대한민국의 조종실에 반역자나 인격장애자가 들어가는 것은 막아야 합니다!
-대통령 후보들에 대한 도덕성검증뿐 아니라 이념검증, 능력검증, 정신감정도 필요합니다. 한나라당부터 좌경이념의 소유자와 결별해야 합니다.

1. 우리는 지난 두 번의 대통령 선거에서 이념검증에 실패함으로써 좌파적 대통령에게 대한민국의 조종실을 맡겨 한국사회의 좌경화를 허용하고 말았습니다. 이념으로 生死가 갈리고 전쟁을 치른 나라에선 좌경이념의 소유자가 공직에 들어가도록 해선 절대로 안됩니다.
2. 조종사도 매년 정신감정을 받습니다. 4800만 국민들의 안전을 책임지는 대통령(군통수권자) 자리에 앉을 사람은 더 엄격한 정신감정을 받아야 합니다. 정신이상자나 인격장애자가 대통령이 되면 국민들의 정신건강도 망가지고 국민과 國富의 국외탈출이 일어납니다.
3. 두 번의 大選에서 좌파대통령을 등장시킨 책임은 한나라당의 기회주의성에 있습니다. 중도와 좌파 표를 얻으려다가 자신의 정체성을 잃어버리는 바람에 김대중, 노무현 후보의 좌경성향을 유권자들에게 제대로 알리지 못했습니다. 요사이 한나라당과 후보들은 또 다시 大勢論에 안주하여 좌파와 싸우지 않고 이념-안보문제를 적당히 넘기려 합니다.
4. 우리는 한나라당과 후보들부터 자신의 이념정체성을 확실히 할 것을 요구합니다. 대한민국 헌법정신인 자유민주적 기본 가치에 대한 확신이 있다면 적어도 다음과 같은 공약을 걸어야 합니다.
-6.15 선언 무효화, 對北퍼주기 중단(금강산관광 중단), 北核해체를 위한 국제제재 동참, 北核저지 실패시 자위적 핵개발 검토, 韓美연합사 해체 작업 중단, 大選음모용 정상회담 반대, 좌경분자들의 공직취임 금지, 反헌법적-反국가적 행태를 일삼는 민노당과 전교조 해산, 私學法 재개정, 적은 세금-작은 정부-많은 일자리, 간첩수사 강화, 국군포로와 납북자 송환, 韓美FTA 지지, 政經유착 근절, 폭력시위 엄단 등 國法질서 회복 등등.
5. 원희룡, 고진화 의원은 이념적 가치관에서 좌파정당원과 같다고 판단되므로 한나라당을 떠나야 합니다. 정책이나 전술은 달라도 되지만 이념이 다른 사람들끼리는 정당을 같이 할 수 없는 법입니다. 2002년 한나라당 대통령 후보 경선에 나왔던 이부영씨는 그 2년 뒤엔 열린당의 의장이 되지 않았습니까. 내부의 이념적 혼란을 정리할 힘도 없는 한나라당이 친북좌파 종식을 어떻게 이루겠습니까?
6. 우리는 좌파정권을 종식시키고 국가를 정상화한 다음 내친 김에 자유통일까지 하여 북한동포를 해방하고 일류국가로 달려가야 합니다. 대세화하고 있는 국민들의 대각성 흐름은 올해 大選과 내년 總選이 수구좌파들의 마지막 무대가 될 것임을 예고하고 있습니다. 대동단결하여 좌파정권을 종식시키고 새로운 세상을 만들어냅시다. 대한민국 만세, 국군 만세, 자유통일 만세!!

*애국단체들이 대동단결하여 '친북좌파종식3.1국민대회'를 오는 3월1일 정오 서울시청광장에서 갖습니다!


