미국의 이라크 점령 정책중 치명적인 실수는 이라크 군대를 해산한 것이었다. 이 해산명령은 당시 행정장관 L. 폴 브레머가 내렸다. 미국의 군부와 CIA, 그리고 파월 국무장관도 事後에 이 사실을 알고 반대했었다고 한다. 40만 명이나 되는 군대가 해산하자 졸지에 실업자가 된 이들중 상당수가 무기를 갖고 叛軍化되어 버렸다. 당시 이라크 군대는 장교단은 주로 순니파, 사병들은 시아파로 구성되어 있었다. 사단장 이상의 고위 간부들만 교체했더라면 이라크 군대는 미군에 충성하면서 叛軍들을 소탕하는 입장에 설 수 있었을 것이다.

최근 부시 대통령은 한 인터뷰에서 브레머 전 장관의 군대해산 명령에 대해서 미리 몰랐던 것처럼 이야기했다. 이에 발끈한 브레머는 2003년 5월에 부시 대통령에게 보낸 편지를 공개했다. 이 편지에서 브레머는 이라크 군대를 해산할 계획이라고 언급하고 있다. 부시 대통령은 며칠 뒤 답장을 보냈는데 그 속에선 이라크 군대 해산 문제를 언급하지 않고 있다.

부시는 브레머의 편지에 나오는 이라크 군대 해산 계획 운운하는 대목에 대해서 별로 신경을 쓰지 않았던 것 같다. 미 합참에선 브레머로부터 이 문제와 관련하여 어떤 자문 요청도 받지 않았다고 한다. 해산명령이 내려간 후에야 군, 국무부, 정보기관이 반대의사를 밝혔으나 너무 늦었다.

브레머는 '이라크 군대는 당시에 이미 해산상태였다. 군대를 재건하려면 다시 이들을 소집했어야 했는데 그것은 오히려 혼란을 가중시켰을 것이다'고 변명하고 있다. 점령정책중 가장 중요한 군대 해산 문제에 대해서 미국의 국가지도부 안에서 진지한 종합적 토론이 없었음이 확실하다. 그때는 勝戰 기분에 들떠서 이 중대사안을 사소한 것으로 치부하고 넘어가버린 것 같다.

이라크 군대 전체를 敵으로 돌린 것이 이런 결과를 빚은 것 같다. 군대는 명령에 죽고 사는 조직이다. 명령을 내리는 사령탑과 신경망만 교체하면 될터인데 군대 전체를 敵으로 간주하여 해산시켜버린 것이다. 敵을 최소화해야 이기는데 敵도 아닌 사람들까지 敵으로 만들어버린 셈이다.

몽골기마군단은 전투를 하여 敵의 항복을 받아내면 그들을 我軍으로 편입시켰다. 다만 장교들은 몽골군이 차지했다. 칭기즈칸의 손자 바투가 유럽원정에 나설 때 약15만 명의 기마군단을 동원했는데 몽골군인은 전체의 10%에도 미달했었고 나머지는 다국적군인들이었다고 한다. 소수로써 다수를 다스리는 일은 로마, 몽골, 영국처럼 대제국을 건설하고 운영해본 나라가 잘 안다. 미국은 그런 경험이 얕다. 덩치만 크고 지혜가 부족한 나라라고나 할까? 우리가 통일기에 북한군을 다룰 때 참고로 할 만한 사례이다.
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뉴욕타임스의 관련기사 소개


WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 — A previously undisclosed exchange of letters shows that President Bush was told in advance by his top Iraq envoy in May 2003 of a plan to “dissolve Saddam’s military and intelligence structures,” a plan that the envoy, L. Paul Bremer, said referred to dismantling the Iraqi Army.

The dismantling of the Iraqi Army in the aftermath of the American invasion is now widely regarded as a mistake that stoked rebellion among hundreds of thousands of former Iraqi soldiers and made it more difficult to reduce sectarian bloodshed and attacks by insurgents. In releasing the letters, Mr. Bremer said he wanted to refute the suggestion in Mr. Bush’s comment that Mr. Bremer had acted to disband the army without the knowledge and concurrence of the White House.

“We must make it clear to everyone that we mean business: that Saddam and the Baathists are finished,” Mr. Bremer wrote in a letter that was drafted on May 20, 2003, and sent to the president on May 22 through Donald H. Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense.

