condemned the tests and in the joint position of October
26, 1998 emphasized the importance of export controls to slow down the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. German export legislation in relation
to states like India is more restrictive than the corresponding directives
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the eu. In the last 15 years the
Federal government by its own account has not approved any nuclear exports
to India (cf. Bundestags-Drucksache 16/1373:9).
The proposal launched by Washington to lift the supply embargo on
India for nuclear technology constitutes a radical turning away from current
controls. Such a step would not only run counter to American law
but also binding international resolutions. The American government
has therefore applied for exemptions for India from American export regulations
and the directives of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This change
of direction brings with it immense dangers for nuclear arms control.
Recognition of India’s nuclear weapons status damages the Non-proliferation
Treaty, weakens multilateral export control regimes, stokes up the
nuclear arms race in Asia, and hampers a peaceful solution of the conflict
with Iran.
India and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
The npt negotiated in 1968 is the core of all efforts to limit the proliferation
of nuclear weapons and to advance nuclear disarmament. Historically,
the Treaty, with its 189 signatory states, has been extraordinarily
successful: only India, Israel, and Pakistan have so far refused to join.1 The
incorporation of these states in the global non-proliferation regime
1. North Korea declared its withdrawal from the npt at the beginning of 2003. However,
it is a matter of dispute whether Pyongyang has in fact met all the legal conditions
for making this step valid.
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 31
remains above all a long-term aim because they possess nuclear weapons
and can join npt only as non-nuclear weapon states. The five nuclear
powers recognized by the Treaty – China, France, the uk, Russia, and the
usa – have laid down in Article IX that only those count as nuclear
weapon states which exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967.
For decades India has described this decision as »discriminatory,« but
at the same time has striven for membership of the club. A lifting of the
nuclear sanctions would grant New Delhi its wish. The stigmatization of
the nuclear embargo would be ended without India having to disarm.
When on July 18, 2005, in Washington us president George W. Bush and
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh presented to a surprised public
their plans for the resumption of nuclear cooperation Bush praised India
as a »responsible state« which could be trusted to deal properly with
modern nuclear technology and so put India on a par with the recognized
nuclear weapon states.
The proposal de facto to accept India into the club of nuclear weapon
states comes at a time when the npt is experiencing the profoundest crisis
in its history. Since the non-nuclear weapon states agreed in 1995 to prolong
the npt indefinitely the nuclear weapon states have ever more
openly and more brazenly violated their disarmament obligations. The
Bush administration’s nuclear weapons policy is the most obvious example.
The usa has extended the range of nuclear deployment to include
pre-emptive military strikes and is continuing to develop new nuclear
weapons. At the same time, Washington has withdrawn from treatybound
arms controls, refuses to ratify the nuclear test ban treaty, and is
easing restrictions on its own nuclear potential. In Washington’s slipstream
other nuclear weapon states are upgrading their own nuclear
weapons (Müller/Sohnius 2006).
At the same time, the crises surrounding the North Korean and Iranian
atomic programs have revealed the weaknesses of the npt. There is
a need for regulation, particularly in relation to controls on nuclear fuel
cycles as well as the possibility to withdraw from membership of the
treaty. And the danger of nuclear terrorism poses new challenges to the
nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Against this background the planned agreement with India represents
a new and heavy strain on the global non-proliferation regime. So far, unlimited
access to peaceful nuclear technology has only been open to npt
members. Non-nuclear weapon states, at the same time, have to open up
all their nuclear facilities to iaea controls. The recognized nuclear
32 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
weapon states have committed themselves in Article VI to nuclear disarmament.
India is continuing to rearm, however, and bars international
inspectors from many of its facilities. New Delhi is therefore to be given
the rights that go with npt membership without assuming the corresponding
duties.
This privileging of India would for many countries be one more incentive
not to submit to the rules of the Treaty. The fear is that for some
Treaty members the exit threshold is dropping. They could be tempted
to follow India’s example and hope in due course to gain access to nuclear
technology even as non-Treaty members. This applies particularly to
states like Iran which are in any case reconsidering their npt membership.
Moreover, efforts towards a universalization of npt would be hampered
because from India’s standpoint (and potentially also from those
of Israel and Pakistan) being granted access to nuclear technology would
be one less reason to join npt.
