Eight Years After 9/11 ¨è

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Sure, al-Qaeda continues to issue vituperative missives by video from its hideouts, many of them directed at the likes of Iran and Hamas. But Hamas spokesman Osama Hamdan seemed to sum up al-Qaeda's plight two years ago, when responding to a particularly rabid attack from Bin Laden's number two. Ayman al-Zawahiri had accused Hamas of "joining the surrender train" by participating in elections and agreeing to form a unity government with Fatah. Hamas, sneered Hamdan in rsponse, had no need of advice from "a fugitive in the Afghan mountains" and did not accept criticism from "those who do not know what is going on."
Even among those who share much of Bin Laden's animus to the U.S. and Israel, al-Qaeda has remained largely irrelevant, its strategy of global jihad rejected in favor of an Islamist radicalism focused on more limited national goals.
The flaw in Bin Laden's strategy of trying to capture the imagination of the Muslim masses through spectacular acts of terror was obvious even in the immediate wake of 9/11. In much of the Arab and Muslim world, there was a pervasive refusal to believe that Muslims had been responsible for the attacks, even after Bin Laden claimed responsibility. The denial inherent in the tendency common from Egypt to Indonesia to blame the Mossad or the CIA for 9/11 reveals a damning negation of al-Qaeda's tactics so repulsive was the mass murder of innocents to ordinary Muslims that most refused to celebrate the attacks, as Bin Laden had hoped they might, but instead sought to blame them on those deemed enemies of Islam.

A. ¾îÈÖ
issue ÍëøÖ(°øÆ÷)ÇÏ´Ù. vituperative ½ÉÇÏ°Ô ³ª¹«¶ó´Â, ¿åÇÏ´Â, µ¶¼³ÀÇ.
missive ßöù×(¼­ÇÑ), °ø¹®¼­. hideout ÀẹÀå¼Ò, ¾ÆÁöÆ®.
the likes of Iran and Hamas À̶õÀ̳ª Çϸ¶½º°°Àº °Íµé. spokesman ´ëº¯ÀÎ.
sum up ¿ä¾àÇÏ´Ù. plight ÍÝÏã(°ï±Ã), óÁö. rabid °Ý·ÄÇÑ. accuse ºñ³­ÇÏ´Ù.
surrender Ç׺¹. participate in Âü¿©ÇÏ´Ù. form ±¸¼ºÇÏ´Ù.
unity government ¿¬ÇÕÁ¤ºÎ. sneer ð¿áÅ(Á¶¼Ò)ÇÏ´Ù. fugitive µµ¸ÁÀÚ.
animus îØëò(ÀûÀÇ), Áõ¿À. irrelevant °ü°è°¡ ¾ø´Â. jihad À̽½¶÷À» À§ÇÑ á¡îú(¼ºÀü).
reject °ÅºÎÇÏ´Ù. radicalism °ú°Ý·Ð, ±ÞÁøÁÖÀÇ. flaw °áÁ¡. mass ´ëÁß.
spectacular ±¸°æ°Å¸®ÀÇ, ±ØÀûÀÎ, íàκ(Àå°ü)ÀÇ. in the wake of ...¿¡ µÚÀ̾î.
pervasive ³ÑÄ¡´Â, Ãæ¸¸ÇÑ. denial Üúìã(ºÎÀÎ). inherent ͳêó(°íÀ¯)ÀÇ, Ÿ°í³­.
the Mossad À̽º¶ó¿¤ Á¤º¸±â°ü. reveal °¨Ãß¾îÁø °ÍÀ» ¾Ë¸®´Ù.
damning ÀúÁÖÀÇ. negation ÜúïÒ(ºÎÁ¤). tactics Àü¼ú.
repulsive Çø¿À°¨À» ÀÏÀ¸Å°°Ô ÇÏ´Â, ³Ã´ãÇÑ. innocent ÁË ¾ø´Â »ç¶÷.
celebrate ÃàÇÏÇÏ´Ù. seek-sought-sought. deem ÆÇ´ÜÇÏ´Ù, »ý°¢ÇÏ´Ù.

B. ±¸¹®
- Even among those who share . . . on more limited national goals.
cf. its strategy of global jihad rejected ¡æ its strategy of global jihad being rejected¡æbecause its strategy of global jihad is rejected¡´µ¶¸³ºÐ»ç±¸¹®¡µ
[¹Ì±¹°ú À̽º¶ó¿¤¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Bin LadenÀÇ Àû°³½ÉÀ» ¸¹ÀÌ °øÀ¯ÇÏ´Â »ç¶÷µé °¡¿îµ¥¼­µµ
al-Qaeda´Â ´ëü·Î °ü°è¾ø´Â ´ë»óÀ̾ú´Ù. ¿Ö³ÄÇϸé Àü ¼¼°è¸¦ »ó´ë·Î ÇÏ´Â al-QaedaÀÇ ÁöÇϵå´Â º¸´Ù Á¦ÇÑ µÈ ±¹°¡¸ñÇ¥¿¡ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃß´Â À̽½¶÷ ±ÞÁøÁÖÀÇ¿¡ ¹Ð·Á¼­ °ÅºÎ´çÇϰí Àֱ⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù.]
- most refused to celebrate . . . them on those deemed enemies of Islam.
cf. them ¡æthe attacks
[´ëºÎºÐÀÇ È¸±³µµµéÀº Bin LadenÀÌ ¹Ù·¨´ø °Íó·³ Å×·¯°ø°ÝÀ» ÃàÇÏÇϱ⸦ °ÅºÎÇÏ¿´´Ù. ´ë½Å¿¡ ±× °ø°ÝÀ» À̽½¶÷ÀÇ ÀûÀ̶ó°í °£ÁֵǴ »ç¶÷µéÀÇ Å¿À¸·Î µ¹¸®±â¸¦ ¿øÇÏ¿´´Ù.]

