죽을 날이 얼마 남지 않은 김정일은 무엇을 남기고 지옥(地獄)으로 가려 할까?

굶주린 북한 주민과 북한이 보유한 군사력은 별개의 문제다.

우리는 먼저 북한이 향후 수천 여기의 핵무기를 비축할 가능성을 배제해서는 안될 것이다.

북한 지역은 비공식적으로 세계 최대의 우라늄 매장지역이다. 핵폭탄 제조에 사용되는 우라늄은 북한에 얼마든지 있다.

여기에다 레이저 분리법에 의한 고농축 우라늄만 있으면 플루토늄 없이도 얼마든지 핵폭탄을 만들 수 있다.

북한은 이미 80-90년대를 거쳐 이 같은 기술을 습득한 것으로 알려져 있다.

북한의 핵 쌍둥이 이란은 이미 1994년 천연 금속 우라늄을 사용, 2002년 10월 2003년 1월간 신고없이 레이저 농축 실험을 실시했다.

설상가상(雪上加霜)으로 대한민국 해협을 자유롭게 오가는 북한 상선은 무기를 싣고 이란으로 간다. 그리고 이란에서 북한으로 돌아올 때는 이란이 제공한 저농축우라늄을 비밀리에 싣고 온다.

이란이 제공한 저농축우라늄은 다시금 북한에서 고농축우라늄으로 바뀐다. 물론 이 반대의 상황도 얼마든지 가능하다.

이제 북한 핵이 소형화가 되지 않았으며, 운반수단이 없다는 둥의 뚱딴지 같은 얘기는 하지 말자. 해군 군함이 북한이 쏜 어뢰 한 방에 격침됐는데도, 북한이 했다는 증거가 없다는 나라가 북핵에 대한 분석이나 제대로 할 수 있나?

국내의 내놓으라 하는 핵 박사들은 북한의 핵 확산에 중국 공산당이 개입되어 있었다는 사실 조차 알지 못했다.

개과천선(改過遷善)의 가망이 없는 김정일의 행태로 볼 때, 북한은 核을 더욱 더 정교화 시킬 것으로 보인다. 그것은 바로 2012년 이전에 중성자탄(中性子彈)과 같은 고성능의 핵무기를 보유하는 것이 될 것이다.

中性子彈은 핵기술의 완성을 의미한다.

中性子彈은 수소폭탄(水素爆彈)의 변종으로 방사선의 방출을 극소화하고 투과성이 좋은 중성자를 방출함으로써 인명만 살상하도록 만들어진 폭탄이다. 북한 입장에서 전장이 협소한 韓半島에서 쓰기 좋은 무기이다.

水素爆彈 보유 가능성도 예의 주시해야 할 것이다.

水素爆彈과 같은 메가톤급 폭탄은 지표폭발(地表爆發)의 경우 풍향에 따라 150km 이상에 걸친 방사능의 국지적 강하에 의한 치사지구(致死地區)를 형성한다. 오늘날 전략(戰略)무기라 불리는 대형 핵폭탄이 이에 속한다.

북한이 중성자탄-수소폭탄을 보유하게 된다면 東北亞에서는 어떤 일이 벌어질까?

北核 문제를 두고 사전에 조율을 마친 미국, 중국, 러시아 등의 국가들이 韓半島의 ‘現狀維持’를 골자로 한 소위 ‘동북아 군축(軍縮)회담’을 할 가능성이 높다. 김정일의 ‘벼랑 끝 전략’에 길들여진 한국은 다람쥐처럼 쳇바퀴만 돌리게 될 것이다.

우리는 지금 이대로 가면 결말이 그대로 보이는 ‘죽음의 종착역’을 쉬지 않고 달려가고 있다. 이 상황을 어떻게 타개할 것인가?

급할수록 原則으로 돌아가야 한다. 더 큰 재앙의 가능성을 사전에 차단하기 위해서라도 한반도 유사시 계획을 하나로 통합하는 ‘마스터플랜’을 韓-美-日 군(軍) 수뇌부 주도로 다시금 작성해야 할 것이다.

장기 전략으로 병행해야 할 것이 북한 주민들에게 南韓의 실정을 인식시키는 것이다.

우리의 우월한 경제(經濟)역량과 자유로운 삶의 양식 등에 대한 북한 주민들의 동경인식을 심어주는 노력을 통해 남한 주도의 自由統一 분위기가 고양 되도록 해야 한다. 이는 북한이 설령 중성자탄-수소폭탄을 보유했을 경우에도 지속적으로 해야 한다.

군사적으로는 다른 대안이 없다. 核에는 核으로 답하는 것이 原則이다. 미국의 核우산을 신뢰할 수 없다면 대응 核개발을 하는 수밖에 없다. 한반도의 결정적인 순간이 다가오고 있다. 우리에게 주어진 時間이 그리 많지 않다.