2007년 2월6일
국민행동본부(본부장 徐貞甲)






휴버트 험프리 미국 부통령은 1966년2월23일 서울을 방문하여 韓美동맹과 관련하여 이런 발언을 한 적이 있다.
<휴전선상, 즉 軍事分界線上에 한 사람의 미국 군인이라도 있는 한, 美 합중국 전체의 힘이 한국의 안전과 방위에 매어져 있는 것입니다. 오늘날 한국은 미국과 한국을 합한 만큼 강대한 것이며, 또한 미국도 오늘날 한국과 미국을 합한 만큼 강대한 것입니다. 이에 관하여 여러분은 의문을 가질 필요도, 의심할 여지도 없을 것입니다>
'한국은 미국과 한국을 합한 만큼 강대하고 미국도 한국과 미국을 합한 만큼 강대하다'(Korea today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. America today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together)는 귀절은 韓美상호방위조약의 본질을 的確하게 설명하고 있다. 이 한국과 미국의 힘을 연결시키는 것이 주한미군이고 韓美연합사이다. 소위 인계철선 개념이다.

험프리 부통령은 미군의 인계철선 역할을 자랑하고 있다. 인계철선 역할은 미국이 원해서 해온 것이다. 노무현씨의 망언대로 한국의 보수층이 하라고 해서 한 것이 아니다. 미국의 國益에도 한국의 國益에도 맞으니까 이뤄진 것이다. 미국은 한국전선에서 피를 흘렸고, 한국군은 미군과 함깨 월남전에서 피를 흘렸다.

약5000명의 한국군이 월남에서 죽었다. 1만 명 이상이 다쳤다. 2003년 이후 이라크에서 죽은 미군보다 두 배나 많은 한국군이 미군과 함께 싸우다가 외국에서 죽은 것이다. 그래서 미군의 인계철선 역할이 한국에서 지속된 것이다. 이것이 북한정권의 남침을 막은 것이다. 이런 사정도 모르는 거짓말꾼 한국 대통령이 미국 사람들 앞에서 한국의 보수층을 고자질하듯이 아부성 발언을 했는데 미국사람들을 감동시킨 데는 실패했고 盧씨의 구제불능성에 대한 기존의 생각을 확인시킨 데는 성공한 듯하다. 미국은 한국에서 인계철선 역할을 하여 이 나라를 지켜내고 세계에서 가장 성공한 친미국가로 만든 데 대하여 자부심을 갖고 있는데 盧씨가 '미국인의 자랑'을 수치라고 말하니 어이가 없었을 것이다.

애국심과 자존심을 모르는 이가 국가와 國軍을 대표하고 지휘하는 나라! 결국은 국민의 책임이다. 마침 국민행동본부가 盧 대통령에 대한 사법처리를 요구하는 고발장을 돌리고 있다.



설날에 다시 생각하는 워싱턴 한국전 기념물 銘文


자유는 공짜가 아니다.
조국은 우리의 아들 딸들에게 경의를 표하노니, 그대들은 이름도 알지 못한 나라의 만난 적도 없는 사람들을 지키기 위해 조국의 부름에 응했도다.

Freedom is not free.
Our nation honors sons and daugthters who answered the call to defend the country they never knew and the
people they never met.
-----------------------
고마움을 모르는 인간과 국가는 반드시 그 대가를 치른다! 그런 배신을 가르치는 지식인과 지도자는 반드시 심판 받는다. 그런 심판은 역사속에서가 아니라 법정에서 이뤄질수록 좋다.



'공산주의자는 마르크스와 레닌을 읽은 사람이고 非공산주의자는 마르크스와 레닌을 잘 아는 사람이다'
이렇게 代入해보아도 될 것 같다.
'좌익은 김일성 김정일을 읽은 사람이고 우익은 김일성 김정일을 잘 아는 사람이다'
북한을 문헌으로써, 그것도 북한에서 생산된 문헌으로써 이해한 사람은 거의가 김정일을 좋게 보고 북한을 誤判한다. 관념으로서의 북한론은 체험으로서의 북한론과 너무나 다르다. 노무현 대통령이야말로 實在하지 않는 관념으로서의 북한과 김정일像을 머리에 넣고 다니니 하는 말마다 초점이 맞지 않는다.
레이건 대통령은 이런 농담도 했다.
'소련 농업에서 잘못 된 점 네 개는 무엇인가?'
'봄, 여름, 겨울, 그리고 가을'
이런 응용은 어떨까?
'노무현 대통령이 말 실수를 특히 많이 할 때는 언제인가?'
'봄, 여름, 겨울, 그리고 가을'

