ÁÖ¸ñ¹Þ´Â ºÏÇÑ SLBM¡¦"Àá¼öÇÔ ÇѰè Å©Áö¸¸ ÆÇ¼¼ ¹Ù²Ü ¹Ì·¡ÀÇ À§Çù"

ºÏÇÑÀÌ ´ë·ú°£Åºµµ¹Ì»çÀÏ(ICBM)°ú ÇÔ²² »õ Àü·«¹«±â·Î °ú½ÃÇÑ Àá¼öÇԹ߻çźµµ¹Ì»çÀÏ(SLBM)¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´Ù¾çÇÑ ºÐ¼®ÀÌ ¿ö½ÌÅÏ¿¡¼­ ³ª¿À°í ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ¿­¾ÇÇÑ Àá¼öÇÔÀÇ ÇѰ踦 ±Øº¹ÇÏÁö ¸øÇØ ´çÀåÀº ½Ç¿ëÈ­ÇÏ±â ¾î·ÆÁö¸¸, ÇâÈÄ ÆÇ¼¼¸¦ Èçµé À§ÇèÇÑ ºñ´ëĪ Àü·ÂÀ̶ó´Â ¿ì·Á°¡ Ä¿Áö°í ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ¹é¼º¿ø ±âÀÚ°¡ ÃëÀçÇß½À´Ï´Ù.

¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¹Ì»çÀÏ Àü¹®°¡µéÀº ¿©ÀüÈ÷ ºÒÅõ¸íÇÑ ºÏÇÑ SLBMÀÇ À§·Â¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¡°½ÇÁ¦ ¿ª·®¡±°ú ¡°ÆÄ±Þ·Â¡±À» ºÐ¸®Çؼ­ Æò°¡ÇÕ´Ï´Ù. źµµ¹Ì»çÀÏ ´É·ÂÀ» µÞ¹ÞħÇÏÁö ¸øÇÏ´Â Àá¼öÇÔ ±â¼ú°ú °ÇÁ¶ ÇöȲÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¶§ ´çÀå ¹°¸®Àû °ø°Ý ¼ö´ÜÀ¸·Î Ȱ¿ëµÉ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù´Â ±â¼úÀû ºÐ¼®, ±×¸®°í ¹«±â ÀÚü°¡ °®´Â ºñ´ëĪÀû ¼º°Ý°ú ¿Ï¼º ÀÌÈÄ °¨´çÇØ¾ß ÇÒ ICBM ÀÌ»óÀÇ À§Çù ¶§¹®¿¡ ¡®°ÔÀÓüÀÎÀú¡¯·Î ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÀáÀçÀû À§Çèµµ ºÐ¼®ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

¹Ì»çÀÏ ¹ß»çÀÇ ±â¹ÝÀÎ Àá¼öÇÔ ±â¼ú ¼öÁظ¸À» ³õ°í º¸¸é ±âÁ¸ SLBM º¸À¯±¹°ú ºñ±³ÇØ ¸î ¼¼´ë³ª µÚóÁ® ÀÖ´Ù´Â µ¥ Àü¹®°¡µéÀº ´ëü·Î µ¿ÀÇÇÕ´Ï´Ù. À̾ð Àª¸®¾ö½º Àü·«±¹Á¦¹®Á¦¿¬±¸¼Ò(CSIS) ¹Ì»çÀÏ ¹æ¾îÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ® ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº VOA¿ÍÀÇ ÀüÈ­ ÅëÈ­¿¡¼­ ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¹Ì»çÀÏ °³¹ß°ú °ü·ÃÇØ¼± ¸Õ ±æÀ» ¿ÔÁö¸¸ Àá¼öÇÔÀÇ °æ¿ì¿£ ±×·¸Áö ¾Ê´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°ÀÌ ºÎºÐÀÌ µµÀü °úÁ¦¡±¶ó°í Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù.

[À̾ð Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹Àå] ¡°They seem to be further along in terms of missile development than they do on sub development. That is the real challenging part.¡±

ƯÈ÷ ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¼º´ÉÀÌ ¿ì¼öÇÑ SLBMÀ» °¡Á³´Ù ÇØµµ ÇöÀç ¿î¿ë ÁßÀÎ Àá¼öÇÔÀº Ç×ÇØ¿¡ ÀûÇÕÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Ù¡±¸ç, ¡°¼ÒÀ½ÀÌ ½ÉÇØ ¹Ì±¹, Çѱ¹, ÀϺ»ÀÇ ´ëÀáÇÔÁ¤À̳ª Àá¼öÇÔ¿¡ Æ÷ÂøµÇ±â ½±´Ù¡±´Â ÇѰ踦 µé¾ú½À´Ï´Ù.

