1975년 8월27일 슐레진저 미국 국방장관은 리처드 L. 슈나이더 주한미국 대사를 데리고 박정희 대통령을 찾아가 한국의 핵무기 개발 의혹과 관련하여 깊은 대화를 나눴다. 미국 정부가 공개한 대화록엔 다음과 같은 대목이 있다.

<슐레진저 국방장관은 한국이 NPT(핵확산금지조약)를 존중하기로 한 것은 건전한 정책이라면서 미국은 한국에 核억지력을 제공하기에 적합한 나라라고 강조하였다. 미국은 작은 핵보유국이 제공할 수 없는 방법으로 중심국가들의 핵위협에 대처할 수 있다는 것이었다. 한국은 소련의 핵위협에 대처할 수 없지만 미국은 할 수 있고, 한국이 핵무기를 개발하려는 노력을 하면 소련으로 하여금 한국에 대하여 핵위협을 가하는 행위를 합리화시키는 결과를 빚을 것이다. 국방장관은 핵억지정책에 대하여 다음 번 양국 국방장관 회담 때 설명을 드릴 것이라고 했다.

이에 대하여 박정희 대통령은 NPT를 지킬 의지가 있다는 사실을 강조하였다. 그는 봅 노박이 보도한 자신의 논평에 대하여 해명하였다. 노박은 자신에게 미국이 핵우산을 제거하면 어떻게 하겠느냐고 물었고, 자신은 미국이 핵우산을 철거하지 않을 것으로 생각한다고 답하였다. 그러나 노박은 계속하여 그런 경우 한국은 핵무기 개발을 고려할 것이냐고 물었다. 박 대통령은 한국이 연구를 시작할 능력은 있으나 현재의 조건하에선 그럴 생각이 없다고 답하였다. 박 대통령은 그가 노박 기자에게 한 논평이 잘못 해석되었고, 특히 원자로 관련 협상에 나온 카나다 정부가 오해를 하였다고 했다. 그는 내가 아무 대답을 하지 않았더라면 한국인의 사기에 큰 타격이 되었을 것으로 생각한다고 했다. 그는 재차 장관에게 한국은 NPT 조약의 의무조항들을 이행할 것이라고 보증하였다.

슐레진저는 핵무기가 한국에 얽혀들지 않는 게 최선이라고 논평하였다. 핵무기를 평양에 쓴다면 2만 내지 3만 명이 죽을 것이다. 한편 소련이 서울에 핵공격을 가한다면 서울은 평양보다 더 취약하므로 300만 명이 죽을 것이다. 박 대통령은 국방장관의 생각에 동의한다면서 장관이 전술핵무기에 대하여 한 말이 한국인의 사기를 높여주었다고 했다. 그는 핵무기 사용 없이도 북한의 공격을 감당할 수 있어야 한다고 했다. 슐레진저는 한국이 核 재처리 시설을 도입하는 것은 원자력 정책 전반에도 나쁜 영향을 줄 것이라고 경고하였다.>

272. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, August 27, 1975.11. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. The meeting time is unrecorded. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Park Chung Hee
Senior Protocol Secretary, Choi Kwan-soo
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Ambassador Richard L. Sneider
NUCLEAR MATTERS

Noting that he had discussed the problem with President Ford, Secretary Schlesinger said that the U.S. attached extreme importance to the NPT. This entirely underscored the wisdom of the ROK adherence to the treaty which we warmly welcomed. The ROK action avoided a very serious political problem in the U.S. where major elements attached particular importance to NPT. The Secretary stressed that the only thing that could undermine the political relationship between the U.S. and the ROK would be the Korean effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

The Secretary added that substantively the ROK adherence to the NPT is a sound policy. The problem is not only in the U.S., but elsewhere. We wish to preclude [text not declassified] ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. [text not declassified] Furthermore, in the complementarity between the U.S. and ROK forces, the U.S. is best suited to provide nuclear deterrence on behalf of its allies. We can deal with nuclear threats against a central power in a way that smaller nuclear powers cannot. We can deter Soviet nuclear threats while the ROK could not and a ROK effort to develop its own nuclear weapons would end up providing the Soviets with justification for threatening the ROK with nuclear weapons. In conclusion, the Secretary offered to explain the logic to nuclear deterrence policy in the next SCM.