10. 소련측에서 본 레이건

근 30년간 워싱턴에 주재하면서 미국의 여섯 대통령을 상대한 소련 대사 아나톨리 도브리닌은 ‘In Confidence'(‘비밀리에’: Times Books)라는 회고록을 남겼다. 美蘇 냉전 시대에 소련의 입장에서 본 현대사의 內幕 이야기이다. 흥미진진한 秘史가 많고 소련 대사의 눈에 비친 歷代 미국 대통령의 인간적 면모가 특히 재미 있다.

도브리닌은 소련측이 상대하기 가장 어려웠던 대통령으로 로널드 레이건을 꼽았다. 소련 지도부의 눈에 비친 레이건은 예측이 불가능한 인물이고 모순덩어리이며 한편으로는 아주 마음씨 좋은 매력적 인물이었다. 소련측이 인식의 혼란을 겪은 것은 레이건의 二重性 때문이었다. 레이건은 폴란드의 자유노조 지원, 군비확충, 아프가니스탄 게릴라 지원, S D I(Strategic Defense Initiative. 이른바 별들의 전쟁 계획. 미사일 방어망 구축계획) 등 對蘇강경정책을 추진하고 공개적으로 소련을 ‘惡의 제국’이라고 비판했다. 그런 한편에선 도브리닌을 만나면 그렇게 다정하게 대해줄 수가 없고, 친필로 소련의 서기장 앞으로 다정한 편지를 써 美蘇 관계 개선을 희망하곤 했다. 도브리닌이 더욱 당혹한 것은 레이건 자신은 이런 모순적 행동에 대해서 전혀 개의치 않았다는 점이다. 레이건은 자신의 二重的 행동에 대해서 조금도 의문을 가지지 않고 오직 자신의 판단과 행동이 정당하다는 확신에 차 있었다는 것이다.

레이건에 대해서 그의 적과 동지들은 모두 과소평가했다고 도브리닌은 지적했다. 레이건은 겉보다 속이 깊은 사람이었고, 천성적인 낙관론과 자연스런 제스처, 그리고 인간적 매력으로 해서 잘못된 점이 있어도 그냥 넘어가기도 했다. 그는 정치적 상상력이 뛰어났고 특히 S D I와 같은 큰 그림을 그리고 이를 우직하게 밀고나가는 배짱이 있었다. 예컨대 레이건은 1981년에 ‘제로 옵션’이란 파격적인 戰略무기감축안을 제시했다.
당시 소련은 東歐 공산국가 안에 중거리핵탄두미사일을 배치하고 있었다. 레이건은 미국도 서유럽국가에 중거리핵탄두미사일 퍼싱2型을 배치하도록 NATO에 요구하겠다고 선언했다. 다만 소련이 東歐의 중거리미사일을 철거하면 미국도 배치하지 않겠다고 제안했다. 이 대담한 제안에 대해서 소련은 물론 거부했고 미국내 진보파도 反核을 부르짖으면서 미국 미사일의 서구 배치에 반대하고 나섰다.