[À̾ð Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹Àå] ¡°They can get really good sub launched ballistic missiles, but their submarine is not seaworthy for it is really loud and easy to be shadowed or followed or found by the U.S. or the South Korean, Japanese anti-submarine ships or submarines.¡±

½ÇÁ¦·Î ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÁÖ·ÂÀ¸·Î ¿î¿ëÇÏ¸ç °³·®À» °ÅµìÇØ¿Â ·Î¹Ì¿À±Þ Àá¼öÇÔÀº ¡®¹Ù´ÙÀÇ °æ¿î±â¡¯¶ó ºÒ¸± Á¤µµ·Î ¼ÒÀ½ÀÌ ½ÉÇÕ´Ï´Ù. °Ô´Ù°¡ 6.7m±ÞÀÇ ¾Ð·Â¼±Ã¼¸¦ °¡Áö°í ÀÖ¾î ¿©±â¿¡ źµµ ¹Ì»çÀÏÀ» ½Æ´Â °ÍÀº ºÒ°¡´ÉÇÕ´Ï´Ù. Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº ¡°ºÎ·Â¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ¼ö¸éÀ¸·Î ¶°¿À¸¥ ¹Ì»çÀÏÀÌ °øÁß¿¡¼­ Á¡È­ÇÏ´Â ¡®Äݵå·ÐÄ¡¡¯ ¿ª·®±îÁö´Â ¾î´À Á¤µµ º¸¿©ÁáÁö¸¸, ÀÌ ¹Ì»çÀÏÀ» ÀåÂøÇØ ¿î¹ÝÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¾ÈÁ¤Àû Àá¼öÇÔÀ» °³¹ßÇϰųª ¹èÄ¡ÇÏÁö´Â ¸øÇß´Ù¡±¸ç ºÏÇÑÀÇ Àá¼öÇÔ ±â¼úÀ» ¡°2~3¼¼´ë µÚ¶³¾îÁø 1950³â´ë³ª 60³â´ë ¼öÁØ¡±À¸·Î Áø´ÜÇß½À´Ï´Ù.

[À̾ð Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹Àå] ¡°It's gonna be a very rudimentary, is probably going to be two to three generations behind, you know 1950s, 60s kind of era. So, it's going to be noisy and it's going to be probably pretty easy to track.¡±

°Ô´Ù°¡ ¡°¹Ì»çÀÏÀ» Àá¼öÇÔ ¹ß»ç ÀåÄ¡¿¡ ¿Ã¸®´Â °ÍÀº ÈξÀ º¹ÀâÇÑ ±â¼úÀ» ÇÊ¿ä·Î ÇÑ´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°´çÀåÀº ±¹°¡ À§½Å(prestige) ¶§¹®¿¡ SLBM ¿ª·®À» °ú½ÃÇÏ´Â °Í¡±À¸·Î ºÐ¼®Çß½À´Ï´Ù.

¾Õ¼­ ºÏÇÑÀº Áö³­ 2016³â 8¿ù ¡®ºÏ±Ø¼º-1Çü¡¯ ¹ß»ç·Î SLMB º¸À¯±¹ ¹Ý¿­¿¡ ¿Ã¶ú´Ù´Â Æò°¡°¡ ³ª¿À±âµµ ÇßÁö¸¸ ¹ß»ç°ü Çϳª¿¡ ºÒ°úÇÑ ½ÅÆ÷±Þ Àá¼öÇÔÀ» Ç÷§ÆûÀ¸·Î ÀÌ¿ëÇÑ °ÍÀ¸·Î ÆÄ¾ÇµÆ°í, Áö³­ÇØ 10¿ù ¼öÁß ¹ß»çÇÑ ¡®ºÏ±Ø¼º-3Çü¡¯Àº Àá¼öÇÔÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ¹ÙÁö¼± À§¿¡¼­ ¹ß»çÇß´Ù´Â ºÐ¼®ÀÌ Áö¹èÀûÀÔ´Ï´Ù. Á¦ÇÁ¸® ·çÀ̽º ¹Ìµéº£¸® ±¹Á¦Çבּ¸¼Ò µ¿¾Æ½Ã¾ÆºñÈ®»ê¼¾ÅÍ ¼ÒÀåÀº ÀÌ·± ÇѰ踦 °í·ÁÇØ ºÏÇÑÀÇ SLBMÀ» ¡°Àå±âÀû À§Çù¡±À¸·Î ±ÔÁ¤Çß½À´Ï´Ù.