President Park assured the Secretary that ROK had every intention of living up to the NPT. He explained the comments reported by Bob Novak. Novak had questioned him on what the ROK would do in case the U.S. nuclear protection was removed. Park had replied that he did not think the U.S. would remove its nuclear umbrella. But Novak persisted and asked whether in such a case the ROK would give consideration to developing nuclear weapons. Park had responded that the ROK did have the capabilities to start research but had no intention to do so under the present circumstances. Park said that his comments to Novak had been misinterpreted, and there had been misunderstanding on the part of the Canadian Government during negotiations for a nuclear reactor. On the other hand if he said nothing, it would be a blow to the morale of the Korean people. He again assured the Secretary that the ROK would live up to its Treaty obligations.

Secretary Schlesinger commented that it would be best if nuclear weapons were not involved in Korea. If a weapon were used against Pyongyang perhaps 20-30,000 people would be killed. On the other hand, if the Soviets launched a nuclear attack on Seoul 3 million people would be killed since Seoul's vulnerability is far greater than Pyongyang. While the U.S. is prepared to view the Soviet nuclear threat, we would plan to be exceedingly cautious on employment of nuclear weapons due to the vulnerability of South Korea.

President Park expressed agreement with the Secretary's views. The Secretary's statements on tactical nuclear weapons had boosted Korean morale, but we should cope with a North Korean attack without the use of nuclear weapons.

[text not declassified]

U.S. COMMITMENT

Secretary Schlesinger said that President Ford is unequivocal in his support of Korea. This view goes back to 1950 when President Ford was angered by the previous withdrawal of U.S. forces. In fact, pressures to reduce the U.S. overseas deployment in Congress have weakened. There was no effort during the 1975 Congress nor is one expected in 1976. The next effort to legislate reduction of overseas deployment, he expects, would be in 1977. The secretary said he is not concerned either about such efforts. He expects President Ford to be re-elected, but if not the Democrats are not likely to eliminate U.S. support for South Korea. As an example of the change of opinion in the left of the U.S., he cited Senator Eagleton's recent statement.

One of the lessons of Vietnam is that the left now understands the illusion of U.S. withdrawal and that the Paris Peace Accords would bring peace. They now understand that if the balance of power shifts the Communists will act aggressively. This lesson is specifically relevant to Korea.

U.S. COMMANDERS

President Park asked as a special personal favor from President Ford that General Stilwell and General Hollingsworth be retained for another year in Korea. He praised their contribution to Korea's defense and urged that they not be shifted during the next year which could be critical. Secretary Schlesinger said we have no intention of moving General Stilwell until his age of retirement at sixty and took note of the President's request with respect to General Hollingsworth.

NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

The Secretary, referring to the Ambassador's approaches on this question, said acquisition of a nuclear reprocessing plant also affects the efficiency of the broader nuclear issue he had discussed previously. As a former Chairman of the AEC, he could tell President Park that the economics of Plutonium reprocessing are difficult and involve high risk. General Electric has abandoned its plant and the cost of the Barnwell Plant have gone out of sight.

In his closing remarks, Secretary Schlesinger praised the political will he had found in Korea for defense of its country. This will was needed in Vietnam and Europe, but there is no need to instill it in Koreans. It is the ultimate source of strength for the Republic of Korea.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. The meeting time is unrecorded. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.

San Francisco, California, August 21, 1969, 4:15𔃄:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Talks Between President Nixon and President Pak
PARTICIPANTS
President Richard Nixon
President Pak of the Republic of Korea
Mr. Sang Ho Cho (Korean Interpreter)
Mr. Victor Lee (U.S. Interpreter)
President Nixon: Before we go into a detailed discussion today, I would like to explain a few items on my new policy toward Korea. Kim Il-Song’s regime is one of the most aggressive and unreasonable Communist countries in the world. As you recall, the Pueblo incident occurred before I took over the Presidency. During my election campaign, I noted that to give a warning to North Korea once is sufficient. If North Korea provokes another provocative incident, we will react, are prepared to react and will take measures harsher than the enemy provocation. This message was given to the Soviet Ambassador in the U.S.22. According to telegram 1693 from Moscow, April 22, Ambassador Jacob Beam delivered this message during his initial call on Kosygin on April 22. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967󈞱, POL US–USSR) Beam’s April 22 oral statement and telegram 1693 are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969?, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 39 and 40. No written record that this message was given to Dobrynin has been found. On April 17, at 9:25 a.m., Nixon and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about the shootdown. According to a transcript of their conversation, “President and K[issinger] discussed idea of formal protest—decided should not be done with Soviets.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC? Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig) and I believe it was conveyed to North Korea.