소련은 西歐의 언론과 여론을 선동하여 퍼싱 미사일 배치 반대운동을 벌이도록 했다. 레이건은 끄떡도 하지 않고 밀고나갔다. 미국은 독일의 콜 수상과 영국의 대처 수상을 설득하여 1984년에 퍼싱 미사일을 서유럽에 배치하였다. 제로 옵션을 반대해오던 소련은 미국측과 교섭해가면서 서서히 생각이 바뀌기 시작했다. 특히 고르바초프가 서기장으로 취임한 1985년 이후 소련은 제로 옵션을 받아들이는 쪽으로 선회하다가 1987년엔 모든 중거리핵탄두 미사일을 全세계적으로 폐기하자는 제안을 했고 미국이 이를 받아들였다. 엉뚱한 것 같았던 제안을 레이건이 우직하게 밀고나가니 소련의 생각이 변하고 사상최초로, 전략무기를 제한하는 데 머문 것이 아니라 감축하는 데까지 이른 것이다. 도브리닌은 소련이 서둘러 중거리 미사일을 東歐에 배치했다가 폐기하는 과정에서 수십억 루블이 낭비되었다고 지적했다.

1984년 레이건은 소련과 격렬하게 대결하면서도 도브리닌 대사에게 직접 전화를 걸어 소련의 反체제 물리학자 사하로프의 부인이 미국에 와서 치료를 받을 수 있도록 소련 지도부에 말을 잘 해달라고 부탁까지 했다. 소련 지도부는 사하로프 박사의 부인이 꾀병을 부리고 있다면서 이 부탁을 거절했으나 1985년에 고르바초프가 등장하자 부인의 출국을 허용했다.

도브리닌은 이 회고록에서 東西 냉전이 미국의 승리로 끝난 것이 레이건의 功이라고 해석하는 것은 과장이라고 말했다. 그는 소련 내부의 변화와 고르바초프의 개혁의지가 결정적이었다면서 냉전의 종식은 美蘇의 공동승리라고 주장했다.

In November 1985 in Geneva, Switzerland, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan met for the first time to discuss issues such as SDI and the reduction of nuclear weapons. However, after meeting, tensions still remained due to fighting in Afghanistan and Central America.

After months of postponement a mini-summit was organized in Reykjavik, Iceland, to open communications further. Here, the two leaders again discussed SDI at length but also made progress toward agreements to reduce ballistic missiles by 50 percent and a 'zero option' agreement in Europe -- meaning there would be no more intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

While no agreement was signed in Reykjavik, both leaders felt that the meeting was a success and opened the way for further progress.


Excerpts of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks

11 October 1986 - Afternoon

President Reagan: The apprehensions you voice fall into two categories.

First, you are concerned that defense could be used for offense. I can assure you that this is not the purpose of SDI. Yes, the concern was voiced that space-based weapons could be used to destroy targets on the ground. But there are no weapons that are more reliable, more effective and faster than ballistic missiles. We already have an agreement prohibiting deployment of mass destruction weapons in space. And if you have additional concerns in this connection, we can work together to ease them.

Second, you voiced the concern that the United States might obtain a possibility for carrying out a first strike, and then avoid retaliation owing to defense. I can say that we do not have the capability for carrying out a first strike, and that this is not our goal.

The concern you voiced encouraged me to suggest drawing up a treaty eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles. In this case the question as to the combinations of offensive and defensive systems that would allow one of the sides to make a first strike disappears automatically. I am convinced that owing to this the situation will become stabler, safer, and that all of this will cost us less. Armaments that reach their target in a few minutes and cannot be recalled would be eliminated, which would provide a guarantee against cheating and the actions of third countries. What we want most of all is to replace ballistic missiles by defense, transition to which would occur in stages, with stability ensured at each stage of the disarmament process.

We are ready to share our accomplishments in strategic defense, and we could include a provision in the treaty which would make the quantity of defensive weapons deployed dependent upon the number of ballistic missiles remaining. Such a situation would be distinguished by high stability, since bombers and cruise missiles are unsuited to a surprise attack, in view of their slow speed and the absence of limits upon air defense systems.

We naturally need to examine the times and stages of transition to strategic defense. The principles of equality and stability would be observed at each stage of this process in this case. My proposal is a serious step, and we need to conduct serious negotiations. I am certain that its implementation will make it possible to place security upon an stronger and stabler foundation. As far as the proposal you made today is concerned, I do not fully understand what topics would be discussed in the negotiations you suggest. Will our proposals be discussed, including our idea of sharing the advantages of strategic defense, and the proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles?