107-4-498
Even in countries where al-Qaeda had hoped to capitalize on resentment against American influence, its networks were largely rolled up by security services as the population looked on, indifferent. By invading Iraq, the Bush Administration arguably did a far more effective job than Bin Laden had done of weakening U.S. influence in the Muslim world and rallying its youth to resistance. Yet, even in Iraq, al-Qaeda's effort to gain control of the resistance failed because its ideology and tactics were so loathsome even to the bulk of the Sunni insurgents fighting the Americans that they eventually made common cause with the U.S. against the jihadists.
Even in Afghanistan, Bin Laden's erstwhile stomping ground, the fight against the U.S. is being waged by the Taliban, which may have been an ally of al-Qaeda but exists entirely independently of Bin Laden's movement and will ultimately make its strategic decisions based on its own, national interests. The sobering reality for Bin Laden is that even among those dedicated to resist the U.S. and its allies, his ideology of global jihad against the "far enemy" (the United States) has failed to supplant the more pragmatic Islamist movements such as Hamas, Hizballah and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, all of whom limit themselves to clearly defined national objectives, eliciting increasingly manic denunciations from al-Qaeda's cave-dwellers.

A. ¾îÈÖ
capitalize on ±âȸ·Î »ï´Ù, ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ´Ù. resentment îØëò(ÀûÀÇ), ¿øÇÑ.
network ðÚòÄØÑ(Á¶Á÷¸Á). roll up ¹«³ÊÁö´Ù, ¸»¾Æ ¿Ã¸®´Ù.
security services º¸¾È±â°ü. look on ¹æ°üÇÏ´Ù. indifferent ¹«°ü½ÉÇÑ.
invade ħ°øÇÏ´Ù. the Bush Administration ºÎ½Ã ÇàÁ¤ºÎ.
arguably ³íÀǰ¡ ÀÖ´Â. rally °á¼Ó½ÃŰ´Ù, °áÇÕÇÏ´Ù. resistance ÀúÇ×.
tactics Àü¼ú. loathsome ¸÷½Ã ½ÈÀº, Áö±ßÁö±ßÇÑ. bulk Å©±â, ¿ëÀû, È­¹°.
Sunni ȸ±³ÀÇ Á¾ÆÄ. insurgent Æøµµ. cause ¸ñÀû, ´ëÀǸíºÐ, ÁÖÀå.
make common cause with ...¿Í ð«ýÍ(Á¦ÈÞ)ÇÏ´Ù, Çù·ÂÇÏ´Ù.
erstwhile ¿¾³¯ÀÇ, ÀÌÀüÀÇ, Áö³­³¯ÀÇ. stomp=stamp Áþ¹â´Ù. wage ÀüÀïÀ» ÇÏ´Ù.
ally µ¿¸Í±¹. ultimately ÃÖÈÄ·Î, ±Ã±ØÀûÀ¸·Î. sober ¼úÀÌ ±ú´Ù, ³ÃÁ¤ÇØ Áö´Ù.
dedicate Çå½ÅÇÏ´Ù. supplant ³²ÀÇ ÀÚ¸®¿¡ µé¾î¾É´Ù, ´ë½ÅÇÏ´Ù.
pragmatic ½Ç¿ëÀûÀÎ. clearly defined national objectives Ù¥ãÆ(¸í½Ã)µÈ ±¹°¡ ¸ñÇ¥.
elicit ²ø¾î³»´Ù, ºÐ¸íÈ÷ ÇÏ´Ù. manic ÎÊîÜ(±¤Àû)ÀÎ.
denunciation °ø°ø¿¬ÇÑ ºñ³­, °í¹ß. cave-dweller µ¿±¼ °ÅÁÖÀÚ.

B. ±¸¹®
- the population looked on, indifferent.
¡æthe population looked on, but they are indifferent.
¡æthe population looked on, being indifferent.
[»ç¶÷µéÀº °ü½Éµµ ¾øÀÌ ±¸°æ¸¸ ÇÏ¿´´Ù.]
- By invading Iraq, the Bush . . . and rallying its youth to resistance.
[À̶óÅ©¸¦ ħ°øÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ºÎ½ÃÇàÁ¤ºÎ´Â ȸ±³±Ç¿¡¼­ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¿µÇâ·ÂÀ» ¾àÈ­½ÃŰ°í ¹Ì±¹¿¡ ÀúÇ×Çϵµ·Ï ÀþÀºÀ̵éÀ» °á¼Ó½ÃŰ´Â µ¥¿¡ Bin Ladenº¸´Ù ÈξÀ ´õ È¿°úÀûÀÎ ÀÏÀ» ÇÏ¿´´Ù.]
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