After recounting American efforts to remove members of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein from civilian agencies, Mr. Bremer told Mr. Bush that he would “parallel this step with an even more robust measure” to dismantle the Iraq military.

One day later, Mr. Bush wrote back a short thank you letter. “Your leadership is apparent,” the president wrote. “You have quickly made a positive and significant impact. You have my full support and confidence.”

On the same day, Mr. Bremer, in Baghdad, had issued the order disbanding the Iraqi military. Mr. Bush did not mention the order to abolish the military, and the letters do not show that he approved the order or even knew much about it. Mr. Bremer referred only fleetingly to his plan midway through his three-page letter and offered no details.

In an interview with Robert Draper, author of the new book, “Dead Certain,” Mr. Bush sounded as if he had been taken aback by the decision, or at least by the need to abandon the original plan to keep the army together.

“The policy had been to keep the army intact; didn’t happen,” Mr. Bush told the interviewer. When Mr. Draper asked the president how he had reacted when he learned that the policy was being reversed, Mr. Bush replied, “Yeah, I can’t remember, I’m sure I said, “This is the policy, what happened?’ ”

Mr. Bremer indicated that he had been smoldering for months as other administration officials had distanced themselves from his order. “This didn’t just pop out of my head,” he said in a telephone interview on Monday, adding that he had sent a draft of the order to top Pentagon officials and discussed it “several times” with Mr. Rumsfeld.

A White House official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the White House is not commenting on Mr. Draper’s book, said Mr. Bush indeed understood the order and was acknowledging in the interview with Mr. Draper that the original plan had proved unworkable.

“The plan was to keep the Iraqi Army intact, and that’s accurate,” the official said. “But by the time Jerry Bremer announced the order, it was fairly clear that the Iraqi Army could not be reconstituted, and the president understood that. He was acknowledging that that was something that did not go as planned.”

But the letters, combined with Mr. Bush’s comments, suggest confusion within the administration about what quickly proved to be a decision with explosive repercussions.

Indeed, Mr. Bremer’s letter to Mr. Bush is striking in its almost nonchalant reference to a major decision that a number of American military officials in Iraq strongly opposed. Some senior administration officials, including the secretary of state at the time, Colin L. Powell, have reportedly said subsequently that they did not know about the decision ahead of time.

Gen. Peter Pace, then the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in February 2004 that the decision to disband the Iraqi Army was made without the input of the joint chiefs. “We were not asked for a recommendation or for advice,” he said.

The reference from Mr. Bremer’s note to Mr. Bush is limited to one sentence at the end of a lengthy paragraph in a three-page letter. The letter devoted much more space to recounting what Mr. Bremer described as “an almost universal expression of thanks” from the Iraqi people “to the U.S. and to you in particular for freeing Iraq from Saddam’s tyranny.” It went on to recall how Mr. Bremer had been kissed by an old Iraqi man who was under the impression that Mr. Bremer was Mr. Bush. In his 2006 memoir, Mr. Bremer said he had briefed senior officials in Washington on the plan, but he did not mention the exchange of letters with Mr. Bush.

On Monday, Mr. Bremer made it clear that he was unhappy about being portrayed as a renegade of sorts by a variety of former administration officials.

Mr. Bremer said he sent a draft of the proposed order on May 9, shortly before he departed for his new post in Baghdad, to Mr. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon officials.

Among others who received the draft order, he said, were Paul D. Wolfowitz, then the deputy secretary of defense; Douglas J. Feith, then under secretary of defense for policy; Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, then head of the American-led coalition forces in Iraq; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Bremer said that he had briefed Mr. Rumsfeld on the plan “several times,” and that his top security adviser in Baghdad, Walter B. Slocombe, had discussed it in detail with senior Pentagon officials as well as with senior British military officials. He said he received detailed comments back from the joint chiefs, leaving no doubt in his mind that they understood the plan.

“I might add that it was not a controversial decision,” Mr. Bremer said. “The Iraqi Army had disappeared and the only question was whether you were going to recall the army. Recalling the army would have had very practical difficulties, and it would have political consequences. The army had been the main instrument of repression under Saddam Hussein. I would go on to argue that it was the right decision. I’m not second-guessing it.”

General McKiernan reportedly felt unhappy with Mr. Bremer’s plan to slowly build a new Iraqi Army from scratch, as were other American officers. In his farewell meeting with Mr. Bremer in June 2003, he urged him to “go bigger and faster” in fielding a new military.

Michael R. Gordon contributed reporting.