Secretary General Gorbachev: I will answer this question later.

[...]

Secretary General Gorbachev: Before I respond, Mr. President, at least briefly to your statement, and the numerous issues you have touched upon, I would like to ask a few questions for the purposes of clarification. As I understand, you share our goal of reducing strategic offensive missiles by 50 percent.

President Reagan: Yes.

Secretary General Gorbachev: At the same time if I understood you correctly, the figures you cited reflect options that were discussed in Geneva and which foresee a 30 percent reduction.

President Reagan: We proposed 6,000 units.

Secretary of State Shultz: This level would include 4,500 ballistic missile warheads and 1,500 air-launched cruise missiles.

Secretary General Gorbachev: Much has already been said about these options, and you know that the matter reached a dead end. Our diplomats in Geneva can go on discussing all of these figures, levels, sublevels, and son on forever. I have data here on American and Soviet strategic arms. I can give this table to you. And what I propose is this: Inasmuch as we agree that strategic missiles should be reduced by 50 percent, let's reduce all forms of armaments in our strategic arsenals by half -- ground-launched missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and missiles carried by strategic bombers. Thus the strategic arsenals would be reduced by 50 percent across the entire spectrum. The structure of our strategic arms evolved historically, you see, and with such a reduction, not one form of armament would be wronged, and the level of strategic confrontation would be reduced by 50 percent. This is a simple, proportionate solution, one which everyone will understand. And then all of these debates, which have now been going on for so many years, about levels, sublevels, what counts or what doesn't count, and so on, will be resolved automatically, since a 50 percent reduction is a 50 percent reduction. And there will be nothing to debate. Do you agree with such an approach?

President Reagan: But my proposal also includes all strategic weapons except freefall bombs carried by bombers. But even these are limited indirectly, since a limit is set on the number of bombers.

[...]

Secretary General Gorbachev: The next issue. Do I understand correctly that the U.S. President no longer likes the zero option he proposed regarding medium-range missiles?

President Reagan: No, I like it very much, but only with a global resolution of the issue. If the zero is on a global scale, then this would be fabulous. But if intermediate-range missiles are eliminated only in Europe, while a significant number of missiles aimed, in your words, at Asia will remain on your side, I could not agree to that. Your missiles could reach Europe from there, after all, and in addition, they could be moved suddenly to other places.

Secretary General Gorbachev: But you have nuclear weapons in South Korea as well, at bases, aboard forward-based weapon systems, not to mention other nuclear arms. Because you had earlier stated concerns regarding the nuclear arms situation in Europe, we also propose eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe. As far as weapons systems with a range below 1,000 km are concerned, we propose freezing them and starting negotiations, and as for weapons in Asia, we also propose starting negotiations with the objective of finding a solution pertaining to these missiles in Asia, and consequently a solution pertaining to these missiles in Asia, and consequently a solution to the problem as a whole.

We have already opted to leave aside the strategic arsenals of Great Britain and France, and this is a concession on our side. Nor are we raising the issue of forward-based systems. Why has the United States not taken any steps in return? What we are now proposing, after all, is a simple solution: zero in Europe and negotiations in Asia.

[...]

Secretary General Gorbachev: But what I want to ask you, Mr. President, is this: If a solution is found for Asia, will you agree to the zero option?

President Reagan: Yes. We stationed them there at the request of our allies, which my predecessor accepted and which I implemented in response to your SS-20 missiles. As far as your missiles in Asia are concerned, I have seen maps from which it follows that while they can't hit England, they can hit France, West Germany, Central Europe, Greece and Turkey. Plus, the fact that they are mobile.

All of this emphasizes everything I discussed back in Geneva. Before we can work things out in regard to armaments, we need to try to clarify the causes of mistrust. If we are able to eliminate it, it will be easier to resolve the problem of armaments.