What about the view of the Deal’s advocates that India’s agreement to
let the iaea inspect all civil nuclear facilities will result in the country
gradually being drawn into npt? Certainly it is desirable that India opens
up more nuclear facilities to international inspection. Such inspections
create transparency and represent one step on the way to full inspection
of all nuclear facilities (cf. Schaper 1996).2
It is true that measures for monitoring the flow of nuclear material
(safeguards) in nuclear weapon states at best have symbolic value. Basically,
such security measures can reveal in time attempts to secretly divert
fissile materials for military purposes. A supplementary npt protocol
(which India will accept as binding) regulates security measures and creates
the legal basis for inspection by means of which secret nuclear activities
(as in Iran or North Korea) will be detected. However, by definition
the iaea will not be able to perform either task in states which already
openly possess nuclear weapons.
All nuclear weapon states accept to some extent inspections of civil nuclear
facilities, but bar access to international inspectors to facilities used
for military purposes. India will not be any different. All military premises,
two heavy water reactors, fast breeder reactors, and processing and
enrichment plants will not be subject to international inspection even in
2. On this basis, among others, because he believes that full exploitation of nuclear energy
can improve India’s economic situation iaea General Director Mohammed
ElBaradei supports the nuclear deal (cf. ElBaradei, June 14, 2006).
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 33
the future. The largest nuclear centers – the Babha Atomic Research Centre
and the Indira Ghandi Centre for Atomic Research – are to remain
completely inaccessible to international inspectors.
According to the Indian plan for the »separation« of civil and military
facilities 14 out of a total of 22 atomic reactors will be opened up to international
inspection by 2014. Eight reactors which are used for both civil
and military purposes shall remain closed to the iaea and the Indian government
alone will decide which of the facilities yet to be built shall be
subject to international inspection (according to Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, March 6, 2006).3 India’s announcement that all civil
facilities would be subject to international inspection is therefore eyewash.
It is clear what inspection rights India is willing to grant the iaea. The
Indian government has promised that inspections within the framework
of safeguards can take place in perpetuity, on condition that the relevant
agreements are »India specific.« The powerful Indian nuclear lobby’s to
some extent sharp criticism of the pro-Western course of the Singh government
indicates that India will accept only minimal controls. The negotiations
with the iaea concerning the extent and form of these
inspections, as well as the question of who will bear the not inconsiderable
costs of the safeguards are in their infancy. The nuclear agreement
can still founder on the question of inspection rights both in India and at
the iaea.
The Nuclear Deal and Nuclear Export Controls
Export controls are, alongside npt, the second instrument of international
efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. All important
supply countries have let it be known in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
that civil nuclear technology will only be delivered to countries which
submit all their facilities to iaea inspections. This is intended to prevent
the recipient from using the goods for purposes other than those originally
intended or to pass them on to third parties.
Since India still refuses to allow international inspections at all its nuclear
facilities the Nuclear Suppliers Group must change its rules before
the usa or another of the 45 participants can supply India with nuclear
3. However it is clear that nuclear imports could be used only in facilities under iaea
supervision.
34 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
technology or nuclear fuel. The usa has proposed that in future it should
be left to nsg members whether they supply India with nuclear technology.
Such a step would call into question the implicit basis of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group because it would breach the iron nsg principle that export
guidelines are binding on all nsg participants equally. This principle
is important in the creation of fair competitive conditions for the export
industries in the participating states. Even more important, equal and
binding rules prevent potential proliferators from avoiding strict export
guidelines in one supplier state by buying them from another nsg participant.
India could do exactly this in the future and the fear is that this door
will also open for other states.
The intended preferential treatment of India is already awakening an
appetite in other countries to supply their client states outside the npt
with nuclear technology. China, for example, has announced that it
wishes to supply Pakistan with nuclear technology on a large scale again.4
What of the argument of advocates that, on the contrary, India is committed
to the application of international standards in the export of nuclear
goods? For two reasons it is questionable whether the nuclear deal
will in fact have a positive effect on Indian export control policy.
