1936년 3월 대대규모의 독일군이 비무장 지대인 라인란트(라인강 주변의 독일영토)로 진주, 로카르노 조약을 위반하였을 때 히틀러가 독일군에 내린 명령은 '프랑스군이 반격하면 싸우지 말고 철수하라'는 것이었다. 히틀러는 독일군이 프랑스軍과 정면승부를 하기엔 아직 力부족이라고 판단하였다. 만약 프랑스군이 연대 규모의 병력을 투입하였더라도 독일군은 물러났을 것이고 독일 군부가 이를 빌미로 쿠데타를 일으켜 히틀러를 몰아냈을 가능성이 높다. 2차 세계대전은 일어나지 않았을 것이고 프랑스가 패망하는 일도 없었을 것이다.

왜 프랑스군은 安保의 생명선인 라인란트 완충지대가 독일군 주둔지로 변하는 것을 막지 못하였나? 프랑스 군부가 아주 패배주의적인 판단을 하였기 때문이다. 프랑스군 총사령관 모리스 가므랑 원수는 불법진주한 독일군에 반격하면 全面戰(전면전)이 일어날 우려가 있으므로 총동원령을 내린 뒤 군대를 보내야 한다고 생각하였다. 국방부도 이 판단에 동조하였다. 그런데 총동원령을 내리면 하루 3000만 프랑의 경비가 들 것이다. 당시 프랑스는 外債(외채)가 많아 국가不渡(부도) 직전으로 몰려 있었고 선거를 앞두고 있었다.

프랑스 집권세력은 총동원령을 결단할 수 없었다. 오히려 독일군에 대항하지 않는 데 대한 변명을 찾아나섰다. 외무장관을 영국으로 보내 "영국이 합세하면 독일군을 치겠다"고 압박한다. 영국이 냉담하게 나올 것임을 알고 그렇게 한 것이다. 프랑스는, 국민들에게 영국의 소극적 태도 때문에 독일군의 라인란트 진주를 허용할 수밖에 없다는 변명꺼리를 만들었다.

연평도에 대한 북괴군의 포격이 있은 직후 한국군의 지휘부서와 대통령이 과감한 대응을 하지 못한 이유중의 하나도 '우리가 전투기로 敵의 해안포대를 폭격하면 전투가 확대될 것이다. 그렇게 하면 한국군만으로는 감당할 수 없다'는 판단이었을 것이다.

연평도 상공에 대기중이던 한국 공군 최신예 편대가 우수한 무기로 敵을 강타하는 것이 再도발을 방지하는 길인데도 프랑스 군대처럼 守勢的 자세를 취하고 만 것이다. 프랑스가 영국을 끌어들이려 한 것처럼 한국도 미국의 도움을 청하였다. 영국과 달리 미국은 신속하게 航母戰團(항모전단)을 전개하였다.

프랑스 군부가 독일군을 치면 전면전이 일어날 것이라고 내각에 보고한 것은 전쟁을 기피하기 위한 고의적 과대평가였을 가능성이 높다. 민간인들에게 그렇게 겁을 주어야 전쟁을 말리려 할 것이라고 생각하였을 것이다.

1939년 9월 프랑스 군부는 똑 같은 실수를 한다. 이때 독일군의 主力은 폴란드 침공에 투입되어 서부戰線(전선)에선 프랑스 군사력이 독일군을 압도하는 형국이었다. 이때 프랑스가 先制(선제)공격을 하였더라면 독일군은 손을 들었을 것이라는 게 戰史學者들의 거의 일치된 평가이다. 이때도 프랑스군은 가므랑 원수가 지휘하고 있었다. 그는 開戰(개전)을 결심하지 못하여 결정적 기회를 놓치고 말았다. 전격전으로 폴란드를 점령한 독일군은 서부전선으로 병력을 집중시킨 뒤 1940년 5월 프랑스를 공격하였다. 라인란트 비무장 지대가 있었으면 독일군의 기습은 성립할 수 없었다. 독일 기갑군단의 아르덴느 돌파전이 성공, 프랑스는 6週(주) 만에 손을 들었다. 역사는 두 번 기회를 놓친 프랑스를 버린 것이다.

李明博 정부와 한국군 지휘부는 천안함 爆沈(폭침)에 대한 응징을 포기하는 첫번째 실수에 이어 연평도 도발에 대한 응징도 포기하곤 '추가 도발에 대하여서만 응징한다'고 물러났다. 두 번 절호의 기회를 놓친 이명박 정부에 역사가 한 번 더 기회를 줄 것인지, 아니면 이것으로 끝이 될 것인지, 귀추가 주목된다.


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France
Historians writing without benefit of access to the French archives (which were not opened until the mid-1970s) such as William L. Shirer in his books The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960) and The Collapse of the Third Republic (1969) have claimed that France, although possessing at this time superior armed forces compared to Germany, including after a possible mobilization 100 infantry divisions, was psychologically unprepared to use force against Germany.[21] Historians such as the American historian Stephen A. Schuker who have examined the relevant French primary sources have rejected Shirer's claims as the work of an amateur historian writing without access to the primary sources, and have found that a major paralyzing factor on French policy was the economic situation[22]. France's top military official, General Maurice Gamelin, informed the French government that the only way to remove the Germans from the Rhineland was to mobilize the French Army, which would cost the French treasury 30 million francs per day[23]. Gamelin assumed a worst-case scenario in which a French move into the Rhineland would spark an all-out Franco-German war, a case which required full mobilization. Gamelin's analysis was supported by the War Minister, General Louis Maurin who told the Cabinet that it was inconceivable that France could reverse the German remilitarization without full mobilization[24].

At the same time, in late 1935-early 1936 France was gripped by a financial crisis, with the French Treasury informing the government that sufficient cash reserves to maintain the value of the franc as currently pegged by the gold standard in regard to the U.S. dollar and the British pound no longer existed, and only a huge foreign loan on the money markets of London and New York could prevent the value of the franc from experiencing a disastrous downfall[25]. Because France was on the verge of elections scheduled for the spring of 1936, devaluation of the franc, which was viewed as abhorrent by large sections of French public opinion, was rejected by the caretaker government of Premier Albert Sarraut as politically unacceptable[25]. Investor fears of a war with Germany were not conducive to raising the necessary loans to stabilize the franc: the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, by sparking fears of war, worsened the French economic crisis by causing a massive cash flow out of France as worried investors shifted their savings towards what was felt to be safer foreign markets[26]. On March 18, 1936 Wilfrid Baumgartner, the director of the Mouvement général des fonds (the French equivalent of a permanent under-secretary) reported to the government that France for all intents and purposes was bankrupt[27]. Only by desperate arm-twisting from the major French financial institutions did Baumgartner manage to obtain enough in the way of short-term loans to prevent France from defaulting on her debts and keeping the value of the franc from sliding too far, in March 1936[27]. Given the financial crisis, the French government feared that there were insufficient funds to cover the costs of mobilization, and that a full-blown war scare caused by mobilization would only exacerbate the financial crisis[27].

Upon hearing of the German move, the French government issued a statement strongly hinting that military action was a possible option[24]. When the French Foreign Secretary, Pierre Étienne Flandin, heard of the remilitarization he immediately went to London to consult the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, as Flandin wished, for domestic political reasons, to find a way of shifting the onus of not taking action onto British shoulders[28]. Baldwin asked Flandin what the French Government had in mind but Flandin said they had not yet decided. Flandin went back to Paris and consulted the French Government what their response should be. They agreed that "France would place all her forces at the disposal of the League of Nations to oppose a violation of the Treaties".[29] Since the French government for economic reasons had already ruled out mobilization, and hence war as a way of reversing Hitler's Rhineland coup, it was decided that the best that France could do under the situation was to use the crisis to obtain the "continental commitment" (i.e. a British commitment to send large ground forces to the defense of France on the same scale of World War I)[30]. The strategy of Flandin was to strongly imply to the British that France was willing to go to war with Germany over the Rhineland issue, in the expectation that the British were not willing to see their Locarno commitments lead them into a war with the Germans over an issue where many in Britain felt that the Germans were in the right. As such, Flandin expected London to apply pressure for "restraint" on Paris[31]. The price of the French "restraint" in regards to the Rhineland provocation, an open violation of both the Versailles and Locarno treaties was to be the British "continental commitment" unequivocally linking British security to French security, and committing the British to send another large expeditionary force to defend France in the event of a German attack[32].

During his visit to London to consult with the British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden, Flandin carried out what the Canadian historian Robert J. Young called "the performance of a lifetime", in which he expressed a great deal of outrage at the German move, stated quite openly that France was prepared to go to war over the issue, and strongly criticized his British hosts for the demands for French "restraint" while not offering to do anything for French sécurité (security). As intended by Flandin, Eden was opposed to the French taking military action, and appealed for French "restraint"[33]. Not aware of what Flandin was attempting to do, French military officials urged the government to tell Flandin to tone down his language[34]. In the face of Flandin's tactics, on March 19, 1936 the British government made a vague statement linking British security to French security, and for the first time since World War I agreed to Anglo-French staff talks, albeit of very limited scope[31]. Though disappointed with the British offers, which the French felt were too little, the French nonetheless considered the pledges of British support gained in 1936 to be a worthwhile achievement, especially given that for economic reasons mobilization was not considered a realistic option in 1936[32]. Those French officials such as René Massigli who believed in the idea of an Anglo-French alliance as the best way of stopping German expansionism expressed a great deal of disappointment that Britain was not prepared to do more for French sécurité[35]. As part of an effort to secure more in the way of the long-desired "continental commitment" that had been a major goal of French foreign policy since 1919, Gamelin told the British military attaché that:

France could fight its own battles and also send some immediate reinforcements to Belgium, but only if it was known for sure that a British Expeditionary Force was on the way. The lack of such a force would mean that France might have to reconsider its commitments in Belgium and the leave the latter to fend for itself... Such action would mean conceding to Germany potential air bases, and facilities for air raids against England, to which we could scarcely be indifferent[36]
The generalissimo of the French Army, General Gamelin, told the French government that if France countered the German forces and this caused a long war, France would be unable to win fighting alone and therefore would need British assistance. The French Government, with an upcoming general election in mind, decided against general mobilization of the French Army.[37] The remilitarization removed the last hold France had over Germany and therefore ended the security France had gained from the Treaty of Versailles. As long as the Rhineland was demilitarized, the French could easily re-occupy the area and threaten the economically important Ruhr industrial area which was liable to French invasion if France believed the situation in Germany ever became a threat.[38]