Ú¸ ÀÇȸ´Â ÝÁùÛºÀ¼â¹ý¾ÈÀ» Åë°ú½ÃÄÑ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. Ú¸ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ´Â ÀÚÀ¯ÝÁùÛ ¶óµð¿À ¹æ¼Û°ú °°Àº µ¶¸³ ¾ð·Ð ¸ÅüµéÀÇ ÀçÁ¤À» Áö¿øÇÏ¿©¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
The Dangers of Inaction in North Korea
¡®Strategic patience¡¯ is played out. The U.S. should pressure Pyongyang on security and human rights.
ÓßÝÁ ¹«´ëÀÀ Á¤Ã¥ÀÇ À§Ç輺
Àü·«Àû Àγ» Á¤Ã¥Àº ¸·À» ³»·È´Ù. Ú¸ÏÐÀº ¾Èº¸ ¹× Àαǹ®Á¦¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ÝÁùÛÀ» ¾Ð¹ÚÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù
By JAY LEFKOWITZ AND CHRISTIAN WHITON
Oct. 14, 2015 1:01 p.m. ET
If an act of North Korean proliferation hadn¡¯t been stopped by Israel almost 10 years ago, Islamic State today might be in possession of the plutonium necessary to make dirty bombs or, worse, crude nuclear weapons. That possibility is one of the many reasons why the Obama administration¡¯s policy of ¡°strategic patience¡± with Pyongyang must end.
ÝÁùÛÀ» ¹æÄ¡ÇÏ¿© µÎ¸é¼, 10¿©³â Àü ñéÔÔÀÇ IS°¡ ÝÁùÛÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ú·¹«±â¸¦ ÀÔ¼öÇÒ »·ÇÏ¿´´Âµ¥, À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ À̰ÍÀ» ÀúÁö½ÃŲ »ç·Ê°¡ ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Á¡Àº, ¿À¹Ù¸¶ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ ÝÁùÛ¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© Àü·«Àû Àγ»¸¦ ³¡³»¾ß ÇÏ´Â ÀÌÀ¯ ÁßÀÇ ÇϳªÀÌ´Ù.
In September 2007, Israeli warplanes, with the tacit approval of President George W. Bush, destroyed a suspicious facility at a site known as al-Kibar. As CIA Director Michael Hayden would disclose the following year, North Korea was helping Syria build a nuclear reactor at al-Kibar similar to its own plutonium-producing unit at Yongbyon, which could eventually produce enough material for one or two warheads a year.
2007³â 9¿ù, À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¹¬ÀÎÇÏ¿¡ ½Ã¸®¾Æ al-Kibar¸¦ Æø°ÝÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±× À̵ëÇØ¿¡ CIA ¸¶ÀÌŬ ÇìÀÌµç ±¹ÀåÀÌ ¹àÈù ¹Ù¿¡ ÀÇÇϸé, ±× Áö¿ª¿¡¼ ½Ã¸®¾Æ´Â ÝÁùÛ ¿µº¯¿¡ ÀÖ´Â °Í°ú À¯»çÇÑ Ç÷çÅä´½ Á¦Á¶¼³ºñ¸¦ ÝÁùÛÀÇ Áö¿øÀ» ¹Þ¾Æ¼ °Ç¼³ ÁßÀ̾ú´Ù. ±× ¼³ºñ´Â 1³â¿¡ ÇÙźµÎ 1-2°³¸¦ ÃæºÐÈ÷ »ý»êÇÒ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.
Al-Kibar is located in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria. Today it is controlled by Islamic State. Thanks to Israel, the terrorist group now controls rubble instead of a nuclear-weapons facility.
À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ ÆÄ±«ÇÑ Áö¿ªÀº ÇöÀç IS°¡ Á¡·ÉÇϰí ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¾ú´Ù¸é, ÇöÀç IS Áý´ÜÀº ú·¹«±â¸¦ º¸À¯Çϰí ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
Pyongyang isn¡¯t only a proliferation risk. In 2010 it sank a South Korean warship without provocation, killing 46 sailors. In 2014 it launched a cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. This year it fired artillery shells at South Korea and maimed two South Korean soldiers with landmines.
ÝÁùÛÀº ÇÙ¹«±â À̿ܿ¡µµ ¿©·¯°¡Áö ÇüÅ·Πµµ¹ßÀ» Çϰí ÀÖ´Ù. 2010³â ÝÁùÛÀº ùÛÏÐÀÇ Ãµ¾ÏÇÔÀ» °Ýħ½ÃÄѼ À庴 46¸íÀÌ Àü»çÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç, 2014³â¿¡´Â ¼Ò´Ï ¿µÈ»ç¿¡ »çÀ̹ö °ø°ÝÀ» ÇÏ¿´°í, ¿ÃÇØ µé¾î¼´Â ùÛÏп¡ Æ÷°Ýµµ¹ßÀ» °¨ÇàÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç ÝÁùÛÁö·Ú ¶§¹®¿¡ ùÛÏÐ º´»ç 2¸íÀÌ ºÎ»ó´çÇÏ¿´´Ù.