On the one hand, the Bush administration already in the run-up to the
deal, gave notice to India to observe international standards in the control
of nuclear technology. This was necessary in order to placate critics in the
us Congress who against the background of the historical good relations
between Teheran and New Delhi doubt whether it is wise to supply India
with modern nuclear technology. Only a month after the nuclear deal had
been announced the us government lifted sanctions against a number of
Indian firms which had been imposed due to proliferation relevant activities.
This charter will scarcely contribute to India improving its export
controls.
On the other hand, India in any case does not always take export controls
seriously. Until very recently the Indian government has tried to
circumvent the export controls of the international nuclear embargo
through covert procurement attempts. In the wake of these secret
4. China can currently supply Pakistan with nuclear technology within the framework
of projects begun before China joined the nsg in 2004. China and Pakistan reached
agreement on a series of new nuclear projects in spring 2006 which first have to be
individually sanctioned by the nsg, however.
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 35
purchases Indian nuclear technology could have fallen into the wrong
hands (Albright/Basu). Indian export control is so lax that even American
hardliners like un ambassador John Bolton reject a relaxation of existing
supply restrictions out of fear that Indian nuclear technology be passed
on to third parties (Ruppe 2006).
The Nuclear Deal and the Arms Race in Asia
In the negotiations with the usa on the nuclear agreement India insisted
that its own nuclear armament plans will not be affected by the nuclear
deal. And successfully, as Indian head of government Singh proudly announced
on March 6, 2006, in Parliament and defended his line against
criticisms from both left and right.
»There will be no restrictions on our strategic program [the Indian
code word for the nuclear weapons program: author’s note] and the plan
to separate civil and military nuclear facilities ensures that sufficient fissile
materials and other basic materials will be available to satisfy the present
and future requirements of our strategic program which will be determined
on the basis of the perceived threat. … The integrity of our nuclear
doctrine and our ability to ensure a credible minimal deterrence have
been adequately maintained« (Singh 2006).
The nuclear deal avoids not only any interference with the Indian nuclear
weapons program but also creates the conditions for accelerated
armament. Support for the civil program will also benefit India’s nuclear
weapons program. This is because India’s uranium reserves are meager.
Already its own outputs cover a mere two thirds of requirements for civil
and military purposes. Without the lifting of supply restrictions there will
be a bottleneck in the uranium supply as early as the end of 2006. If India
as announced wishes to continue to build up civil utilization and pursue
nuclear armament it will have to import uranium in the short term.
Such uranium imports would enable India to use its own scarce uranium
reserves primarily or even exclusively for nuclear weapons production.
A group of Indian and Pakistani experts have calculated that imports
of nuclear fuel for those facilities which in future will come under international
supervision would put India in a position to increase nuclear
weapon production from the current seven warheads to 40󈞞 nuclear
weapons a year (Mian/Nayyar/Rajaraman/Ramana 2006: 20󈞄). Add to
that the fact that spent fuel rods alone which India does not wish to put
under international supervision contain enough plutonium for around
36 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
1,000 more nuclear weapons (Mian/Ramana, January/February 2006:
17).
Although India’s nuclear weapons policy is surrounded by a mantel of
secrecy there is no doubt that New Delhi’s policy of »minimal deterrence«
boils down to further nuclear armament. India intends to build up its nuclear
weapons arsenal in the coming years from around 40󈞞 nuclear
weapons to 300� land, air, and sea based missiles (Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, September/October 2005).
For other reasons too it may be doubted whether the nuclear deal will
promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Military misuse of civil
imports cannot be ruled out over the long term because the us-friendly
and pro-Western course of the current Indian government can change
(Wagner 2006). In addition, the resumption of international nuclear cooperation
would provide India with the technical knowledge the country
lacks after the 30-year nuclear embargo. Since in India the military and
civil nuclear programs are particularly close knit the nuclear weapons program
would also benefit from any technology transfer.
A new arms race threatens because regional rivals Pakistan and China
are likely to react to a build up in India’s nuclear weapons capacity with
their own armament. Pakistan is currently building a reactor which
would probably put the country in a position to draw level with India and
also produce 40󈞞 warheads a year (Warrick 2006). If India continues
to arm itself with nuclear weapons Pakistan would certainly use this capacity.
