[Special report] THE KOREAS ¨é

In South Korea the average income per person is only half Japan's.
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Either way, the profound consequences for the economy, the government's finances and the nation's social structure have barely begun to sink innor has the impact on families. Nicholas Eberstadt, a demographer at the American Enterprise Institute, puts it with only mild exaggeration: changing fertility patterns mean that '2,500 years of East Asian family tradition stand to come to an end with the region's rising generation.' What will it do to people if many, perhaps most, of them will no longer have brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts or even cousins? As Mr Eberstadt points out, when family structures atrophyeven in a country such as South Korea where children are treated as fondly as they are in Italysturdy institutional alternatives will quickly need to be found to take on the role now played by family networks.
As the South Korean population ages, the country's high savings rate is almost bound to decline, which will have an effect on both what the economy can invest and what the government can raise in taxes. As it is, the country's national pension scheme and a long-term-care scheme for the old are only two decades old, and their funding structure is not geared to South Korea's expected demographic transformation over the coming quarter-century, which will involve a rapidly ageing society, a shrinking workforce and a population in absolute decline.

In search of a miracle
Until now most of the debate about such matters has concentrated on Japan, where the working-age population has already begun to fall. Yet Japan is a prosperous place, which will help it deal with the consequences. In South Korea the average income per person is only half Japan's. If the country does not find new sources of economic growth, it will grow old before it grows rich. Throw in the prospect of paying for the integration of 23m North Koreans to the mix, and the case for a radical approach to growthin essence, another miracle on the Hanstarts to press itself forward. The only problem is the country's dismal politics.

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