김정일을 힘으로 굴복시키겠다는 意志가 필요한 때다.

김필재 기자 spooner1@hanmail.net
[블로그: http://blog.naver.com/climb1]

관련기사-Surprise Word on Nuclear Gains by North Korea and Iran
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: November 12, 2003

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 — Two intelligence reports issued in recent days find that North Korea and Iran have made advances on a variety of technologies necessary to build nuclear weapons that surprised many nuclear experts and Western intelligence officials.

Overall, the reports support the consensus view that North Korea is far ahead of Iran in the production of actual weapons and poses the most urgent proliferation problems for the Bush administration.

Yet Iran's program turns out to have been even broader and deeper than American intelligence agencies suspected. A 30-page confidential report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency and sent to 20 governments on Monday describes a program that reached back at least 18 years and involved extremely complex technologies, including an exotic program to use lasers to enrich uranium.

In recent weeks, President Bush has declared that his administration is making great progress in its diplomatic effort to disarm both countries, putting together coalitions of neighboring countries to pressure the two surviving governments of what he famously called the "Axis of Evil."

But the essence of the Central Intelligence Agency report about North Korea is that that country is speeding up its weapons production. And Iran's decision to allow the international agency into facilities that were previously closed to inspectors may, diplomats said, blunt Mr. Bush's effort to seek some kind of sanctions in the United Nations, leaving Iran with an advanced nuclear infrastructure that could be restarted at a moment's notice.

Taken together, the reports show that Iran and North Korea have each dabbled in separating plutonium — one path to a bomb — and have each set up centrifuges to enrich uranium. The difference, as the C.I.A. told Congress, is that North Korea has fully mastered the complexities of detonating a bomb, perhaps with the help of some of its nuclear suppliers like Pakistan. There is no evidence that Iran has made that much headway.

"The Iranians did a lot better at this than Saddam Hussein did," one administration official said. "But not as well as Kim Jong Il," he added, referring to the North Korean leader.

The international agency's report is full of examples showing that Iran fooled the global nuclear watchdog for years. It refers to "limited and reactive" cooperation with inspectors and "changing and contradictory" stories. Despite that history of deception, though, the international agency insisted that there is no evidence of a current weapons project in Iran. That conclusion left many experts agape.

"It's dumbfounding that the I.A.E.A., after saying that Iran for 18 years had a secret effort to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, would turn around and say there was no evidence of a nuclear weapons program," said Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, a private group that tracks nuclear arms. "If that's not evidence, I don't know what is."

A federal intelligence official echoed that assessment, saying, "It's obvious that this is not an atoms for peace program."

But the international agency's report, while detailed, found no actual weapons of the kind that North Korea boasts about.

Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute, a private group based in Washington, argued that the agency's job of simultaneously promoting and regulating nuclear power had blinded it to Tehran's ambitions. "Iran is an example," he said, "of what happens when you let the rhetoric of atoms for peace take precedence over the hard realities of a nation that supports terrorism going nuclear."

Still, American officials said the 30-page document from the international inspectors included details missing from American intelligence reports. "They may have suspected it," said David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security, an arms control group in Washington. "But a lot of this stuff would not have been known to the U.S. government."

Private and federal experts said that the most stunning revelation was how Tehran had labored in secret for 18 years to enrich uranium, a main fuel of nuclear arms. Its effort focused on developing centrifuges, a standard method in which fast spinning concentrates U-235, the uranium isotope used in making bombs.

The report said that Tehran acknowledged building two centrifuge plants and finishing a third site, the Kalaye Electric Company, which made centrifuge parts and did extensive centrifuge testing and experimental purification of uranium. Inspectors were blocked from entering the electric company's facilities earlier this year they now know that behind a false wall of boxes were scores of centrifuges, in what appeared to be a pilot program to produce weapon-grade uranium.

That is exactly the kind of program that North Korea is also believed to be involved in as an alternative to the country's main nuclear weapons development program. The project was discovered a few years ago by South Korean intelligence officials, though its exact location is still a mystery. Inspectors were thrown out of North Korea on New Year's Eve.

While the North Koreans have clearly made more progress, intelligence officials say, the international agency's report indicates that the Iranians have been more technologically daring than most experts expected.

The report reveals that for 12 years Iran developed a program to use lasers to purify uranium. In theory, the exotic technique can be highly efficient in producing enriched uranium. But no country, including the United States, has found a way to make it economical in the production of fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. It is so expensive that experts assume its only usefulness would be for a military program where costs are no obstacle.

"The technology and physics are not easy," said Steve Fetter, a physicist at the University of Maryland. "It's probably the most difficult of all the enrichment techniques to master."

The international agency's report said that three years ago Iran established a pilot plant for laser enrichment and used it between October 2002 and January of this year to conduct experiments on natural uranium. The Iranian authorities said the pilot plant was disassembled in May.

David E. Sanger reported for this article from Washington and William J. Broad from New York.