A high-ranking Pakistani officer has threatened that Pakistan
would not only rethink its nuclear weapons policy but could also realign
its foreign policy as a whole if the West supports India’s nuclear program
(Ruppe, July 14, 2006).
The advocates of the agreement argue that it would conduct India towards
arms control. us Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted at
the hearings on the nuclear deal before Congress that the strategy of isolating
India had not worked. This policy has had no effect on Indian nuclear
weapons policy, and had not prevented India and Pakistan from
carrying out nuclear tests in 1998.
That may be true but it is questionable whether the new approach will
lead to a curb on India’s nuclear program and so lessen the danger of a
new arms race. India has promised in exchange for the lifting of nuclear
sanctions to take on the same responsibilities as the recognized nuclear
weapon states and to behave accordingly. The Indian government’s arms
control policy pledges so far fall far short of this self-imposed aim. New
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 37
Delhi refuses to sign the Test Ban Treaty although the five recognized nuclear
weapon states have already done so, and has merely promised to test
no more nuclear weapons until further notice.5
Furthermore, India wants more fissile materials for nuclear weapons
although none of the five recognized nuclear weapon states produce enriched
uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons any more. It is true
that New Delhi stated within the framework of the nuclear deal that it
would assist an agreement on the ban on producing fissile materials for
military purposes. On this topic too, however, the disarmament-hostile
Bush administration and the Singh government, intent on maximum
freedom of action are basically in agreement and wish to avoid a verifiable
ban for as long as possible.
The Nuclear Deal and the Conflict Concerning the Iranian Nuclear Program
The nuclear deal will hinder efforts towards a diplomatic solution in the
nuclear dispute with Iran. The intended lifting of nuclear sanctions provides
hardliners in Teheran with arguments they would otherwise lack for
maintaining their nuclear course. At the end of July 2005, only two weeks
after the us and India had declared their readiness for nuclear cooperation,
a member of the Iranian government complained about American
double standards: »On the one hand the usa refuses to provide a member
of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with nuclear
technology to be used for peaceful purposes but at the same time from
selfish motives they cooperate with India which stands outside the
Treaty« (cf. Tisdall, July 28, 2005).
The Bush administration freely admits that it is applying double standards.
us Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, who was prominent
in the negotiations on the nuclear agreement, said in a speech on April 6,
2006, that »We treat India, a democratic and peaceful friend differently
from Iran and North Korea, and we are proud of it. … India keeps to the
rules, Iran does not. If that is a system of double standards then we are
proud to adopt such double standards for a democratic friend« (cf.
5. Prime Minister Singh declared on July 18, 2005, that India was ready within the
framework of the nuclear deal »to assume the same responsibilities and practices
and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced
nuclear technology, such as the United States« (cited in: The White House
2005).
38 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
Ruppe, April 12, 2005). This stance, also shared by the German government,
6 may attract sympathy for Iran among states not bound by the
treaty which in any case doubt the value of the npt because of us nuclear
weapons policy.
The international community wishes to convince Iran that maintaining
its nuclear path will have political and economic costs. The nuclear
deal with India, on the other hand, is likely to strengthen the forces in Teheran
which believe that long term a strategy of staying the course will be
rewarded. The parallels are clear. For decades the us pushed for nuclear
disarmament in South Asia and supported un Security Council resolutions
condemning India and Pakistan for their nuclear policy. Now John
Bolton describes the nuclear weapons programs of India and Pakistan as
»open and legitimate« (March 1, 2006, Arieff 2006).
This arbitrary distinction between acceptable and unacceptable nuclear
programs invalidates the search for universal and generally binding
rules for the prevention of proliferation. Thinking it through to the end
the new approach means that the us no longer regards the further proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction as a problem but increasingly
makes a distinction between good and bad proliferation (cf. also Mützenich
2006). eu efforts to give international non-proliferation treaties global
validity would founder if this approach came to dominate (Neuneck/
Meier 2006).