Now I would like to elaborate on my new policy toward Asia.33. Reference is to the Nixon Doctrine, first enunciated by President Nixon at Guam on July 25. He stated that the United States expected that Asian nations would increasingly be responsible for their own military defense. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 554?. See also Foreign Relations, 1969?, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29. The press overlooked my statement to the effect that the U.S. will fulfill its treaty obligations with the Asian countries concerned. We will honor the U.S.–ROK Defense Treaty. What we must think over is what would be the best way to keep these commitments. We have relaxed our travel restrictions and purchases with regard to Communist China, but we regard Communist China as an aggressive nation. U.S. policy toward Communist China has not changed, and we will not admit the country into the U.N. It is also necessary in this connection to pay attention to the Sino-Soviet conflict. As you know, the Soviet Union has not helped us in solving the issues concerning Communist China, North Korea, the Vietnam War and the Middle East. It is also one of the countries which provide military aid to North Korea.

We cannot cooperate with the Soviet Union without the latter’s reciprocal acts. Under these circumstances, a collective security with the Soviets against Communist China is meaningless. It is first necessary for the Soviets to act with sincerity.

I believe that the non-Communist countries located on the periphery of Communist China must be strengthened since they are threatened by Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Soviet Union will also become a greater threat than now if it is left alone.

Now with regard to Vietnam, we are aware of various efforts made by the ROK in South Vietnam. We are withdrawing our troops from SVN when we think that the South Vietnamese have built the ability to replace them. As we informed you in advance, I agreed with President Thieu at Midway to withdraw 25,000 troops. During my recent talks with him, we decided to replace more troops in August, but we have been withholding taking the measure due to the enemy offensive of 2 weeks ago. Probably within about 10 days, President Thieu, General Abrams and other leaders concerned will talk over the subject again. We will inform you in advance the number and time of these troop withdrawals, which will be carried out as long as they do not affect our combat capabilities.

In regard to the Paris talks, I just had a talk with Ambassador Lodge today, who informed me that there has been no progress. As you know, November 1 is the first anniversary of our bombing halt. If I had been the President last November, I would not have halted the bombing. This is just between us if there is no further progress in the Paris talks, we will re-evaluate the situation about October 15.

I believe that your government’s efforts toward military and economic self-reliance are the correct road to take. I hope that other countries in Asia will follow suit. It is necessary for the U.S. to continue to play a great role in Asia. I think that economic and military aid to those countries like the ROK which make self-reliance efforts should be continued. The self-reliance remarks you made this morning (at the Presidio of San Francisco), I think, were good ones for American public opinion to consume. As a private citizen and government official, I travelled a great deal in the Pacific region. I can assure you that we will not retreat from the Pacific area and we will not reduce our commitments, but I think we need intelligent policy, by giving aid to the countries who attempt to help themselves. I have just made a general statement. Do you have any questions on such subjects as military equipment and economic development?

President Pak: I appreciate hearing your firm policy toward the ROK, Asia in general and the Communist Bloc. I would like to make my views clear on these subjects. As you know, Kim Il-Song during the past 10 years or so has almost completed war preparations to unify the country by force. He is looking for an opportunity to invade the South. He has not done so because of the U.S. commitments to the ROK and the presence of American troops in our country. Kim will provoke a war if he believes that this American policy toward the ROK is going to change or has changed. Kim’s objective in making various provocations is to have American troops stationed in the ROK withdraw as they have done in South Vietnam, alienate the ROK from the U.S. and have the U.S. not intervene when anything happens in Korea. The strengthening of ROK defense would check these provocations of Kim and have him give up the idea of invading the South by force. A way to achieve this objective is to strengthen the equipment and combat capability of the ROK forces rather than to strengthen U.S. forces in South Korea, to the extent that the ROK can singlehandedly resist North Korean invasion, since the U.S. has various commitments all over the world.

