*몽골군대는 인류역사상 가장 효율적인 군사조직이었다. 오늘날의 기업인들이 참고로 할 만한 조직과 효율성의 원리가 숨어 있다. GE의 전 회장 웰치는 성공조직의 3대 조건을 Simplicity, Speed, Self-confidence라고 했다. 이 조직원리가 바로 몽골 기말군단의 조직원리이기도 했다.

아래 글에서 필자=디모티 메이는 몽골기마군단의 가장 큰 성공요인을 규율이라고 규정했다. 몽골군단 이전의 흉노, 아바르, 거란 등의 유목기마민족들도 몽골과 비슷한 전술과 조직을 갖고 있었으나 징기스칸은 여기에다가 규율과 시스템을 덧붙임으로써 연전연승하는 군대를 만들 수 있었다는 것이다.

군대규율은 間斷 없는 훈련과 지도자의 솔선수범 및 구성원들 사이의 인간적인 의리가 뒷받침되어야 한다. 몽골인들은 평소에 해온 대규모 사냥을 통해서 기마군단의 기동훈련을 자연스럽게 했다고 한다. 일상적 삶이 군대훈련이기도 했다. 삶과 군대가 한덩어리로 되어 있으면 전투는 자연스런 행동으로 되어 나온다.

그밖에 몽골군단이 가진 스파이망과 대량살상의 원칙이 또한 常勝의 비결이었다. 저항하면 다 죽이고 항복하면 살려준다는 원칙은 핵무기의 사용위협과 같았다. 다 죽든지 항복하든지의 선택의 기로에서 많은 도시들은 저항을 포기하지 않을 수 없었다.

이하 全文을 소개한다.


Mongol Arms


Until the modern era, no military force could compete with that of the Mongols in terms of effectiveness and certainly mobility. Through the use of a well disciplined and trained army, that focused on mobility and careful planning, the Mongols carved out the largest contiguous empire in history. Often their armies fought on several fronts at once, a difficult enough task in modern history and practically unheard of during the medieval period.

Training

All males between the ages of 15 to around 60 who were capable of bearing arms were eligible for military service. The rigors of daily living in the harsh climate of Mongolia prepared the nomads well in terms of endurance and fortitude. Trained from youth to be expert horsemen and archers, the nomads of Mongolia were well prepared to be warriors. By the thirteenth century, nomad horse archer armies already possessed a long history of success. Yet, the one which Chinggis Khan created perfected this form. He added the essential element that separated the Mongols from their peers: discipline. This enabled him to overcome the assortment of tribal confederations and alliances, which he faced before becoming the ruler of all Mongolia. While other armies would disintegrate in order to loot the dead and baggage of an enemy in flight, Chinggis Khan ordered his armies to wait until victory was complete. Those who disobeyed this command would be struck down. This disciplined soldier was then given a high rate of mobility. Each trooper had a string of three to five horses. This allowed him to exchange mounts when one tired. If one was slain, the Mongol trooper had replacements. In sedentary armies, this simply was not possible. Horses were simply too expensive to maintain to allow each cavalryman to have more than one, especially the large horses necessary to carry an armored warrior.

Equipment

The Mongols themselves, in order to maintain their mobility, were lightly armored compared to many of the armies they faced. Their armor, for the most part, consisted of lacquered or boiled leather, which mainly covered the upper body. A helmet was also part of their accoutrement. Other types of armor, such as chain mail, did appear, but it was not as widespread among the Mongols due to the weight. The armament of the Mongols focused on the bow. This was a double recurve composite bow, made of layers of sinew, horn, and wood. Each warrior had more than one, probably attached, in a special quiver, to their saddles on each horse in addition to quivers of arrows. The bow itself possessed an incredible amount of penetrating power, often consisting of pull weights of over one hundred pounds. The Mongols used a wide variety of arrows, many with specialized purposes, such as armor piercing, blunt stun arrows, and even whistling arrows for signaling purposes. In addition, the soldiers carried sabres, maces, axes, and sometimes a short spear with a hook at the bottom of the blade. Other supplies, such as rope, rations, files for sharpening arrows, etc., were also carried. This made the soldiers of the Mongol army a self-sufficient unit able to function independently of supply lines. Thus, they were not hampered by a slow moving baggage train, allowing them to make the rapid marches that so characterized Mongol warfare.

Organization

The organization of the Mongol army was also an old tradition of the steppe: the decimal system. The army was built upon a squad of ten (arban). Ten of these would then compose a company of a hundred (jaghun ). The next unit was a regiment of a thousand (mingghan). Most of the commanders listed in the contemporary sources were leaders of a mingghan. The equivalent of the modem division was a unit consisting of ten thousand (tumen).

The organization was simple, but sensible. The system could also easily be applied to new conscripts from vassals, or even forcibly conscripted troops from among the conquered. Yet, it is one thing to have organized units, but quite another to have them operate with any amount of efficiency. This is why the discipline of the Mongol army was such a key factor. The tactics that the Mongol army used, such a caracole technique in which the soldiers advanced, shot, then wheeled back in order for the next rank to fire, demanded unit integrity. Unit integrity was achieved through the battue, or hunt. During the battue, the army would form lines which often stretched for miles. These ranks would then begin to envelope an area, forcing the game into the ring. The Mongols would then tighten their ranks, so that the circle continued to shrink. The objective of this was not to allow any animal to escape. An incredibly high degree of organization, communication, and cooperation was necessary for this task. Without it, points of rendezvous could not be established, gaps would eventually appear in the ranks, and inevitably, confusion would result. Only a disciplined army, with a high degree of unit integrity and command structure could accomplish this task.

Strategy and Tactics

Before invading a territory, the Mongols made extensive preparations in a quriltai. At this meeting it was decided not only how the upcoming war would be conducted, but also, which generals would participate in it. In The Secret History of the Mongols, this procedure is demonstrated on several occasions. The Mongols meanwhile would have been accumulating intelligence on their opponent. Only after this was obtained, would there be a declaration of hostilities. Then, during the quriltai, units would be called up. Although the planning of the campaign was a major component, the Mongol generals still maintained a high degree of independence. Thus, they were able to complete their objectives on their terms, but they still had to abide by the timetable. This allowed the Mongols to coordinate their movements and concentrate their forces at prearranged sites.

The Mongols had a set method of invasion which varied only slightly from campaign to campaign. First the Mongol army would invade in several columns. Often it was three pronged attack, consisting of an army of the center and then two flanking forces. Flanking forces in some cases went into neighboring territories before rendezvousing with the army of the center. All of these columns were covered by a screen of scouts who constantly relayed information back to their mother column. In addition, because of their pre-planned schedule as well as the scouts, the Mongols not only marched divided, but also were also able to fight united. Furthermore, because of their forces marched in smaller concentrations, the Mongols were not impeded with columns stretching for miles. They used their mobility to spread terror to the effect that rarely were their opponents ever really prepared to concentrate their forces when the enemy appeared everywhere.

The use of a many-pronged invasion also fit into their preferred method of engaging the enemy. The Mongols preferred to deal with all field armies before moving deep into enemy territory. This was very practical. Reaching this goal was rarely difficult, as the enemy (except in the case of the Khwarazmians) usually sought to meet the Mongols before they destroyed an entire province. Furthermore, the use of columns with its screen of scouts gathering intelligence enabled the Mongols to locate the enemy armies much more rapidly than one army wandering around. In addition, since the Mongols could usually unite their forces before the enemy was cognizant of all of the different invasion forces, the Mongols were better able to conceal their troop strengths. This also meant that an embattled force could receive reinforcements or, in the advent of defeat, they could be avenged.

By concentrating on the field armies, the strongholds had to wait. Of course, smaller fortresses, or ones easily surprised, were taken as they came along. This had two effects. First, it cut off the principle city from communicating with other cities where they might expect aid. Secondly, refugees from these smaller cities would flee to the last stronghold. The reports from these cities and the streaming hordes of refugees not only reduced the moral of the inhabitants and garrison of the principle city, it also strained their resources. Food and water reserves were taxed by the sudden influx of refugees. Soon, what was once a formidable undertaking became easy.