These provocations are made only more ominous now that U.S. officials have concluded that Pyongyang, which tested its first nuclear device in 2006, possesses miniaturized nuclear warheads. Yet the Obama administration continues to do little to mitigate this growing threat.
ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ µµ¹ß µéÀº ÝÁùÛÀÌ ¼ÒÇüÈµÈ ú·ÅºµÎ¸¦ º¸À¯Çϰí ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ¡Á¶¶ó°í Ú¸ÏÐ ´ç±¹Àº °á·ÐÀ» ³Â´Ù. ÝÁùÛÀº 2006³â ù ú·½ÇÇèÀ» ÇÏ¿´´Âµ¥, ±×·¯³ª ¿À¹Ù¸¶ Á¤ºÎ´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ À§Çù¿¡ ÀûÀýÈ÷ ´ëÀÀÇÏÁö ¾Ê°í ÀÖ´Ù.
Hillary Clinton explained this approach as ¡°strategic patience¡± in 2009, but it is merely the latest step in a U.S.-North Korean dance that has developed through three U.S. administrations over 25 years. Offers of U.S. assistance are met by North Korean promises to allow inspections, followed by recantations and provocations, which lead to the breakdown of negotiations—until the cycle starts up again.
2009³â, Èú·¯¸® ±¹¹«Àå°üÀº ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹«´ëÀÀ Á¤Ã¥À» Àü·«Àû Àγ»¶ó°í Ç¥ÇöÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹«´ëÀÀÀº Áö³ 25³â µ¿¾È 3¸íÀÇ Ú¸ÏдëÅë·ÉÀÌ ÃëÇÑ Á¤Ã¥¿¡ ºÒ°úÇÏ´Ù. ÝÁùÛÀº ú·»çÂûÀ» ¹Þ°Ú´Ù°í ¾à¼ÓÇϰí Ú¸ÏÐÀÇ ¿øÁ¶¸¦ À̲ø¾î³ÂÀ¸³ª, ÀÌÈÄ ¾à¼ÓÀ» Ãë¼ÒÇϰí ÇÙ °³¹ßÀÌ ÁøÇàµÇ¸é¼ Çù»óÀÌ ±úÁ³À¸¸ç, ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ »çÀÌŬÀÌ ´Ù½Ã ¹Ýº¹µÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù.
Two decades after President Bill Clinton signed the Agreed Framework with Pyongyang, the one certainty about North Korea is that it is a nuclear state. What¡¯s missing from America¡¯s North Korea strategy is a focus on changing the nature of the regime, which competes with Islamic State for the position of world¡¯s most inhumane.
20³â Àü ºô Ŭ¸°ÅÏ Ú¸ ´ëÅë·ÉÀº ÝÁùÛ°ú ºñÇÙÈ ±âº» ÇÕÀÇ¿¡ µµ´ÞÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÇöÀç, ÝÁùÛ¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ºÐ¸íÇÑ Á¡Àº ú·¹«±â¸¦ º¸À¯ÇÑ »óŶó´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÝÁùÛÀº ºñÀεµÀû ÀÜÀμº ºÐ¾ß¿¡¼ Áßµ¿ IS¿Í ½Öº®À» ÀÌ·ç°í Àִµ¥, Ú¸ÏÐÀº ÝÁùÛ Ã¼Á¦ÀÇ º»ÁúÀ» º¯È½ÃŰ·Á´Â ³ë·ÂÀÌ °á¿©µÇ¾î ÀÖ´Ù.
The U.S. and its allies should broaden their focus and seek a policy of constructive engagement with Pyongyang on economic and human-rights matters, in addition to the usual security concerns. Such a dialogue could resemble Cold War-era initiatives such as the Helsinki Accords and Jackson-Vanik amendment, which forced the problem of human-rights violations into security-related statecraft with the Soviet Union.