President Nixon: If the Soviets or the Chinese invade the ROK, it will be a different ball game. Since you were in the military, I would like to elaborate a little on my decision on the establishment of the ABM network.44. On March 14, the President announced his decision for an ABM program that included a Safeguard system, which was a modified version of Lyndon Johnson’s Sentinel system. Safeguard called for 12 separate sites for area missile defense, 19 radars, and several hundred interceptor missiles. Nixon also decided to continue testing for multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). On March 14, the White House issued a press release, printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 273?. According to our intelligence, Communist China will have 25 to 50 ICBM’s by 1976 which can hit targets in the U.S. We now have about 1,000 but without the ABM network a nuclear-armed China might be able to use nuclear blackmail against non-nuclear countries in Asia and pose a danger to the U.S. That is why this subject is so important for the defense and security of the Free World.

President Pak: To continue my views, the Korean War, anti-guerrilla operations (in the ROK) and Vietnamese War have been carried well with U.S. aid. Concerning Korea, I do not think you have to worry about the Korean problem if our equipment is further strengthened. I believe that we can meet North Korean threats without increasing the present level of U.S. force in South Korea if (military) equipment is strengthened.

President Nixon: In this connection, we are now studying sympathetically the MAP and other proposals your side has made following Mr. Packard’s recent visit to your country. I am aware of the fact that some of the ROK units are equipped with weapons of World War II.

President Pak: I appreciate your explanation of the so-called Nixon doctrine on Asia.55. See footnote 3 above. I agree in principle with your new policy, especially on the aspect of having those countries which have relied on the U.S. since the end of World War II try to help themselves. Some Asians, however, are apprehensive because of their misconception and misunderstanding of your policy, believing that the U.S. intends to wash its hands of Asia, leaving Asian problems to the Asians themselves. They will naturally dispel this apprehension when they fully understand your new policy. It will be necessary for us to give guidelines and study methods of gradually decreasing the U.S. burdens so as to have these Asian countries able to defend themselves. In this connection, I would like to have the U.S. guide various countries of Asia so they can share the responsibility and burdens in accordance with their respective ability. At present, some countries are sharing excessive burdens beyond their ability and vice versa. The Republic of Korea and Japan are good examples. Korea is not only divided but also is a developing country. Japan, despite its strong economy, is hardly carrying its share of the burdens in Asia. The Japanese are even trying to refuse to provide military bases to Okinawa when it is returned to Japan, thus hindering the unity of Asia. Several Asian countries as well as the people of South Korea are dissatisfied with such a Japanese posture. I do not have the details on the bilateral negotiations for the return of Okinawa to Japan, but I believe that if the island is to be reverted to Japan, the Japanese share of the burdens in Asia must be increased first, before Okinawa is actually returned.

President Nixon: This is a delicate issue because of the constitution of Japan which we helped draft. For a long time I have thought that Japan should play a much more significant role than the present in its defense and collective economic activity. Some progress has been made in the economic aspect. As you are aware, Prime Minister Sato is coming here in November, and we should make every effort to have him survive politically. Free Korea is very important to Free Japan. Japan spends only about one percent of its GNP in its defense, which I believe is too small.

President Pak: The Japanese say that the defense and security of South Korea and Japan are interrelated, but in practice they haven’t done anything.

President Nixon: That is true.

President Pak: They think that they do not have to do anything since they have South Korea in front of them and the U.S. in back of them. They need U.S. advice in this regard. For example, most of the “equipment” carried by North Korean guerrillas who have infiltrated into South Korea such as their radios and shoes are made in Japan. Although we made a protest against this, they continue to sell these items to make a profit. Thus the people of South Korea have no good feelings toward the Japanese. Incidentally, there have been reports to the effect that since American troops have been withdrawing, other allied troops might follow suit. It is my thinking that unless we are requested by South Vietnam or the U.S., we will continue to station our troops in Vietnam.

