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The Wall Street Journal 2005. 10. 26.
2005-10-26 19:01:36
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Losing Patience With Pyongyang
The Wall Street Journal 2005. 10. 26. [REVIEW & OUTLOOK]
Watch carefully when Hu Jintao pays his first visit to Pyongyang as Chinese president Friday. In the run-up to this repeatedly delayed visit there are intriguing signs that Beijing may finally be losing patience with its dangerous ally.
As long as Pyongyang was just directing its threats against the U.S. and South Korea, China could safely ignore them. But then the Bush administration changed the rules of the game by pushing Beijing to accept a key role in talks on ending North Korea¢¥s nuclear-weapons programs. So when Pyongyang backtracked on the six-party accord that China brokered last month -- by setting new conditions on its surrender of nuclear weapons -- it amounted to a direct affront to Beijing.
North Korea¢¥s insistence that it would not even begin to dismantle its arsenal until it received a light-water reactor as a reward, brought a rare rebuke from China. A Foreign Ministry spokesman warned Pyongyang not to have 'any misunderstanding' about the agreement, which included only a vague reference to discussing such a reactor at an unspecified future date.
Beijing¢¥s anger was also evident in the postponement of Mr. Hu¢¥s trip earlier this year, apparently due to North Korea¢¥s intransigence in the six-party talks. And now that it is finally taking place Pyongyang appears to be anxious not to antagonize its Chinese benefactor any further.
How else to explain the fact that North Korea has significantly toned down its rhetoric in recent days? Of course, toned down rhetoric means rather less in Pyongyang¢¥s dictionary than anywhere else. All North Korea has done is promise to turn up for the next round of six-party talks -- which bring together the two Koreas, the U.S., Russia, China and Japan -- in November without setting any preconditions.
New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson returned from bear hugs in Pyongyang full of hints about supposed North Korean 'flexibility.' Pyongyang¢¥s now playing down its demands for a new reactor up front, and has suggested it would allow the U.S. to monitor how such a reactor is used.
A note of caution is in order here. Although his trip was authorized by the Bush administration and he flew to Pyongyang on a U.S. Air Force plane, it¢¥s in Gov. Richardson¢¥s interests to put a positive spin on his visit. A likely contender for the Democratic nomination in 2008, he was toasted by his North Korean hosts with chants of 'Here¢¥s to the next president.' In contrast to John Kerry, who rubbished the six-party talks during the last presidential campaign, Gov. Richardson has been astute enough to attach himself to the administration¢¥s coattails so that he can claim part of the credit if Pyongyang is forced to follow through on last month¢¥s agreement.
But that¢¥s only likely to happen if Beijing becomes frustrated enough to apply real pressure. With China estimated to supply North Korea with at least 90% of its oil and 40% of its food supplies, Beijing is in a position to exert serious leverage. One sign that Beijing may be moving closer to a willingness to do this came with a report in the New York Times Monday that China recently complied with a U.S. request to block an Iranian cargo plane, suspected of carrying missile parts, from flying through its airspace on the way back from North Korea. In the past, Beijing has allowed similar such flights to land and refuel, repeatedly turning a blind eye to Pyongyang¢¥s proliferation activities.
But being so closely associated with North Korea¢¥s illicit activities undermines China¢¥s attempts to portray a more responsible image, and even efforts to reform its economy. Take for instance the nation¢¥s flagship bank, the Bank of China. Last month its preparations for a forthcoming initial public offering were dealt a blow by The Wall Street Journal¢¥s revelation that it was one of the banks being investigated by the U.S. for possible links to North Korea¢¥s illicit fund-raising activities.
By such actions, the Bush administration is tightening the screws on not only Pyongyang¢¥s few remaining sources of hard currency but also its proliferation activities. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently revealed, the Proliferation Security Initiative has succeeded in blocking at least two transfers to North Korea of material for its nuclear and chemical-weapons programs.
Equally importantly, such a strategy raises the cost to China of failing to take more vigorous action against its former ally. That¢¥s a strategy strongly reinforced by Pyongyang¢¥s own behavior. Last month¢¥s six-party agreement was meant to be a diplomatic triumph for Beijing, a symbol of its emergence as a major player in the international arena. But North Korea¢¥s subsequent antics put paid to any prospect of the accord being seen in that light, at least in the short term.
No wonder Pyongyang may be a little anxious as it awaits Mr. Hu¢¥s arrival. In public, diplomatic pleasantries will most likely be preserved. But behind the scenes, it should be increasingly clear to China¢¥s leaders that their interests as a rising power on the world stage no longer lie in aligning themselves so closely with such a dangerous regime.
independent@independent.co.kr
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