Detroit: The Death and Possible Life of a Great City ¨ê

114-7-529
But Young isn't the only politician to blame. In 1956, when I was 8 years old, my Congressman was John D. Dingell. There are people in southeastern Michigan who are still represented by Dingell, the longest-serving member in the history of the House of Representatives. "The working men and women of Michigan and their families have always been Congressman Dingell's top priority," his website declares, and I suppose he thinks he has served them well by resisting, in succession, tougher safety regulations, more-stringent mileage standards, relaxed trade restrictions and virtually any other measure that might have forced the American automobile industry to make cars that could stand up to foreign competition.
By so ably satisfying the wishes of the auto industry by encouraging southeastern Michigan's reliance on this single, lumbering mastodon Dingell has in fact played a signal role in destroying Detroit. He was hardly alone if you wanted to get elected in southeastern Michigan, you had to support the party line dictated by the Big Four GM, Ford, Chrysler and their co-conspirator the United Auto Workers. Anything that might limit the industry's income was bad for the auto industry, and anything bad for the auto industry was deemed dangerous to Detroit.

A. ¾îÈÖ
Congressman ±¹È¸ÀÇ¿ø. the House of Representatives ù»êÂ(ÇÏ¿ø).
representative ±¹È¸ÀÇ¿ø, ´ëÇ¥ÀÚ. top priority °¡Àå ¿ì¼±ÀûÀÎ °Í.
in succession ¿¬¼ÓÀûÀ¸·Î. safety regulations ¾ÈÀü±ÔÁ¤.
more-stringent ´õ ¾ö°ÝÇÑ. relaxed °ü´ëÇÑ. trade restrictions ¹«¿ªÁ¦ÇÑ.
virtually »ç½Ç»ó. measure Á¶Ä¡. stand up to ¿ë°¨È÷ ¸Â¼­´Ù.
competition °æÀï. reliance ÀÇÁ¸. lumbering À°ÁßÇÏ°Ô ¿òÁ÷ÀÌ´Â, ²Ã»ç³ª¿î.
mastodon ¸¶½ºÅäµ·( º»¹®¿¡¼­´Â GMÀ» °¡¸®Å´).
the party line ÓÚ(´ç)ÀÇ ÒÊàÊ(³ë¼±). dictate ò¦Öµ(Áö·É)ÇÏ´Ù, ¸í·ÉÇÏ´Ù.
conspirator À½¸ðÀÚ, ÍìÙÇíº(°ø¸ðÀÚ). the United Auto Workers ¿¬ÇÕ ÀÚµ¿Â÷ ³ëÁ¶.

B. ±¸¹®
- There are people in southeastern . . . still represented by Dingell
cf. represent ¼±°Å±¸¹ÎÀ» ´ëÇ¥ÇÏ´Ù.
ex. He represents Michigan in the Senate.=Michigan is represented in the Senate by him. ¡´±×´Â ¹Ì½Ã°£ÁÖ ¼±ÃâÀÇ »ó¿øÀÇ¿øÀÌ´Ù¡µ
[¹Ì½Ã°£ÁÖÀÇ µ¿³²ºÎ¿¡´Â ¾ÆÁ÷µµ DingellÀ» ±¹È¸ÀÇ¿øÀ¸·Î ¼±ÃâÇϰí ÀÖ´Â »ç¶÷µéÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù.]

114-8-530
The UAW had once been the most visionary of American unions. As early as the 1940s, UAW president Walter Reuther was urging the auto companies to produce small, inexpensive cars for the average American. In 1947 and '48 the union even offered to cut wages if the Big Three would reduce the price of their cars. But by the early 1980s, the UAW had entered into a nakedly self-interested pact with the auto companies. After the union's president joined GM's chief congressional lobbyist to defeat a tougher mileage standard in 1990, the lobbyist declared that "we would not have won without the UAW." It was, he said, "one of the proudest days of my life."
The union really can't be blamed for pushing for fabulous wages and lush benefits for its members that game required two players, and the automakers knew only how to say yes. But the union leadership's fatal mistake was insisting that workers with comparable skills and comparable seniority be paid comparable wages, irrespective of who employed them. If a machinist at a prosperous GM deserved $25 an hour, so did a machinist who worked for a barely profitable Chrysler or for a just-holding-its-own supplier plant that made axles or wheels or windshield wipers.
This defiant inattention to market reality not only placed the less healthy firms in peril, but by pricing labor so uniformly high, it also closed off Detroit to any possible diversification of its industrial base. When the automakers' inattention to engineering, style and quality caused them to crash into a wall of consumer indifference, there was no other industry that could step forward and employ workers who would have been thrilled to make even a fraction of what they once earned. Now nearly 1 in 3 Detroit residents is out of work and not many of the unemployed have a prayer of finding a job anytime soon.