President Nixon: There has been no progress in the Paris talks, and November 1 is the first anniversary of our bombing halt. What do you think our tactics should be? Do you think we should reopen the bombings?

President Pak: It is up to your decision, but I think it is difficult (to reopen the bombings) because of your domestic public opinion. When I was informed by Ambassador Porter regarding the bombing halt, last November, I told him how we would be taking this action without reciprocal action or commitment on the part of North Vietnam.

President Nixon: In the event that we resume our bombings, what do you think the reactions of Asia would be?

President Pak: Free countries in Asia would welcome it. But it is up to your decision.

President Nixon: What is your view on the Sino-Soviet conflict? How deep do you think it is and how long do you believe it might last?

President Pak: We have analyzed the situation a great deal. There is a 50󈞞 chance a war might break out between the two countries. Some believe that a war will not be staged since both of them know they both would suffer a great deal of damage and a war might be a prolonged one. On the other hand, some interpret that the longer the present conflict continues, the harder for the Soviets to deal with Communist China. We also have information that the Soviet military takes a hawkish attitude. One thing is certain, though—the present conflict will not be solved in the near future.

President Nixon: I oppose the view that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should cooperate to restrain Communist China. Both the Soviet Union and China are our potential enemy, and this view does not make sense. If the Soviet Union sweeps over China, the former will get stronger, posing a greater threat to Asia.

President Pak: I agree with you.

President Nixon: This explains the reasons why we have eased the travel restrictions and purchases. We are trying to dispel the Soviet idea of opposing China by cooperating with the U.S. But we will continue to support Free China, and our policy toward Communist China remains the same as before.

President Pak: It would be better for us to remove both powers than have one of the powers get stronger than the other.

President Nixon: The economic growth rate in such countries as South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Free China and Thailand has grown higher than other countries of the world, whereas the economic level of China and North Korea has been lowered. Now the danger is in the area of subversion. This is acute in the ROK, for example, because of forces lying beyond the Parallel. Although, as you know, public opinion here demands reduction of troops we have all over the world, I rejected the idea of decreasing the number of our men staying in the ROK. I will make this view clear to the public to warn Kim Il-Song. I had talks with General Bonesteel, and during the last Cabinet [NSC] meeting66. See Document 34. we received a report that the supply of small ships to the ROK Navy has progressed at a fast tempo. Although our defense budget this year is tight, I think we will be able to meet some of the requests the ROK has made. I do not want to give a wrong notion to Kim Il-Song that the U.S. is lessening its responsibility for the defense of the ROK. Now, I know you have various economic programs under way. This will be known in two to three weeks, but I would like to inform you that today the Export-Import Bank has decided to give $73 million to the ROK for the construction of one power plant and an atomic power plant. Since I heard that your country wants more private investment unlike some of the Asian countries, I plan to encourage this aspect.

President Pak: As I told you in the car (while proceeding to the St. Francis Hotel from the Presidio of San Francisco), the ROK is indebted to the U.S. for its economic growth. Our “financial independence rate” until a few years ago was about 50 percent. It will be 94.8 percent in the next fiscal year and almost 100 percent in the year after next. We will, however, need surplus agricultural products for the time being. We have encouraged exports to obtain more foreign currency and private investment. The South Korean people have been making efforts to achieve a self-independent economy, and I hope you would consider giving us assistance to achieve this target during the next several years.

President Nixon: I have held the same view since my first visit to your country in 1953. It is difficult with this year’s budget, but the ROK is an exception.

President Pak: The U.S. has been imposing a restriction on its import of textiles, but I hope that you make the ROK an exception in the measure so as to help the country achieve its economic independence.

President Nixon: The matter on the textiles mainly concerns Japan. The ROK has entered the textile market only during the recent years. I hope that a reasonable solution can be found to satisfy both the ROK and Japan. We can discuss the matter in detail tomorrow, but this is not an easy problem to solve. I will try to deal with the ROK problem discreetly.

President Pak: I think I have told all the subjects I had in mind.