Secretary General Gorbachev: That's true. Which is why I am amazed that you dispute what I told you about our missiles in Asia. They cannot reach Europe. Specialists know this well, and therefore your position seems to be an obvious paradox. This is not to mention the fact that it could be stipulated precisely in an agreement that no missiles will be moved anywhere, and that everything will be subjected to the strictest inspection.

I think that we can instruct our experts to discuss your thoughts and my idea. But do I understand correctly? If a solution is found regarding Asia, will you agree to the zero option in Europe.

President Reagan: Yes.

[...]

Secretary General Gorbachev: As far as SDI is concerned, it is not evoking concern among us today in the military respect. We are not afraid of a three-echelon ABM system. If your laboratory research motivates you to create such a system, considering that obviously America has a great deal of money, our response will be different, asymmetrical. What actually troubles us is that it will be difficult for us to persuade our people and our allies as to the absence of the ABM treaty. There would be no logic in this, and nothing could be built on this basis.

President Reagan: We have absolutely no desire to eliminate the ABM treaty. This treaty is defensive, but you capitalized on its provisions to create a powerful defensive potential. We did not do this.

In this situation all we can say to the Americans is this: If the other side destroys us, we will destroy it. But people are not sleeping any easier for this. We propose supplementing the ABM Treaty with provisions on specific defensive weapons being created not for a first strike or to obtain advantages. We want this to be available to all the world.

Secretary General Gorbachev: We will not deploy SDI. We have another concept.

President Reagan: We do not intend to eliminate the ABM Treaty.

[...]

President Reagan: A couple of words in conclusion. You said that you don't need SDI, but then we would be able to carry out our programs in parallel, and if you find that you have something a little better, than perhaps you could share it with us.

Secretary General Gorbachev: Excuse me, Mr. President, but I do not take your idea of sharing SDI seriously. You don't want to share even petroleum equipment, automatic machine tools or equipment for dairies, while sharing SDI would be a second American Revolution. And revolutions do not occur all that often. Let's be realistic and pragmatic. That's more reliable.

President Reagan: If I thought that SDI could not be shared, I would have rejected it myself.

16 October 1986 - Morning

[...]

Secretary General Gorbachev: We know that you plan to deploy SDI. But we do not have such plans. And we cannot assume an obligation relative to such a transition. We have a different conception.

Secretary of State Shultz: I would like to mention also the third question, which we included because you emphasize it so much. This is the situation which would exist until the time when the conditions indicated above were realized. The question is: what general understanding can the parties reach relative to the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty on activity related to creating a long-range strategic defense?

The President stated to you and the whole world that he will not renounce the SDI program. You do not agree with that. But as I understand it, you recognize his problem and that he is trying to meet your concern half-way.

Secretary General Gorbachev: But I think that I am even helping the president with SDI. After all, your people say that if Gorbachev attacks SDI and space weapons so much, it means the idea deserves more respect. They even say that if it were not for me, no one would listen to the idea at all. And some even claim that I want to drag the United States into unnecessary expenditures with this. But if the first ones are right, then I am on your side in this matter, but you have not appreciated it.

President Reagan: What the hell use will ABM's or anything else be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?

Secretary General Gorbachev: Absolutely right. I am for that. But the point is that under the ABM Treaty the parties do not have a large-scale antimissile defense, and you want to deploy such a defense.

President Reagan: But what difference does it make if it is not nuclear weapons? What difference whether it exists or not?

On the other hand, you know that even in this situation we will not be able to guarantee that someone will not begin to make nuclear weapons again at some point.

Secretary General Gorbachev: Mr. President, you just made a historic statement: What the hell use will SDI be if we eliminate nuclear weapons? But it is exactly because we are moving toward a reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons that I favor strengthening the ABM Treaty. In these conditions it becomes even more important. As for your arguments about the madman who decides to resort to nuclear weapons, I think that we will be able to solve that problem, it is not that serious.

President Reagan: It appears that the point is that I am the oldest man here. And I understand that after the war the nations decided that they would renounce poison gases. But thank God the gas mask continued to exist. Something similar can happen with nuclear weapons. And we will have to shield against them in any case.