The Mongols were then free to lay siege without interference of the field army as it had been destroyed. Smaller forts and cities could not harry the Mongols who either foraged or were out on other various missions during the siege. Most importantly, the many columns and raiding forces, prevented the main cities from being effective in assisting its smaller neighbors before hand as to do so in any strength, would leave it open to attack. Finally, the capture of the outer strongholds and towns, provided the Mongols more siege experience as well as raw materials in the form of labor to either man the siege machines, or to act as a human shield for the Mongols. It was also not uncommon for defeated troops to be recruited into the Mongol army. The most common method of preventing mutiny at a critical moment was to simply divide the new recruits into the already existing units. This preventing them from being a cohesive force, and it helped maintain unit integrity in the already existing formations.

Then came the task of destroying any hopes for an opponent to rally. This was carried out by harrying the enemy leader until they dropped. Chinggis Khan first carried this out in the wars of unification in Mongolia. In his first few encounters, he did not do this and it returned to haunt him. After that, it becomes a familiar tale. In Khwarazm, it was the flight of Muhammad to the Caspian Sea with Jebe and Subedei in pursuit. In the south of that empire, Chinggis Khan himself pursued Jelal al-Din to the Indus and later sent more troops after him. Then in Europe, King Bela IV received no breathing room after the disaster at Mohi.

By being constantly on the move, the enemy leader was unable to serve as a rallying point for his armies. They too would have to keep moving to find him. In many reports, the enemy leaders were only a few steps ahead of the Mongols. This also offered an opportunity for the Mongols to acquire new intelligence on other lands, as it was only sensible for the fleeing king to run in the opposite direction of the Mongols. The pursuing forces then could wreak havoc in new territories. Their presence made it advisable for local powers to keep their forces at home rather than going to help their overlord. In many instances, the Mongol, when they encountered a local army, would defeat it while avoiding the strongholds. Again, the method of destroying a field army before laying siege. The most important aspect of these flying columns that went in pursuit, is that they destruction they made as well as the fear they spread, created a buffer between the territory in which they were in and the one in which the main army was subduing.

The tactics used, whether in the field or during a siege, focused on two aspects: firepower and mobility. Military historians often speak of the great success of the English with their longbows at Agincourt or Crecy, but almost a century before Crecy, the Mongols had demonstrated on several occasions the advantages of concentrated firepower over any opponent. Not only did a withering hail of arrows break a charge of armored knights, but it also could pin units to a particular location. During siege operations, the Mongols still relied on concentrated firepower. At the siege of Aleppo, Hulegu used twenty catapults against the Bab al-Iraq alone (Gate of Iraq). In Jûzjânî, there are several episodes in which the Mongols constructed hundreds of siege machines in order to surpass the number, which a defending city possessed. While Jûzjânî surely exaggerated, the improbably high numbers which he used for both the Mongols and the defenders does give one a sense of the large numbers of machines used at a single siege.

Mobility was vital for the Mongols to carry out the caracole technique. By advancing, firing, wheeling, and retreating, the Mongol warriors left themselves open to a possible counterattack. Only due to the unit integrity, and mobility (i.e. number of horses involved) permitted the Mongols to do this technique. Other tactics, such as encircling the enemy as the Mongols did during the battue hunt, could only be achieved with a high degree of mobility. Perhaps of most importance, it allowed the Mongols to withdraw and then reappear unexpectantly. This made it almost impossible for their opponents to accurately report on the movements of the Mongol armies.

Discipline separated the Mongol armies from their contemporaries. Without discipline, the Mongols could not have perfected the system of steppe/horse archer warfare, which had existed for centuries. Nomads since the Scythians and Hsiung-nu based their armies and method of war on mobility and the bow. The Mongols, however, perfected it, allowing them to conquer the entire steppe land of Eurasia. While some may dismiss this accomplishment as simply being a victory over other tribes, one must remember, these are the tribes from which the Khitan, the Jurchen, and the mighty Seljuk armies came. Horse archers from the steppes were a desired element in every sedentary army stretching from China to Egypt. The Mongols perfected the system by adding the strict discipline that allowed them to overcome other nomads who also relied on the key factors of mobility and the bow. After overcoming the nomads of the Eurasian steppes, the victories over sedentary armies seem less astonishing.


Contributed by
Timothy May
Ph. D. Candidate
The University of Wisconsin-Madison





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