Improving the Nuclear Deal
Shortly after coming to office at the beginning of 2001 the Bush administration
decided to cultivate India as a strategic partner in Asia. The »biggest
democracy in the world« was to form a military and political
counterweight vis-à-vis China. Moreover, India is attractive as a market
for us products. If the nuclear deal goes through us firms would have a
head start over international rivals in the state regulated nuclear and defense
sectors. These geostrategic and economic interests explain the
6. On April 19, 2006, the German ambassador to India, Bernd Mützelburg, told the
Indian daily The Hindu: »Everyone in Germany understands … that India and Iran
cannot be compared, not only because one state is a partner in the npt and the other
is not, but also because India is demonstrably a reliable and responsible state when
it comes to non-proliferation« (cf. Baruah, April 19, 2006).
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 39
change of course in us policy towards India. On their account it is worth
it for the Bush administration to weaken multilateral instruments like the
npt, the value of which many in the us government doubt in any case
(Mian/Ramana: 12󈝹).
Before the us can supply India with nuclear technology the us Congress
has to agree to a change in the strict us export guidelines. The
House of Representatives has already got the relevant legislation under
way and links its agreement to four conditions: (i) India must come up
with a »credible« plan for separating civil and military nuclear facilities,
(ii) it must reach agreement with the iaea on the inspection of civil facilities,
(iii) it must actively support a multilateral treaty on ending production
of weapons grade fissile materials, and (iv) the lifting of sanctions
shall depend on the agreement of the members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (cf. House of Representatives, July 21, 2006: 9󈝷).7
The Nuclear Suppliers Group therefore will be next to take decisions
on the nuclear deal. Since the Group always makes decisions on a consensus
basis each one of the 45 participant states possesses a formal veto.
Support for the nuclear deal has come so far only from the nuclear
weapon states France, the uk, and Russia.8 The American course has been
criticized by, alongside China, the traditional advocates of disarmament
Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Austria, and Sweden. Political heavyweights
such as Brazil, Japan, and Germany have so far not taken a clear
position.
The German government has tacked for months concerning how it
will react to the nuclear deal. According to press reports the Foreign Office
is split on the question. While the Asia department pragmatically calls
for support for the American line the disarmament department advocates
the imposition of stronger conditions on India. There is obviously considerable
fear of angering Washington or New Delhi by criticizing the
deal (Muscat 2006). In the run-up to the state visit to Germany of Indian
premier Singh in April 2006 the German ambassador in New Delhi,
Bernd Mützelburg made it clear that »we would be glad to see and already
see … that India is increasingly attaining the same rank as the other
7. At the time of writing similar legislation was expected to be passed by the us Senate
in September 2006.
8. Paris has wanted to cooperate with India in the nuclear sector for a long time. President
Jacques Chirac signed a corresponding agreement on February 20, 2006 with
New Delhi (see Declaration by India and France, 2006).
40 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
nuclear weapon states, with the same rights and the same duties. That is
a process that we will willingly support. Therefore we will not object to
the civil nuclear agreement with the usa« (cf. Baruah 2006).
Since this advance the German government has avoided any commitment
on this issue central for non-proliferation.9 Foreign minister Frank-
Walter Steinmeier asked merely »whether another time might be better
for such an agreement given the ongoing negotiations with Iran« (Steinmeier
2006). In a joint press conference with Prime Minister Singh in
April 2006 Chancellor Angela Merkel avoided any commitment but
made it clear that Germany would wait to see how the us Congress would
decide: »Then we will see in the Nuclear Suppliers Group,« according to
Merkel (Federal Press Conference, April 23, 2006). The German government
appears to want to avoid the topic and is hiding behind partners and
allies. If the nuclear deal founders in Washington or New Delhi the problem
will have solved itself. If the us Congress consents to the agreement,
however, the government can argue that the force of circumstances makes
German agreement to the lifting of sanctions necessary.
In the Bundestag misgivings preponderate. All three opposition parties
have tabled motions which either call for a continuation of the supply
embargo or call on the German government to link agreement to the deal
to Indian assent to arms control. There is clearly no agreement in the government
coalition on what position should be taken to the nuclear deal.
While in a parliamentary debate at the beginning of March 2006 the disarmament
spokesman of the cdu/csu faction, Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu
Guttenberg, described the agreement as »ambivalent,« his counterpart
from the spd, Rolf Mützenich, warned that the deal called into question
the principle anchored in the npt that only states which renounce nuclear
weapons will be rewarded with access to civil nuclear technology. »This
is the first time that this principle has unilaterally – it must be said – been
thwarted« (German Bundestag, Records of the plenary sessions 16/23:
1805). Cross-party unity still reigns, however, that the German government
should try to improve the deal and oblige India to stricter arms control
measures (German Bundestag, Records of the plenary sessions 16/23:
3176�, 3207�).