[Á¦ÇÁ¸® ·çÀ̽º ¼ÒÀå] ¡°I take it seriously but it's probably a longer-term thing.¡±

ƯÈ÷ ¡°Áß±¹µµ SLBM °³¹ß¿¡ ¸Å¿ì ¿À·£ ½Ã°£ÀÌ °É·È°í 1980³â´ë¿¡ ¸Å¿ì Á¶¾ÇÇÑ ¸ðµ¨À» ¼±º¸¿´Áö¸¸ ¡®¹èÄ¡Çß´Ù¡¯°í ¸»ÇÒ ¼öµµ ¾ø´Â ¼öÁØÀ̾ú´Ù¡±°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù.

[Á¦ÇÁ¸® ·çÀ̽º ¼ÒÀå] ¡°It took the Chinese a long time to work that out. You know, and the Chinese deployed a really lousy SLBM in the 1980s and I guess I wouldn't even really say they deployed it.¡±

Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº ÀεµÀÇ ¿¹¸¦ µé¸ç, ¡°Á¦´ë·Î ÀÛµ¿Çϴ źµµ¹Ì»çÀÏÀ» º¸À¯ÇßÁö¸¸ Àá¼öÇÔÀ» °³¹ßÇÏ´Â µ¥´Â 20³â°¡·® °É·È´Ù¡±¸ç, ÀÌÁ¦¾ß ±â¼úÀ» °®Ãá °ÍÀ¸·Î º¸Àδ١±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¡°ºÏÇѺ¸´Ù °æÁ¦ ±Ô¸ð°¡ ÈξÀ Å©°í ±â¼ú¿¡ Á¢±ÙÇϱ⠽¬¿î ÀεµÀÇ »ç·Ê¸¦ º¼ ¶§ (Àá¼öÇÔ) °³¹ßÀÌ ¾ó¸¶³ª ¾î·Á¿îÁö ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù¡±´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

[À̾ð Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹Àå] ¡°Even countries like India—they have spent like 20 years trying to get their submarine, their ballistic missiles work well and they're just now, sort of getting it. India is obviously a much bigger economy and much broader access to technology than North Korea so it's a hard thing to do.¡±

ÇÏÁö¸¸ ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¼º´ÉÀÌ ´ëÆø °³¼±µÈ ½ÅÇü Àá¼öÇÔ °ÇÁ¶¸¦ ½ÃµµÇÑ´Ù¸é »óȲÀº ´Þ¶óÁú ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ¹Ì»çÀÏ Àü¹®°¡µéÀÌ SLBMÀ̶ó´Â ¹«±â°¡ °®´Â Àü·«Àû Ư¼ö¼º ¶§¹®¿¡ ÇöÀçÀÇ ±â¼ú ¼öÁØÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ¾ðÁ¨°¡ Çö½ÇÈ­ÇÒ ÀáÀçÀû À§·Â¿¡ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃç Æò°¡ÇÏ°í ´ëºñÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í °æ°íÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ÀÌ ¶§¹®ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

ƯÈ÷ °ø°Ý ¸ñÇ¥±îÁö Àº¹ÐÈ÷ Á¢±ÙÇÑ µÚ ¹ß»çÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾î ±¡¡¤ÇÏ¿ÍÀÌ´Â ¹°·Ð ¹Ì º»Åä±îÁö »çÁ¤±Ç¿¡ µÎ´Â Àü·«¹«±â·Î¼­ÀÇ Æ¯¼º ¶§¹®¿¡ ºÏÇÑ ICBMÀÇ ÇѰ踦 ±Øº¹ÇÑ ¡®°ÔÀÓüÀÎÀú¡¯°¡ µÉ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ¿ì·Á°¡ ³ª¿É´Ï´Ù.

·çÀ̽º ¼ÒÀåÀº ºÏÇÑÀÌ ´çÀå ¿ì·ÁÇÒ ¸¸ÇÑ SLBM °³¹ß ´Ü°è¿¡ µµ´ÞÇÑ °ÍÀº ¾Æ´ÏÁö¸¸ ¿Ï¼ºµÈ ÀÌÈÄ¿¡´Â ¾öû³­ À§ÇùÀ» °¡ÇÏ´Â ¹«±â°¡ µÉ °ÍÀ¸·Î ³»´ÙºÃ½À´Ï´Ù.

[Á¦ÇÁ¸® ·çÀ̽º ¼ÒÀå] ¡°It's a much harder capability to work out than the stuff we're seeing...It will take them a long time, but the flip side of it is it shows a lot of ambition, and when they get it to work, that's gonna be a lousy day.¡±

¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÇöÀç °ú½ÃÇϰí ÀÖ´Â ¹«±â ±â¼úº¸´Ù ÈξÀ º¹ÀâÇØ °³¹ß ¼Óµµ´Â ´À¸®°ÚÁö¸¸, SLBM °³¹ß¿¡ »ó´çÇÑ ¾ß½ÉÀÌ ÀÖ´Â ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÀÛµ¿ °¡´ÉÇÑ ¹«±â¸¦ ¼±º¸ÀÌ´Â ¼ø°£ ²ûÂïÇÑ ³¯ÀÌ µÉ °Í¡±À̶ó´Â °æ°íÀÔ´Ï´Ù. Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº ¡°SLBMÀº ºÏÇÑ ¹Ì»çÀÏ À§Çù¿¡ »õ·Î¿î Â÷¿øÀ» ´õÇÒ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ³»´ÙºÃ½À´Ï´Ù. ¡°½ÉÁö¾î ¼º´ÉÀÌ ¶³¾îÁö´Â Àá¼öÇÔÀ̶ó ÇÏ´õ¶ó°í ÀÏ´Ü ±âµ¿À» ½ÃÀÛÇϸé, ¹Ì-ÇÑ-ÀÏ ÇØ±º °£ ¹ÐÁ¢ÇÑ À§Ä¡ÃßÀû °øÁ¶°¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ¸ç µ¿½Ã¿¡ Å« ºñ¿ëÀ» ¹ß»ý½Ãų °Í¡±À̶ó°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.

[À̾ð Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹Àå] ¡°It would certainly add a different dimension to the North Korean missile threat. It would add a big antisubmarine and it would impose a lot of costs on allied forces in a conflict because you have to devote resources and keep an eye on.¡±

¶ÇÇÑ, ¡°Àá¼öÇÔÀº ¼öÁß Ç×ÇØÀÇ Æ¯¼º»ó ±âÁö¿Í »ó½Ã ±³½ÅÀÌ ¾î·Á¿ö À§±â ÆÇ´Ü°ú ´ëÀÀ ¿©ºÎ¸¦ »óºÎÀÇ Áö½Ã ¾øÀÌ ÇöÀå¿¡¼­ °áÁ¤ÇØ¾ß ÇÒ ¶§°¡ ¸¹´Ù¡±¸ç, ¡°ÇÙ¹«±â žÀç°¡ ÀǽɵǴ ºÏÇÑ Àá¼öÇÔÀÇ ¼ö¸é »ó½Â µîÀÇ ¿òÁ÷ÀÓ¿¡ °úÀ× ´ëÀÀÇØ Ãæµ¹·Î Ä¡´Ý°Å³ª, ¹Ý´ë·Î ¹«´ëÀÀ¿¡ µû¸¥ ¾öû³­ ¼Õ½ÇÀ» °¨¼öÇØ¾ß ÇÒ ¿ÀÆÇÀÇ À§ÇèÀÌ Å©´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.

[À̾ð Àª¸®¾ö½º ºÎ±¹Àå] ¡°Oftentimes they're forced to make decisions without necessarily much clear direction from their chain of command. The nature of the submarine here you're very stealthy, you're very quiet, meaning they're not in constant communication with home base...it adds another point of friction, another opportunity for a lot of miscalculation.¡±

ÇÑÆí ºÏÇÑ SLBMÀÇ ¼º´É¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±â¼úÀû ºÐ¼®°ú ÀáÀçÀû ¿ª·® Áø´Ü°ú´Â º°µµ·Î, ¹Ì±¹¿¡ Á¦½ÃÇÒ Çù»ó¿ë Ä«µå·Î Àд ºÐ¼®µµ ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ¿ª·®ÀÌ °ËÁõµÇÁö ¾ÊÀº ¡®´ëÇü ¹«±â¡¯¸¦ »õ·Î ¼±º¸ÀÎ µÚ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ¹º°¡ ¾çº¸ÇÏ¸é ³Ñ°ÜÁÙ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â ¡®¼±¹°¡¯·Î Æ÷ÀåÇØ ¿Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ °ú°Å Çù»ó ¹æ½Ä°ú ÀÏÄ¡ÇÑ´Ù´Â ÁöÀûÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç ÀÛÀüÂü¸ð Ãâ½ÅÀÎ µ¥À̺ñµå ¸Æ½ºÀ£ ¹Ì±¹ ¹ÎÁÖÁÖÀǼöÈ£Àç´Ü(FDD) ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¼¼ÄÁµå ½ºÆ®¶óÀÌÅ©(ÇÙ °ø°ÝÀ» ¹ÞÀ¸¸é Áï°¢ ÇÙÀ¸·Î ÀÀ¡ º¸º¹ÇÏ´Â ´É·ÂÀ» °®Ãç »óÈ£ ¾ïÁöÇÏ´Â °Í) ´É·ÂÀ» °®Ãá Àá¼öÇÔ ±º´ÜÀ» °³¹ßÇÒ ¼öµµ ÀÖÁö¸¸, ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÇöÀç ¿øÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ½ÅÇü SLBMÀÌ ±×·± ¿ª·®À» °¡Áø °Íó·³ º¸ÀÌ°Ô ¸¸µå´Â °Í¡±À̶ó°í Áø´ÜÇß½À´Ï´Ù.

[µ¥À̺ñµå ¸Æ½ºÀ£ FDD ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø] ¡°I think we can assess that really what they want at the very least is to give us the appearance of the capability of this new SLBM. Surely they want a second strike capability because that really contributes to deterrence. However, I think that what we ought to consider is this may be part of its eventual negotiation strategy. Like the Hwasong-16, the Pukguksong-4 may be something to be bargained away for concessions during some kind of future negotiation process.¡±

¡°ÀÌ´Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ Çù»ó Àü·«ÀÇ ÀÏȯÀ¸·Î º¸À̸ç, È­¼º-16Çü ¹Ì»çÀϰú ¸¶Âù°¡Áö·Î ºÏ±Ø¼º 4Çü SLBMµµ ÇâÈÄ Çù»ó °úÁ¤¿¡¼­ ¾çº¸¸¦ ¾ò¾î³»´Â ´ë°¡·Î ¡®ÆÈ¾Æ¸ÔÀ¸·Á´Â¡¯ ´ë»óÀÏÁö ¸ð¸¥´Ù¡±´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù. ¸Æ½ºÀ£ ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°ÀÌ·± ¸ð½ÀÀº ¹º°¡¸¦ °øÂ¥·Î ¾ò¾î³»´Â ºÏÇÑ Á¤±ÇÀÇ ´É·Â°ú ÀÏÄ¡ÇÑ´Ù¡±¸é¼­ ¡°¿Ï¼ºÇÏÁöµµ ¸øÇÑ ¹Ì»çÀÏ ¿ª·®À» ¸¶Ä¡ Æ÷±âÇÏ´Â °Íó·³ Çϸ鼭 ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÀÌ·± ¿ª·®À» ¿ì·ÁÇÏ´Â ¹Ì±¹À¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ¾çº¸¸¦ ¾ò¾î³»·Á ÇÒ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ³»´ÙºÃ½À´Ï´Ù.

[µ¥À̺ñµå ¸Æ½ºÀ£ FDD ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø] ¡°This is in keeping with the regime¡¯s ability to get something for nothing. They would actually be giving up a capability that they've never really completed. But because we are so concerned with this capability that they expect us to make concessions, so that they will give up this capability. So I think it's really part of their political warfare strategy, their long con. And as I said, the ability to get something for nothing.¡±

¸Æ½ºÀ£ ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ÀÌ´Â ¡°¹¹µçÁö °øÂ¥·Î °¡Áö±â À§ÇÑ Á¤Ä¡Àü Àü·«(political warfare strategy)ÀÇ ÀϺÎÀÌÀÚ Å« ³ë·ÂÀ» ±â¿ïÀÎ »ç±â±Ø¡±À̶ó°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù.

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