Ú¸Ïаú µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀº ÝÁùÛÀÇ °æÁ¦¿Í ÀαÇÀ» °³¼±ÇÏ´Â Á¤Ã¥À» ÆîÃÄÄ¡¸é¼, µ¡ºÙ¿©¼ Åë»óÀûÀÎ ¾Èº¸Á¤Ã¥¿¡ °ü½ÉÀ» µÎ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ½Ãµµ´Â Ò²îú ½Ã´ë¿¡ áÌÖ¤¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ÇàÇØÁø Á¤Ã¥µé°ú À¯»çÇÏ´Ù. ´ç½Ã à¤Û°Àº áÌÖ¤ÀÇ ÀαÇÀ» °³¼±½ÃŰ·Á°í ½ÃµµÇÏ¸é¼ ¾Èº¸ Á¤Ã¥µéÀ» ÃßÁøÇÏ¿´¾ú´Ù.
North Korea would thus have to negotiate not only its external behavior but also its mistreatment of its citizens. The regime¡¯s treatment of its neighbors is tied to its treatment of its own citizens. Neither lapse can be addressed successfully in isolation. Only a broad evolution of conduct could lead to a normalization of relations between North Korea and the free world and, ultimately, a fundamental change to the regime from within.
ÀÌÁ¦ ÝÁùÛÀº ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ´ë¿ÜÁ¤Ã¥°ú ÀαÇÅëÁ¦ ½Ç»óÀ» Çù»óÇÏ¿©¾ß ÇÒ µí º¸ÀδÙ. ÝÁùÛÀÇ ´ë¿ÜÁ¤Ã¥°ú ³»ºÎÀ뱂 ÅëÁ¦»óȲÀº ¼·Î ¸Â¹°·Á ÀÖ´Ù. °í¸³µÈ »óȲ¿¡¼´Â »ç¼ÒÇÑ ½Ç¼öÁ¶Â÷µµ Á¦´ë·Î ´Ù·ç¾îÁú ¼ö ¾ø°Ô µÈ´Ù. ÝÁùÛ ³»ºÎ¿¡¼ ±Ùº»ÀûÀÎ º¯È°¡ ÀϾ°Ô Çϱâ À§ÇÏ¿©, ÝÁùÛÀÌ ÀÚÀ¯¼¼°è¿Í ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ Á¤»ó°ü°è¸¦ ±¸ÃàÇϵµ·Ï À̲ø¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
Pyongyang of course doesn¡¯t want normalization, as it reaps many benefits from being a dangerous pariah. Kim Jong Un and his government justify militarism and repression at home by pretending they face foreign threats. Pyongyang¡¯s belligerence has resulted in considerable foreign aid over the years. Exports to China, which reached a record $2.9 billion in 2014, and an additional $1.2 billion in exports to South Korea, help sustain the regime.
ÝÁùÛÀº ¿ÜºÎ·ÎºÎÅÍ µûµ¹¸²À» ¹Þ´Â Á¤Ã¥À¸·Î ¸¹Àº À̵æÀ» º¸°í ÀÖÀ¸¹Ç·Î Á¤»ó ±¹°¡È¸¦ ¹Ù¶óÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù. ±èÁ¤Àº Á¤±ÇÀº ¿ÜºÎ À§ÇùÀ» ºùÀÚÇÏ¿© ÁֹεéÀ» ÅëÁ¦ÇÏ¸é¼ ±ººñ¸¦ È®ÀåÇϰí ÀÖ´Ù. ¼ö³â µ¿¾È ÝÁùÛÀº È£Àü¼º ´öÅÃÀ¸·Î ¿ÜºÎ·ÎºÎÅÍ ¿øÁ¶¸¦ À̲ø¾î ³»°í ÀÖ´Ù. 2014³â, ÝÁùÛÀÇ ¹«¿ª¼öÃâÀº ñéÏÐÀ¸·Î 29¾ï ´Þ·¯ ùÛÏÐÀ¸·Î 12¾ï ´Þ·¯ ±Ô¸ð¿¡ À̸¥´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¼öÃâÀÌ ÝÁùÛ Ã¼Ã¼¸¦ ÁöÅÊÇÏ´Â µ¥ ±â¿©Çϰí ÀÖ´Ù.
Changing this dynamic ought to be the focus of U.S. policy. America cannot force China and others to cease their trade with North Korea, but it can lead a multilateral approach to Pyongyang in which military, economic and human-rights concerns are linked. The U.S. and its partners could press Beijing and Seoul to condition continued trade with the North on a commitment to such a linked approach.
Ú¸ÏÐÀÇ Á¤Ã¥Àº ÝÁñé ¹«¿ª ¹× ÑõÝÁùÛ ¹«¿ª °ü°è¸¦ º¯È½ÃŰ´Â °Í¿¡ ÁýÁßÇÏ¿©¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. Ú¸ÏÐÀº ñéÏÐ ¹× ´Ù¸¥ ³ª¶ó°¡ ÝÁùÛ°ú ±³¿ªÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» °Á¦·Î ÁߴܽÃų ¼ö´Â ¾ø´Ù. ±×·¯³ª Ú¸ÏÐÀº ÝÁùÛ¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ±º»ç, °æÁ¦ ¹× Àαǰ³¼± µîÀÌ ¿¬°èµÈ ´ÙÀÚ°£ Á¢±Ù¹æ¹ýÀ» ÁÖµµÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. Ú¸ÏÐ ¹× µ¿¸Í±¹Àº ñéÏаú ùÛÏÐÀ» ¾Ð¹ÚÇÏ¿©, ÝÁùÛ°úÀÇ ±³¿ª¿¡¼ ±×·¯ÇÑ ¿¬°èµÈ Á¢±Ù¹ý¿¡ ´ëÇÑ È®¾àÀ» ¹Þ¾Æ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
The U.S. can also aid a political transition that, as we know from defectors, many North Koreans desire. The U.S. Congress should pass the pending North Korean Sanctions Enforcement Act, which could spur the administration to target businesses and organizations that flout existing sanctions. Washington should also boost financial support for independent civilian media like Free North Korea Radio, help North Korean defectors reach safe havens, and promote family reunification visits and cultural exchanges with the free world.
Å»ºÏÀÚµé »ç·Ê¿¡¼ º¸µíÀÌ ¼ö¸¹Àº ÝÁùÛ ÁֹεéÀÌ ¿°¿øÇÏ´Â Á¤Ä¡Àû º¯È¸¦ À̲ø¾î³»´Â Áö¿øÀ» Ú¸ÏÐÀº ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÝÁùÛ ºÀ¼â Á¤Ã¥À» °ø°ø¿¬È÷ À§¹ÝÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷°ú Á¶Á÷µé¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© Ú¸ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ Á¦ÀçÁ¶Ä¡¸¦ ÃëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï Ú¸ ÀÇȸ´Â ÝÁùÛºÀ¼â¹ý¾ÈÀ» Åë°ú½ÃÄÑ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. Ú¸ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ´Â ÀÚÀ¯ÝÁùÛ ¶óµð¿À ¹æ¼Û°ú °°Àº µ¶¸³ ¾ð·Ð ¸ÅüµéÀÇ ÀçÁ¤À» Áö¿øÇÏ¿©¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ ¸ÅüµéÀº, Å»ºÏÀÚµéÀÌ ¸Á¸íÁö¿¡ ¾ÈÂøÇϰí Çì¾îÁø °¡Á·À» »óºÀÇϰųª ¿ÜºÎ¼¼°è¿Í ¹®È ±³·ù¸¦ ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» µ½°í ÀÖ´Ù.
While conventional wisdom holds that steps like these make diplomacy and disarmament more difficult, Cold War experience shows that a focus on human rights can get the attention of repressive regimes and even spur the advancement of reformers.
Åë³ä»ó ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Á¶Ä¡µéÀº ¿Ü±³¿Í ±ººñÃà¼Ò¸¦ ¾î·Æ°Ô ¸¸µé °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÀÌ¹Ì ³ÃÀü½Ã´ë¿¡, Àαǿ¡ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃß´Â °ÍÀÌ, µ¶Àç Á¤±ÇÀÇ ÁÖÀǸ¦ À̲ø¾î³»°í ³»ºÎ Çõ¸í°¡µéÀÇ È°µ¿À» ÃËÁø½ÃŲ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» °æÇèÇÏ¿´´Ù.
South Korean President Park Geun-hye¡¯s visit to Washington this week is an opportunity for President Obama to end ¡°strategic patience¡± and work with an ally to craft a diplomatic path addressing both security and human rights. If he misses this window, it will be up to the next president to take up the charge.
ùÛÏÐ ÚÓ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ À̹ø ÁÖ Ú¸ÏÐ ¹æ¹®Àº, ¿À¹Ù¸¶ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ Àü·«Àû Àγ»¸¦ ³¡³»°í µ¿¸Í±¹°ú ÇÔ²² ¾Èº¸ ¹× À뱂 ºÐ¾ß¿¡ ¿Ü±³Àû ³ë·ÂÀ» ±â¿ïÀÌ¸é¼ °øµ¿º¸Á¶¸¦ ¸ÂÃß´Â ±âȸÀÌ´Ù. ¸¸¾à À̹ø ±âȸ¸¦ ³õÄ¡¸é, ´ÙÀ½ ´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô·Î ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Ã¥ÀÓÀÌ ³Ñ¾î°¥ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
Mr. Lefkowitz was President George W. Bush¡¯s special envoy for North Korean human rights issues. Mr. Whiton was deputy envoy and is the author of ¡°Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War¡± (Potomac).
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dangers-of-inaction-in-north-korea-1444842093
The Dangers of Inaction in North Korea
¡®Strategic patience¡¯ is played out. The U.S. should pressure Pyongyang on security and human rights.
ÓßÝÁ ¹«´ëÀÀ Á¤Ã¥ÀÇ À§Ç輺
Àü·«Àû Àγ» Á¤Ã¥Àº ¸·À» ³»·È´Ù. Ú¸ÏÐÀº ¾Èº¸ ¹× Àαǹ®Á¦¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ÝÁùÛÀ» ¾Ð¹ÚÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù
By JAY LEFKOWITZ AND CHRISTIAN WHITON
Oct. 14, 2015 1:01 p.m. ET
If an act of North Korean proliferation hadn¡¯t been stopped by Israel almost 10 years ago, Islamic State today might be in possession of the plutonium necessary to make dirty bombs or, worse, crude nuclear weapons. That possibility is one of the many reasons why the Obama administration¡¯s policy of ¡°strategic patience¡± with Pyongyang must end.
ÝÁùÛÀ» ¹æÄ¡ÇÏ¿© µÎ¸é¼, 10¿©³â Àü ñéÔÔÀÇ IS°¡ ÝÁùÛÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ú·¹«±â¸¦ ÀÔ¼öÇÒ »·ÇÏ¿´´Âµ¥, À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ À̰ÍÀ» ÀúÁö½ÃŲ »ç·Ê°¡ ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Á¡Àº, ¿À¹Ù¸¶ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ ÝÁùÛ¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© Àü·«Àû Àγ»¸¦ ³¡³»¾ß ÇÏ´Â ÀÌÀ¯ ÁßÀÇ ÇϳªÀÌ´Ù.
In September 2007, Israeli warplanes, with the tacit approval of President George W. Bush, destroyed a suspicious facility at a site known as al-Kibar. As CIA Director Michael Hayden would disclose the following year, North Korea was helping Syria build a nuclear reactor at al-Kibar similar to its own plutonium-producing unit at Yongbyon, which could eventually produce enough material for one or two warheads a year.
2007³â 9¿ù, À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¹¬ÀÎÇÏ¿¡ ½Ã¸®¾Æ al-Kibar¸¦ Æø°ÝÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±× À̵ëÇØ¿¡ CIA ¸¶ÀÌŬ ÇìÀÌµç ±¹ÀåÀÌ ¹àÈù ¹Ù¿¡ ÀÇÇϸé, ±× Áö¿ª¿¡¼ ½Ã¸®¾Æ´Â ÝÁùÛ ¿µº¯¿¡ ÀÖ´Â °Í°ú À¯»çÇÑ Ç÷çÅä´½ Á¦Á¶¼³ºñ¸¦ ÝÁùÛÀÇ Áö¿øÀ» ¹Þ¾Æ¼ °Ç¼³ ÁßÀ̾ú´Ù. ±× ¼³ºñ´Â 1³â¿¡ ÇÙźµÎ 1-2°³¸¦ ÃæºÐÈ÷ »ý»êÇÒ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.
Al-Kibar is located in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria. Today it is controlled by Islamic State. Thanks to Israel, the terrorist group now controls rubble instead of a nuclear-weapons facility.
À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ ÆÄ±«ÇÑ Áö¿ªÀº ÇöÀç IS°¡ Á¡·ÉÇϰí ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, À̽º¶ó¿¤ÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï¾ú´Ù¸é, ÇöÀç IS Áý´ÜÀº ú·¹«±â¸¦ º¸À¯Çϰí ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
Pyongyang isn¡¯t only a proliferation risk. In 2010 it sank a South Korean warship without provocation, killing 46 sailors. In 2014 it launched a cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. This year it fired artillery shells at South Korea and maimed two South Korean soldiers with landmines.
ÝÁùÛÀº ÇÙ¹«±â À̿ܿ¡µµ ¿©·¯°¡Áö ÇüÅ·Πµµ¹ßÀ» Çϰí ÀÖ´Ù. 2010³â ÝÁùÛÀº ùÛÏÐÀÇ Ãµ¾ÏÇÔÀ» °Ýħ½ÃÄѼ À庴 46¸íÀÌ Àü»çÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç, 2014³â¿¡´Â ¼Ò´Ï ¿µÈ»ç¿¡ »çÀ̹ö °ø°ÝÀ» ÇÏ¿´°í, ¿ÃÇØ µé¾î¼´Â ùÛÏп¡ Æ÷°Ýµµ¹ßÀ» °¨ÇàÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç ÝÁùÛÁö·Ú ¶§¹®¿¡ ùÛÏÐ º´»ç 2¸íÀÌ ºÎ»ó´çÇÏ¿´´Ù.
These provocations are made only more ominous now that U.S. officials have concluded that Pyongyang, which tested its first nuclear device in 2006, possesses miniaturized nuclear warheads. Yet the Obama administration continues to do little to mitigate this growing threat.
ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ µµ¹ß µéÀº ÝÁùÛÀÌ ¼ÒÇüÈµÈ ú·ÅºµÎ¸¦ º¸À¯Çϰí ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ¡Á¶¶ó°í Ú¸ÏÐ ´ç±¹Àº °á·ÐÀ» ³Â´Ù. ÝÁùÛÀº 2006³â ù ú·½ÇÇèÀ» ÇÏ¿´´Âµ¥, ±×·¯³ª ¿À¹Ù¸¶ Á¤ºÎ´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ À§Çù¿¡ ÀûÀýÈ÷ ´ëÀÀÇÏÁö ¾Ê°í ÀÖ´Ù.
Hillary Clinton explained this approach as ¡°strategic patience¡± in 2009, but it is merely the latest step in a U.S.-North Korean dance that has developed through three U.S. administrations over 25 years. Offers of U.S. assistance are met by North Korean promises to allow inspections, followed by recantations and provocations, which lead to the breakdown of negotiations—until the cycle starts up again.
2009³â, Èú·¯¸® ±¹¹«Àå°üÀº ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹«´ëÀÀ Á¤Ã¥À» Àü·«Àû Àγ»¶ó°í Ç¥ÇöÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹«´ëÀÀÀº Áö³ 25³â µ¿¾È 3¸íÀÇ Ú¸ÏдëÅë·ÉÀÌ ÃëÇÑ Á¤Ã¥¿¡ ºÒ°úÇÏ´Ù. ÝÁùÛÀº ú·»çÂûÀ» ¹Þ°Ú´Ù°í ¾à¼ÓÇϰí Ú¸ÏÐÀÇ ¿øÁ¶¸¦ À̲ø¾î³ÂÀ¸³ª, ÀÌÈÄ ¾à¼ÓÀ» Ãë¼ÒÇϰí ÇÙ °³¹ßÀÌ ÁøÇàµÇ¸é¼ Çù»óÀÌ ±úÁ³À¸¸ç, ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ »çÀÌŬÀÌ ´Ù½Ã ¹Ýº¹µÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù.
Two decades after President Bill Clinton signed the Agreed Framework with Pyongyang, the one certainty about North Korea is that it is a nuclear state. What¡¯s missing from America¡¯s North Korea strategy is a focus on changing the nature of the regime, which competes with Islamic State for the position of world¡¯s most inhumane.
20³â Àü ºô Ŭ¸°ÅÏ Ú¸ ´ëÅë·ÉÀº ÝÁùÛ°ú ºñÇÙÈ ±âº» ÇÕÀÇ¿¡ µµ´ÞÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÇöÀç, ÝÁùÛ¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ºÐ¸íÇÑ Á¡Àº ú·¹«±â¸¦ º¸À¯ÇÑ »óŶó´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÝÁùÛÀº ºñÀεµÀû ÀÜÀμº ºÐ¾ß¿¡¼ Áßµ¿ IS¿Í ½Öº®À» ÀÌ·ç°í Àִµ¥, Ú¸ÏÐÀº ÝÁùÛ Ã¼Á¦ÀÇ º»ÁúÀ» º¯È½ÃŰ·Á´Â ³ë·ÂÀÌ °á¿©µÇ¾î ÀÖ´Ù.
The U.S. and its allies should broaden their focus and seek a policy of constructive engagement with Pyongyang on economic and human-rights matters, in addition to the usual security concerns. Such a dialogue could resemble Cold War-era initiatives such as the Helsinki Accords and Jackson-Vanik amendment, which forced the problem of human-rights violations into security-related statecraft with the Soviet Union.
Ú¸Ïаú µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀº ÝÁùÛÀÇ °æÁ¦¿Í ÀαÇÀ» °³¼±ÇÏ´Â Á¤Ã¥À» ÆîÃÄÄ¡¸é¼, µ¡ºÙ¿©¼ Åë»óÀûÀÎ ¾Èº¸Á¤Ã¥¿¡ °ü½ÉÀ» µÎ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ½Ãµµ´Â Ò²îú ½Ã´ë¿¡ áÌÖ¤¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ÇàÇØÁø Á¤Ã¥µé°ú À¯»çÇÏ´Ù. ´ç½Ã à¤Û°Àº áÌÖ¤ÀÇ ÀαÇÀ» °³¼±½ÃŰ·Á°í ½ÃµµÇÏ¸é¼ ¾Èº¸ Á¤Ã¥µéÀ» ÃßÁøÇÏ¿´¾ú´Ù.
North Korea would thus have to negotiate not only its external behavior but also its mistreatment of its citizens. The regime¡¯s treatment of its neighbors is tied to its treatment of its own citizens. Neither lapse can be addressed successfully in isolation. Only a broad evolution of conduct could lead to a normalization of relations between North Korea and the free world and, ultimately, a fundamental change to the regime from within.
ÀÌÁ¦ ÝÁùÛÀº ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ´ë¿ÜÁ¤Ã¥°ú ÀαÇÅëÁ¦ ½Ç»óÀ» Çù»óÇÏ¿©¾ß ÇÒ µí º¸ÀδÙ. ÝÁùÛÀÇ ´ë¿ÜÁ¤Ã¥°ú ³»ºÎÀ뱂 ÅëÁ¦»óȲÀº ¼·Î ¸Â¹°·Á ÀÖ´Ù. °í¸³µÈ »óȲ¿¡¼´Â »ç¼ÒÇÑ ½Ç¼öÁ¶Â÷µµ Á¦´ë·Î ´Ù·ç¾îÁú ¼ö ¾ø°Ô µÈ´Ù. ÝÁùÛ ³»ºÎ¿¡¼ ±Ùº»ÀûÀÎ º¯È°¡ ÀϾ°Ô Çϱâ À§ÇÏ¿©, ÝÁùÛÀÌ ÀÚÀ¯¼¼°è¿Í ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ Á¤»ó°ü°è¸¦ ±¸ÃàÇϵµ·Ï À̲ø¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
Pyongyang of course doesn¡¯t want normalization, as it reaps many benefits from being a dangerous pariah. Kim Jong Un and his government justify militarism and repression at home by pretending they face foreign threats. Pyongyang¡¯s belligerence has resulted in considerable foreign aid over the years. Exports to China, which reached a record $2.9 billion in 2014, and an additional $1.2 billion in exports to South Korea, help sustain the regime.
ÝÁùÛÀº ¿ÜºÎ·ÎºÎÅÍ µûµ¹¸²À» ¹Þ´Â Á¤Ã¥À¸·Î ¸¹Àº À̵æÀ» º¸°í ÀÖÀ¸¹Ç·Î Á¤»ó ±¹°¡È¸¦ ¹Ù¶óÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù. ±èÁ¤Àº Á¤±ÇÀº ¿ÜºÎ À§ÇùÀ» ºùÀÚÇÏ¿© ÁֹεéÀ» ÅëÁ¦ÇÏ¸é¼ ±ººñ¸¦ È®ÀåÇϰí ÀÖ´Ù. ¼ö³â µ¿¾È ÝÁùÛÀº È£Àü¼º ´öÅÃÀ¸·Î ¿ÜºÎ·ÎºÎÅÍ ¿øÁ¶¸¦ À̲ø¾î ³»°í ÀÖ´Ù. 2014³â, ÝÁùÛÀÇ ¹«¿ª¼öÃâÀº ñéÏÐÀ¸·Î 29¾ï ´Þ·¯ ùÛÏÐÀ¸·Î 12¾ï ´Þ·¯ ±Ô¸ð¿¡ À̸¥´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¼öÃâÀÌ ÝÁùÛ Ã¼Ã¼¸¦ ÁöÅÊÇÏ´Â µ¥ ±â¿©Çϰí ÀÖ´Ù.
Changing this dynamic ought to be the focus of U.S. policy. America cannot force China and others to cease their trade with North Korea, but it can lead a multilateral approach to Pyongyang in which military, economic and human-rights concerns are linked. The U.S. and its partners could press Beijing and Seoul to condition continued trade with the North on a commitment to such a linked approach.
Ú¸ÏÐÀÇ Á¤Ã¥Àº ÝÁñé ¹«¿ª ¹× ÑõÝÁùÛ ¹«¿ª °ü°è¸¦ º¯È½ÃŰ´Â °Í¿¡ ÁýÁßÇÏ¿©¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. Ú¸ÏÐÀº ñéÏÐ ¹× ´Ù¸¥ ³ª¶ó°¡ ÝÁùÛ°ú ±³¿ªÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» °Á¦·Î ÁߴܽÃų ¼ö´Â ¾ø´Ù. ±×·¯³ª Ú¸ÏÐÀº ÝÁùÛ¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© ±º»ç, °æÁ¦ ¹× Àαǰ³¼± µîÀÌ ¿¬°èµÈ ´ÙÀÚ°£ Á¢±Ù¹æ¹ýÀ» ÁÖµµÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. Ú¸ÏÐ ¹× µ¿¸Í±¹Àº ñéÏаú ùÛÏÐÀ» ¾Ð¹ÚÇÏ¿©, ÝÁùÛ°úÀÇ ±³¿ª¿¡¼ ±×·¯ÇÑ ¿¬°èµÈ Á¢±Ù¹ý¿¡ ´ëÇÑ È®¾àÀ» ¹Þ¾Æ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
The U.S. can also aid a political transition that, as we know from defectors, many North Koreans desire. The U.S. Congress should pass the pending North Korean Sanctions Enforcement Act, which could spur the administration to target businesses and organizations that flout existing sanctions. Washington should also boost financial support for independent civilian media like Free North Korea Radio, help North Korean defectors reach safe havens, and promote family reunification visits and cultural exchanges with the free world.
Å»ºÏÀÚµé »ç·Ê¿¡¼ º¸µíÀÌ ¼ö¸¹Àº ÝÁùÛ ÁֹεéÀÌ ¿°¿øÇÏ´Â Á¤Ä¡Àû º¯È¸¦ À̲ø¾î³»´Â Áö¿øÀ» Ú¸ÏÐÀº ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÝÁùÛ ºÀ¼â Á¤Ã¥À» °ø°ø¿¬È÷ À§¹ÝÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷°ú Á¶Á÷µé¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© Ú¸ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ Á¦ÀçÁ¶Ä¡¸¦ ÃëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï Ú¸ ÀÇȸ´Â ÝÁùÛºÀ¼â¹ý¾ÈÀ» Åë°ú½ÃÄÑ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. Ú¸ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ´Â ÀÚÀ¯ÝÁùÛ ¶óµð¿À ¹æ¼Û°ú °°Àº µ¶¸³ ¾ð·Ð ¸ÅüµéÀÇ ÀçÁ¤À» Áö¿øÇÏ¿©¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ ¸ÅüµéÀº, Å»ºÏÀÚµéÀÌ ¸Á¸íÁö¿¡ ¾ÈÂøÇϰí Çì¾îÁø °¡Á·À» »óºÀÇϰųª ¿ÜºÎ¼¼°è¿Í ¹®È ±³·ù¸¦ ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» µ½°í ÀÖ´Ù.
While conventional wisdom holds that steps like these make diplomacy and disarmament more difficult, Cold War experience shows that a focus on human rights can get the attention of repressive regimes and even spur the advancement of reformers.
Åë³ä»ó ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Á¶Ä¡µéÀº ¿Ü±³¿Í ±ººñÃà¼Ò¸¦ ¾î·Æ°Ô ¸¸µé °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÀÌ¹Ì ³ÃÀü½Ã´ë¿¡, Àαǿ¡ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃß´Â °ÍÀÌ, µ¶Àç Á¤±ÇÀÇ ÁÖÀǸ¦ À̲ø¾î³»°í ³»ºÎ Çõ¸í°¡µéÀÇ È°µ¿À» ÃËÁø½ÃŲ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» °æÇèÇÏ¿´´Ù.
South Korean President Park Geun-hye¡¯s visit to Washington this week is an opportunity for President Obama to end ¡°strategic patience¡± and work with an ally to craft a diplomatic path addressing both security and human rights. If he misses this window, it will be up to the next president to take up the charge.
ùÛÏÐ ÚÓ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ À̹ø ÁÖ Ú¸ÏÐ ¹æ¹®Àº, ¿À¹Ù¸¶ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ Àü·«Àû Àγ»¸¦ ³¡³»°í µ¿¸Í±¹°ú ÇÔ²² ¾Èº¸ ¹× À뱂 ºÐ¾ß¿¡ ¿Ü±³Àû ³ë·ÂÀ» ±â¿ïÀÌ¸é¼ °øµ¿º¸Á¶¸¦ ¸ÂÃß´Â ±âȸÀÌ´Ù. ¸¸¾à À̹ø ±âȸ¸¦ ³õÄ¡¸é, ´ÙÀ½ ´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô·Î ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Ã¥ÀÓÀÌ ³Ñ¾î°¥ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.
Mr. Lefkowitz was President George W. Bush¡¯s special envoy for North Korean human rights issues. Mr. Whiton was deputy envoy and is the author of ¡°Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War¡± (Potomac).
Ãâó :
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dangers-of-inaction-in-north-korea-1444842093
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