Through its passive stance the German government is missing an opportunity
to help determine the conditions of a lifting of nuclear sanc-
9. The answer to a question by the Bundestag faction Bündnis 90/Die Grünen on the
topic remained largely devoid of substance (cf. Bundestags-Drucksache 16/1373).
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 41
tions. This is all the more astonishing as the Foreign Minister and the spd
recently selected nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a major
topic of German foreign policy. Particularly in the first half of 2007, when
Germany will have the eu presidency and the chair of the G8 at the same
time, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will increase in significance
(Beck 2006).
There is some room to maneuver between unconditional agreement
and total rejection of the nuclear deal which can be used to bind India
more firmly into the network of multilateral arms control obligations
without damaging transatlantic or German-Indian relations. The dispute
about the right conditions for the lifting of nuclear sanctions and so the
integration of India, Israel, and Pakistan in non-proliferation is in full
swing. Its outcome will depend largely on the European advocates of
arms control, like Germany, because only they have the political weight
to defy the nuclear weapon states.
Since India would like to join the club of recognized nuclear weapon
states it is reasonable to demand that it obey the same rules as them. In
concrete terms, this concerns three areas.
First, India must acknowledge the nuclear disarmament obligations of
Article VI of the npt and take the same arms control steps as the other
recognized nuclear weapon states. Before the nuclear supply restrictions
are lifted India must sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and declare a binding
moratorium on the production of weapons grade fissile materials. The
supply states should make it clear that a breach of these obligations – for
example, by a nuclear weapons test – would lead to renewed sanctions.
Second, India must define what it means by a »credible minimum deterrence
« and specify reliable boundaries for its nuclear weapons policy.
This transparency is necessary in order to diminish the danger of a regional
arms race. A refusal on India’s part to clearly outline its own nuclear
weapons potential would be an indication that India also wishes to
use civil supplies to advance its nuclear armament.
Finally, India must clearly, permanently, and verifiably separate civil
and military nuclear fuel cycles. All facilities, including those yet to be
built, which also only partly serve civil purposes must permanently come
under »safeguards.« Until the corresponding control agreements with
the iaea come into force supply restrictions should not be lifted.
These steps would be eloquent expression that India is ready to draw
closer to the global non-proliferation regime. Such measures would also
lead towards the goal of a nuclear free world. Giving up this goal and
42 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal ipg 4/2006
drawing back from the requirement that India, Israel, and Pakistan enter
the npt as non-nuclear weapon states would mean admitting the collapse
of the npt. How the international community deals with the Indian nuclear
program will decide the future of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation
as a whole.
Bibliography
Albright, David/Basu, Susan (March 10, 2006): »India’s Gas Centrifuge Program:
Stopping Illicit Procurement and the Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know-How,«
Institute for Science and International Security (isis), Washington, d.c. (http://
www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/indianprocurement.pdf, accessed 31.7.
06).
Arieff, Irwin (March 1, 2006): »India, Pakistan Got Atomic Arms ›Legitimately,‹ us,«
Reuters: New York.
Baruah, Amit (April 19, 2006): »The Sky Is the Limit for Indo-German Relationship,«
in: The Hindu (http://www.thehindu.com/2006/04/19/stories/2006041905671100.
htm, accessed 31.7.2006).
Beck, Kurt (June 26, 2006): Rede des Vorsitzenden der Sozialdemokratischen Partei
Deutschlands, des rheinland-pfälzischen Ministerpräsidenten Kurt Beck auf der
Veranstaltung »Frieden durch Abrüstung: Völkerrecht und nukleare Nichtverbreitung
«, spd Disarmament Conference, Willy-Brandt-Haus, Berlin.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 2005): »India’s Nuclear Forces
2005,« pp. 73󈞷.
Federal Press Conference (2006): Press conference of Chancellor Merkel and the Indian
Prime Minister Singh in Hanover (Berlin).
Bundestags-Drucksache [Parliamentary document] 16/1373: Antwort der Bundesregierung
auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Winfried Nachtwei, Jürgen Trittin,
Alexander Bonde, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion bündnis 90/die
grünen: Haltung der Bundesregierung zum Abkommen zwischen Indien und den
USA zur nuklearen Zusammenarbeit, May 4, 2006.
Declaration by India and France on the Development of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes,
New Delhi, February 20, 2006.
Deutscher Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll (Records of the plenary sessions) 16/23, Stenografischer
Bericht, 23. Sitzung, March 10, 2006.
Deutscher Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll 16/36, Stenografischer Bericht, 36. Sitzung,
May 19, 2006.
ElBaradei, Mohamed (June 14, 2006): »Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards,« in: Washington
Post.
House of Representatives (July 21, 2006): »H.R. 5682, A bill to exempt from certain
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,« Report No. 109�, Part I, 109, 2nd
Session. Washington, d.c.
ipg 4/2006 Meier, The US-India Nuclear Deal 43
Mian, Z./Nayyar, A.H./Rajaraman, R./Ramana, M.V. (July 11, 2006): »Fissile Materials
in South Asia and the Implications of the u.s.–India Nuclear Deal,« Draft report for
the International Panel on Fissile Materials, Princeton: International Panel on Fissile
Materials. (http://www.fissilematerials.org/southasia.pdf, accessed 31.7.2006).
Mian, Zia/Ramana, M.V. (January/February 2006): »Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs:
Behind the u.s. Nuclear Deal With India,« in: Arms Control Today 36 (1): pp. 11󈝽.
Müller, Harald/Sohnius, Stephanie (2006): »Intervention und Kernwaffen. Zur neuen
Nukleardoktrin der usa,« in: HSFK-Report 1/2006, Frankfurt/M.: Hessische Stiftung
für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung.
Mützenich, Rolf (August 2006): »Von guten und bösen Nuklearmächten,« in: Blätter
für deutsche und internationale Politik 51 (8): pp. 905�.
Muscat, Sabine (February 23, 2006): »Auswärtiges Amt streitet über Nuklearexporte
an Indien,« in: Financial Times Deutschland.
Neuneck, Götz/Meier, Oliver (2006): »In der Defensive: Europas Politik der Nichtverbreitung
von Massenvernichtungswaffen,« in: Reinhard Mutz/Bruno Schoch/
Corinna Hauswedell/Jochen Hippler/Ulrich Ratsch (eds.): Friedensgutachten 2006,
Münster: lit-Verlag, pp. 198�.
Perkovich, George (1999): India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Nonproliferation.
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
Rice, Condoleezza (April 5, 2006): »Remarks of Condoleezza Rice at the House International
Relations Committee on the u.s.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,
« u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Washington, d.c.
Ruppe, David (March 8, 2006): »u.s. Concerns Overridden for India Nuclear Deal,«
in: Global Security Newswire.
Ruppe, David (April 12, 2006): »u.s. Acknowledges ›Double Standard‹ on India
Deal,« in: Global Security Newswire.
Ruppe, David (July 14, 2006): »u.s.-Indian Nuclear Deal Could Cause ›Realignment‹
in South Asia, Pakistani Official Says,« in: Global Security Newswire.
Schaper, Annette (1996): »Viewpoint: The Case for Universal Full-Scope Safeguards
on Nuclear Material,« in: The Nonproliferation Review, No. 3 (Winter): pp. 69󈞼.
Singh, Manmohan (March 6, 2006): »Text of PM Singh’s Statement to India’s Parliament
on the Civil-Military Separation Plan,« New Delhi.
Steinmeier, Frank-Walter (23.03.2006): »Die größte Herausforderung ist der Iran,«
Interview in: Die Zeit.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (July 18, 2005): »Joint Statement between
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,« Washington,
d.c.
Tisdall, Simon (July 28, 2005): »Tehran Accuses us of Nuclear Double Standard,« in:
Guardian.
Wagner, Christian (March 2006): Indien als strategischer Partner der usa, swp-Aktuell
13, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
Warrick, Joby (July 24, 2006): »Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program,« in: Washington
Post.