President Nixon: On the troop matter, I will inform you tomorrow if our government and President Thieu have decided on it.77. On August 22, from 10:12 to 10:48 a.m., Nixon again met with Park at the St. Francis Hotel. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC? Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig. The issues covered in their conversation are summarized in Lake’s memorandum to Kissinger see footnote 1 above. A joint statement was released at San Francisco on August 22 see Public Papers: Nixon: 1969, pp. 682?. We are partners in our common struggle. I know that for the ROK population, South Korea has sent more troops in percentage than the U.S. has done. I will inform you of all the measures we plan to take on Vietnam as they occur.

President Pak: I appreciate listening to your views on various subjects. I am encouraged to hear your remarks on the Korean problem.

President Nixon: It is a little noisy outside, but please remember that 98 percent of the American people are Korea’s friends.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Memcon—The President and President Pak (Korea). Top Secret Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the St. Francis Hotel. President Park also made a speech to a Korean-American association at the Presidio in San Francisco earlier on August 21, but the primary purpose of his visit was to meet with President Nixon. This memorandum is attached to an undated memorandum from Lake to Kissinger summarizing the meeting and another one on the morning of August 22. Lake stated that President Nixon indicated he would take the following actions: “to inform the Koreans in advance of the time and number of U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, to study sympathetically MAP, military assistance, and other Korean proposals, to plan to encourage more U.S. private investment in Korea, to help the Koreans with surplus agricultural products, to reappraise the Export/Import Bank’s limited capital so as to probably increase it, to talk with General Bonesteel about more fighter planes for Korea, and to visit Korea during his term of office.” (Ibid.)

2 According to telegram 1693 from Moscow, April 22, Ambassador Jacob Beam delivered this message during his initial call on Kosygin on April 22. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967󈞱, POL US–USSR) Beam’s April 22 oral statement and telegram 1693 are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969?, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 39 and 40. No written record that this message was given to Dobrynin has been found. On April 17, at 9:25 a.m., Nixon and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about the shootdown. According to a transcript of their conversation, “President and K[issinger] discussed idea of formal protest—decided should not be done with Soviets.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC? Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig)

3 Reference is to the Nixon Doctrine, first enunciated by President Nixon at Guam on July 25. He stated that the United States expected that Asian nations would increasingly be responsible for their own military defense. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 554?. See also Foreign Relations, 1969?, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29.

4 On March 14, the President announced his decision for an ABM program that included a Safeguard system, which was a modified version of Lyndon Johnson’s Sentinel system. Safeguard called for 12 separate sites for area missile defense, 19 radars, and several hundred interceptor missiles. Nixon also decided to continue testing for multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). On March 14, the White House issued a press release, printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 273?.

5 See footnote 3 above.

6 See Document 34.

7 On August 22, from 10:12 to 10:48 a.m., Nixon again met with Park at the St. Francis Hotel. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC? Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig. The issues covered in their conversation are summarized in Lake’s memorandum to Kissinger see footnote 1 above. A joint statement was released at San Francisco on August 22 see Public Papers: Nixon: 1969, pp. 682?.
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Persons
Abrams, Creighton W., Jr.General,USA, Commander, U.S. Military Command, Vietnam Army Chief of Staff from October 12, 1972
Beam, Jacob D.Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 14, 1969
Dobrynin, Anatoliy FedorovichSoviet Ambassador to the United States
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.Colonel, Brigadier General in November 1969 Major General in March 1972 Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1969 until June 1970 Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970
Johnson, Lyndon B.former President of the United States (1963?)
Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung)Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung), Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of the DPRK until December 28, 1972 President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) of the DPRK from December 28, 1972 and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
Kissinger, Henry A.Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Kosygin, Alexei N.Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) of the Soviet Union
Lake, W. Anthonymember, National Security Council Staff from 1970 until 1971
Nguyen Van ThieuPresident of the Republic of Vietnam
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Packard, DavidDeputy Secretary of Defense until December 13, 1971
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Porter, William J.Ambassador to the ROK until August 18, 1971
Sato EisakuPrime Minister of Japan until July 6, 1972
Abbreviations & Terms
EC?unarmed, four-engine propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft
GNPgross national product
HAKHenry A. Kissinger
ICBMintercontinental ballistic missile
MAPMilitary Assistance Program
MIRVmultiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
NSCNational Security Council
RGrecord group
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
SVNSouth Vietnam
USUnited States
USSRUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics