1972년 11월18일 필립 하비브 주한미국 대사는 丁一權 전 총리를 초청하여 나눈 대화를 그날 美 국무부로 電文 보고하였다. 당시 朴正熙 대통령은 유신선포 직후의 정치일정을 전광석화처럼 추진하고 있을 때였다. 정일권 前 총리는 하비브 대사에게 이틀 전 밤에 대통령과 장시간 술을 함께 하였다고 털어놓았다. 이 보고문서는 최근 공개되었는데, 이런 대목이 있었다.

<나는 정일권 전 총리와 식사하는 자리를 이용, 박정희 정부가 저명한 反정부 활동가들을 폭력적으로 다루는 사례를 몇 건 알고 있다고 했다. 정일권은 신민당의 전 국회의원 여섯 명이 얻어맞았다면서 김한수 의원이 특히 가혹하게 다뤄졌다고 했다. 김대중의 비서도 심하게 얻어 맞았다고 한다. 그 과정에서 비서는 마침내 김대중의 비자금 소스를 실토하였다고 丁一權은 말하였다. 정일권은 김대중에 의하여 협박을 받았던 회사들이 비자금 소스였다면서, 김대중은 그들이 돈을 주지 않으면 국회에서 회사를 공격하는 발언을 하겠다고 협박하였다는 것이다. 나는 정일권에게, 총리와 그에게 잔인한 폭력은 절대로 합리화될 수 없다는 점을 강조하였음을 상기시키면서, 대통령에게, 정부가 이런 방법을 쓰고 있다는 사실은 바깥으로 알려지게 되어 있고, 그리스의 예에서 보듯이 이런 사실만큼 미국 사람들을 멀리 떼어놓는 일은 없을 것임을 확실히 전해달라고 했다. 예상한대로 정일권은 나의 견해에 동의한다면서 그는 개인적으로 이런 일에 반대하였다고 했다. 그는 그런 일은 중지될 것이라고 했다. 나는 그가 나의 메시지를 대통령에게 전할 것이라고 믿는다.>



166. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 23𔃆 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo.
Seoul, November 18, 1972, 1052Z.

6685. Subj: Martial Law and Government Changes—Discussion With Chong Il Kwon. Summary: Over Lunch Nov. 18, Chong Il Kwon told me of the President’s decision that day that universities will reopen from Dec 1 to 20 then go into the usual winter recess until March. Armored vehicles and troops will be removed from the streets of Seoul late Nov 18, but martial law will not be lifted until after the presidential election. Chong disclosed a number of other major aspects of the changes to come. I used the occasion to emphasize to Chong in strong terms my concern over the government’s resort to brutality in a number of recent cases and the certainty that its continuation would alienate the U.S. He said it would stop. I advised Chong that a ROK mission to the U.S. to present the ROKG’s case for government changes could be counterproductive. End summary.

1. Former Prime Minister Chong Il Kwon had a number of interesting things to say when he came to lunch at my request on Nov 18. It is now clear that Chong is one of a five or six member inner council consulting regularly with the President on governmental changes. He said at the outset that he had a long drinking session with the President two nights ago and that the President is appreciative that the Embassy here and the USG in Washington have exercised restraint in public comments about martial law and the constitutional changes. Chong seemed to be saying at the same time that Park remains concerned about USG reactions to these changes. (We have heard the same thing from other sources.) Main points of interest in the conversation were:

A. The President and a small group of advisers made a decision on the morning of Nov 18 to reopen all universities Dec 1. University presidents will be informed immediately and public announcement is [garble]. The intention would be that students return mainly for final examinations. Universities would then close at the normal school year-end about Dec 20 and as usual remain in winter recess until March. Military units will be stationed near the universities, perhaps out of public view, but will not be placed on the campuses. Chong said this is extremely sensitive and asked us to hold it closely. Comment: This seems to represent a conclusion by President Park that student opposition to government changes, if any, can be handled, or that if there is to be a confrontation with the students he will have it and get it over now rather than later.

B. During the late night of Nov 18, armored vehicles and all troops will be withdrawn from public places in Seoul. Military units will, however, remain out of sight in an alert status at strategic points throughout the city. He said martial law would not be lifted before the presidential election.

C. The latest dates for next steps, which Chong said are firm, are Dec 15 for Unification Council elections, Dec 27 for inauguration. Two methods of electing the president are being considered. Under one scheme, a candidate would be nominated if proposed by 50 or more members of the Unification Council and the Council would choose in secret ballot from among candidates so nominated. Under the other scheme, no nominations would be made and instead each Council member would simply write the name of a person he would like to have as President on his ballot the person getting a majority vote would be elected.

D. It is almost certain that National Assembly elections will be held in February in order to complete government changes as rapidly as possible. It is now expected that the National Assembly will consist of about 210 members. Chong expects that 50 to 70 of these will be opposition representatives elected mainly from the cities. He candidly acknowledged that the one-third selected by the President would be entirely pro government people who could be counted upon to vote with the government.

E. Cabinet changes after the presidential election will not, in Chong’s view, be extensive and will not affect the Prime Minister. President Park is keeping his own counsel, but Chong thought changes would affect only the economic ministries and perhaps defense. He thought retired General Sun Son Chul a likely candidate for Defense Minister, but said there are also others. Ambassador to Tokyo Yi Ho, former Justice Minister, is a strong candidate to replace the present chief justice.

2. I used the occasion of this luncheon to let Chong know that I am aware of the disturbing number of cases in which the government has employed brutality against prominent persons who have opposed the government. Chong acknowledged that six former Assemblymen of the NDP have been beaten up, Kim Han Su having been treated worse than others. Kim Tae Chung’s secretary had also been badly mauled. In the process, Chong said the secretary had finally disclosed the secret sources of Kim Tae Chung’s funds. These were said by Chong to be Korean companies who were threatened by Kim Tae Chung with anti-company speeches on the National Assembly floor if they failed to pay. I reminded Chong that I had told the Prime Minister and him, among others, from the beginning that use of brutality is never justified. I urged him to make clear to the President that news of the government’s use of these methods is bound to get out and that, as the Greek experience had shown, nothing would be more likely to alienate the American people. Chong predictably said he agreed and that he personally had opposed this sort of thing. He said it would stop. I am reasonably sure he will carry my message to the President.

< 3. Chong said that the government is considering sending a team of former National Assemblymen to the U.S. “to explain” the steps that the ROK is taking, not in Washington but in outlying areas around the U.S. I replied that at this juncture Washington is more important than the outlying areas but that in both the ROK will find the government changes not well received. The mission therefore would not have good prospects for success. He nodded to indicate that this also was his view.

4. I asked Chong about reports the government was thinking of limiting the number of newspapers to four in Seoul and one in each province. He said there was no such plan.

Habib

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 23𔃆 KOR S. Confidential Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo.