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¹Ì Áß¾ÓÁ¤º¸±¹(CIA) ºÏÇÑ ºÐ¼®°üÀ» Áö³½ ºê·ç½º Ŭ¸µ³Ê Ç츮ƼÁöÀç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº 27ÀÏ VOA¿¡ ¡°¿ÀÇÚ·± ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀÌ Á¦½ÃÇÑ ±Ù°ÅµéÀº °ø°¨ÇÏÁö¸¸, ÀüÀÛ±Ç Àüȯ ³íÀÇ ÆóÁö °á·Ð¿¡´Â µ¿ÀÇÇÏÁö ¸øÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
[Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø] ¡°I think there are lot of commendable points in his article that I agree with. Although, I don¡¯t agree with the conclusion. I think there always has to be a goal of having operational control transition¡¦I think if we formally renounced forever op-con transfer. I think that would cause strain with the South Korean government and I think it would have negative impact on South Korean public opinion poll of the US and the Alliance itself¡±
¾ç±¹Àº ÀüÀ۱ǿ¡ °ü·ÃÇÑ ¸ñÇ¥´Â °¡Á®¾ß Çϸç, ¿µ¿øÈ÷ ¾øÀ» °ÍÀ̶ó´Â °ø½Ä Ç¥¸íÀº Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ¿ÍÀÇ °ü°è¸¦ ¾ÇȽÃų »Ó ¾Æ´Ï¶ó µ¿¸Í ÀÚü¸¦ Àǹ®½ÃÇÏ´Â Çѱ¹ ³» ¿©·Ð¿¡ ºÎÁ¤Àû ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¥ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â ÁöÀûÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
´Ù¸¸ Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº Çö½ÃÁ¡¿¡¼ Çѱ¹±ºÀº ÁöÈÖ, ÅëÁ¦, Åë½Å Á¤º¸, °¨½Ã, Á¤Âû µîÀ» È¿À²ÀûÀ¸·Î ¼öÇàÇϱâ À§ÇÑ Ã¼°èÀÎ C4ISR ´É·Â¿¡ »ó´çÇÑ °áÁ¡À» µå·¯³»°í ÀÖ´Ù¸ç, À̰°Àº Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÃæÁ·µÇÁö ¾Ê´Â ÇÑ Àü½ÃÀÛÀü±Ç ÀüȯÀº ¾î·Æ´Ù´Â Á¡µµ °Á¶ÇÒ Çʿ䰡 ÀÖ´Ù°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
¹Ì-ÇÑ ´ç±¹Àº Áö³ÇØ ÀüÀ۱ǿ¡ ´ëÇÑ ±âº»¿î¿ë ´É·Â °ËÁõÀ» ¸¶Ä£ °¡¿îµ¥, ¿ÃÇØ ÃÑ ¼¼ ´Ü°è Áß µÎ ¹øÂ°ÀÎ ¿ÏÀü ¿î¿ë ´É·Â °ËÁõÀ» ¾ÕµÎ°í ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ÇÏÁö¸¸ ¹Ì±¹Àº ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀº Çѱ¹±ºÀÇ ÇÙ½É ±º»ç ´É·Â È®º¸, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ¹Ì»çÀÏ À§Çù¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ãʱâ Çʼö ´ëÀÀ ´É·Â ±¸ºñ, Çѹݵµ¿Í Áö¿ª ¾Èº¸ ȯ°æ µî 3´ë ¼±Á¦Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÃæÁ·µÅ¾ß °¡´ÉÇÏ´Ù´Â Á¡À» ºÐ¸íÈ÷ Çϰí ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù.