A. ¾îÈÖ
The UAW ¿¬ÇÕÀÚµ¿Â÷³ëÁ¶. visionary ºñÀüÀÌ ÀÖ´Â, ȯ¿µÀ» º¸´Â.
urge Ã˱¸ÇÏ´Ù. reduce °¨¼ÒÇÏ´Ù, ÁÙÀÌ´Ù. nakedly ³ë°ñÀûÀ¸·Î.
self-interested À̱âÀûÀÎ. pact °è¾à, ÇùÁ¤, Á¶¾à.
chief congressional lobbyist ÀÇȸ´ã´ç ¼ö¼® ·Îºñ½ºÆ®. defeat ÆÐ¹è½ÃŰ´Ù.
declare ¼±¾ðÇÏ´Ù. blame ²ÙÁßÇÏ´Ù. fabulous ¾öû³­, Å͹«´Ï¾ø´Â, ¹Ï¾îÁöÁö ¾Ê´Â.
wage ìüÑÑ(ÀÓ±Ý). lush dzºÎÇÑ, À¯¸®ÇÑ. benefit ÀÌÀÍ.
leadership ÁöµµºÎ. fatal Ä¡¸íÀûÀÎ. comparable °øÅëÀûÀÎ, ÇÊÀûÇÏ´Â.
seniority æÄÍíßíæê(¿¬°ø¼­¿­). irrespective of...¿¡ °ü°è¾øÀÌ.
machinist ±â°è ±â¼úÀÚ. prosperous ¹ø¿µÇÏ´Â.
deserve ¹ÞÀ»¸¸ÇÑ ÀÚ°ÝÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. barely profitable °ÅÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÀ» ³»Áö ¸øÇÏ´Â.
just-holding-its-own supplier plant Àڱ⠰͸¸ ì±â´Â ÇÏû°øÀå.
defiant ¹ÝÇ×ÀûÀÎ, ±³¸¸ÇÑ. inattention ¹«°ü½É, ºÎÁÖÀÇ.
defiant inattention to market reality ½ÃÀåÀÇ Çö½ÇÀ» ¹«½ÃÇÏ´Â °Å¸¸ÇÑ Çൿ.
firm ȸ»ç. peril À§Çè, êËÑñ(À§³­). diversification ÒýåÆûù(´Ù¾çÈ­).
industrial base »ê¾÷±â¹Ý. crash Ãß¶ô. indifference ¹«°ü½É.
fraction ÀϺκÐ, ÝÂâ¦(ºÐ¼ö). resident ÁÖ¹Î. prayer ¼º°øÀÇ ±âȸ, ±âµµ.

B. ±¸¹®
-we would not have won without the UAW.
cf. °¡Á¤¹ý°ú°Å¿Ï·á :°ú°Å»ç½ÇÀÇ ¹Ý´ëÀÇ °æ¿ì¸¦ »ó»ó.
¡´ if+S+had+pp...., S+Á¶µ¿»ç°ú°Å+have+pp.....¡µ
cf. without UAW¡æif it had not been for UAW.
[UAW°¡ ¾ø¾ú´õ¶ó¸é ¿ì¸®´Â ½Â¸®ÇÏÁö ¸øÇÏ¿´À» °ÍÀÌ´Ù]
-there was no other industry that . . .a fraction of what they once earned.
[±×µéÀÌ Àü¿¡ ¹ú´ø ÀÓ±ÝÀÇ ÀϺκÐÀÌ¶óµµ ¹ÞÀ» ¼ö ÀÖÀ¸¸é ´ë´ÜÈ÷ ±â»µÇÒ ±Ù·ÎÀÚ¸¦ ³ª¼­¼­ ¹Þ¾ÆÁÙ ±â¾÷Àº ¾îµð¿¡µµ ¾ø¾ú´Ù.]
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