Secretary General Gorbachev: I am increasingly convinced of something I knew previously only second-hand. The President of the United States does not like to retreat. I see now that you do not want to meet us half-way on the issue of the ABM Treaty, which is absolutely essential in conditions where we are undertaking large reductions in nuclear arms, and you do not want to begin negotiations on stopping nuclear testing. So I see that the possibilities of agreement are exhausted.

[...]

Secretary General Gorbachev: It is a shame, Mr. President, that you and I do not have enough time to discuss humanitarian issues. We have concrete ideas on this which we simply are not going to have time to discuss. I have to say that people in the Soviet Union are very concerned about the human rights situation in the United States. There is one other important subject. This is the importance of mutual information in our day. The situation now is this: the Voice of America broadcasts around the clock in many languages from stations you have in various countries in Europe and Asia, while we cannot present our point of view to the American people. Therefore, to achieve parity, we are forced to jam Voice of America broadcasts. I propose the following: we will stop jamming Voice of America and you will be able to broadcast what you consider necessary to us, but at the same time you will meet us half-way and help us lease, from you or in neighboring countries, radio stations that would allow us to reach the American people with our point of view.

President Reagan: The difference between us is that we recognize freedom of the press and the right of people to listen to any point of view. This does not exist in your press. Today in Washington there will be a press conference, and Americans will see it, and newspapers will publish the text of it. It is not that way in your country. Your system envisions only a government press.

Secretary General Gorbachev: But I asked a concrete question. I proposed that we can stop jamming Voice of America if you will meet us half-way and give us an opportunity to lease a radio station from you or lease or build a station in one of your neighboring countries.

President Reagan: I will consult about this when I return to the United States, and I will take a favorable position.

Secretary General Gorbachev: We are for parity in general. In the information field, for example, or in film. Almost half of the movies showing in our theaters are American. Soviet movies are hardly ever shown in the United States. That is not parity.

President Reagan: We do not have any ban on your movies. The film industry is a free business, and if someone wants to show your films he can do it.

Secretary General Gorbachev: I see that the President avoids this question and goes into talk about business.

President Reagan: Our government cannot control the film market. If you want to inundate us with your movies go right ahead. How our movies get to your country, I do not know.

Secretary General Gorbachev: It is an interesting situation, simply a paradox. In your country, the most democratic country, obstacles arise to showing our movies, while in our country, a totalitarian country, almost half the movies being shown are American. How can you reconcile this, that the Soviet Union is an undemocratic country but your films are being shown?

President Reagan: There is a difference between free enterprise and government ownership. You have no free enterprise, everything belongs to the government and the government puts everything on the market. In the United States we have private industry, and other countries have the right to sell their goods, movies and so on. You have the right to set up a rental organization in our country to distribute your movies, or to lease some theater. But we cannot order it.

Secretary General Gorbachev: One more question. There were two television bridges between the USSR and the United States recently. One involved the participation of the communities of Leningrad, Copenhagen, and Boston, and the other had Soviet and American doctors. In our country they were watched by 150 million people, but in the United States they were not shown.

President Reagan: The only thing I can answer is that the movie theaters and all belong to your government, and you show what you want in them. But our government cannot compete with private business.

But I want to tell you that your performing groups, such as the Leningrad Ballet, draw an enormous crowd in the United States, and they are shown on television too. But if you want to show other things too, please do. We have leasing companies, and theaters which show foreign films.

Secretary General Gorbachev: Mr. President, we have quite a few complaints about the United States. Here is the last question. For 30 years now you have refused to let our trade union figures enter the United States. Mr. Shultz simply does not give them visas. Where is the parity here? You know, your trade union figures come to the USSR and have interesting professional contacts and meetings with workers. But you do not let our people in. In your country, which is so self-confident, they are viewed as subversive elements.

President Reagan: I would like to look into this. Maybe I will have some proposals on the film problem that you mentioned.

Secretary General Gorbachev: Good.