ÀüÀÛ±Ç ¹®Á¦¿¡ ±íÀÌ °ü¿©ÇÑ ¹ö³ªµå ¼¤Æ÷ Àü ÁÖÇѹÌ8±º »ç·É°üÀº VOA¿¡, ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀÇ ´çÀ§¼º¿¡ ´ëÇØ¼± °ø°¨Çϸ鼵µ Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ ½ÃÇÑ Áß½ÉÀÌ ¾Æ´Ñ Á¶°ÇºÎ¶ó´Â Á¡À» ºÐ¸íÈ÷ ÀÎÁöÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í °Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[¼¤Æ÷ Àü »ç·É°ü] ¡°I don¡¯t know what time has to do with Op-Con transition. It defies logic, in other words the transition should occur when both sides agree that they¡¯ve met the conditions for the transfer of authority. Because the conditions are driven by readiness by the combined readiness of the Alliance for the US and ROK forces and time doesn¡¯t necessarily have any impact.¡±
3´ë ¼±Á¦ Á¶°ÇÀÌ ¿¬ÇÕ Àü·ÂÀÇ ´ëºñż¼¿Í ¹ÐÁ¢ÇÏ°Ô °ü·Ã ÀÖ´Â Á¡À» °¨¾ÈÇÒ ¶§, ½ÃÇÑ Áß½ÉÀÇ ÃßÁø ÀÏÁ¤Àº ¾çÃøÀÌ ÇÕÀÇÇÑ Á¶°ÇºÎ ³í¸®¿¡ ¾î±ß³´Ù´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
µµ³Îµå Æ®·³ÇÁ ¹Ì±¹ ´ëÅë·É°ú ¹®ÀçÀÎ Çѱ¹ ´ëÅë·ÉÀº Áö³ 2017³â Á¤»óȸ´ã¿¡¼, Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÑ Çѱ¹±ºÀ¸·ÎÀÇ ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀÌ Á¶¼ÓÈ÷ °¡´ÉÇϵµ·Ï µ¿¸Í Â÷¿øÀÇ Çù·ÂÀ» Áö¼ÓÇØ ³ª°¡±â·Î °áÁ¤Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¾Èº¸ Àü¹®°¡µé »çÀÌ¿¡´Â ¾ç±¹ÀÌ ¡®Á¶°ÇºÎ¡¯·Î ÇÕÀÇÇßÀ½¿¡µµ Çѱ¹ÀÌ »ç½Ç»ó ½ÃÇÑ Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ÃßÁøÇϰí ÀÖ´Ù°í º¸´Â ½Ã°¢ÀÌ ¸¹½À´Ï´Ù.
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ºòÅÍ Â÷ Àü·«±¹Á¦¹®Á¦¿¬±¸¼Ò(CSIS)Àº Áö³ 22ÀÏ ¹Ì-ÇÑ °ü°è ¾ÇÈ º¯¼ö·Î ÀüÀÛ±Ç Àüȯ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ²ÅÀ¸¸ç, ¾çÃøÀÌ Á¶°ÇºÎ·Î ÇÕÀÇÇÑ »ç¾ÈÀÌ Çѱ¹ÀÇ Á¤Ä¡Àû °è»ê¿¡ µû¶ó ¾ðÁ¦µç ½ÃÇÑ Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ¹Ù²Ü ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[Â÷ ¼®ÁÂ] ¡°Which the Moon government for political, some ideological reasons would like to see this happen by the end of his term in office. Now of course there are lots of prerequisites that have to be met for that to happen¡¦But this may all be trumped by a political imperative by the South Koreans that could also create more complication in the relationships.¡±
ºê·ç½º º£³Ý ·£µå¿¬±¸¼Ò ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øµµ VOA¿¡ Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¸ñÇ¥½ÃÇѱîÁö Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÃæÁ· ¾ÈµÆÀ½¿¡µµ ÀüȯÀ» ¿ä±¸ÇÒ ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Ù¸ç, °ÅºÎÇÒ °æ¿ì °ü°è ¾Çȸ¦ ¿ì·ÁÇØ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Å¸ÇùÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ¼À¹ýÀÌ ±ò·Á ÀÖÀ» °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù°í ºÐ¼®Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[º£³Ý ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø] ¡°I think it is a possibility that the US could just decide to compromise. When you have an alliance you have to say how intensely each side feel about a position.¡±
ÀÌ¿¡ ´ëÇØ Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº Çѱ¹ÀÌ ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀÇ Á¶°Ç ÃæÁ·¿¡ ½ÇÆÐÇÒ °æ¿ì, Çѱ¹ ³» ¿©·Ð µîÀ» ÀǽÄÇØ ¹Ì-ÇÑ ´ç±¹ÀÇ Á¶À²µÈ ¿©·Ð °ü¸®°¡ ¹Ýµå½Ã ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù°í °Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
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