However, in practice, the 'critical engagement' framework has failed on both counts, whether in creating leverage for adaptive engagement, or inducing a change in the status quo of North Korea's systematic control, instead feeding into it.

This approach rested on two false assumptions. First, that engagements sanctioned or proposed by the regime are the only or best channel for transformative engagement, and second, that North Korea has been or is willing to be a driving force for change, rather than its people, who do not have a vested interest in maintaining the regime and have served as a countervailing force.

Engaging through approaches proposed by the regime only serves Pyongyang's interests by providing materials and training to those whose depend on maintaining a system that oppresses the population and invests in military technologies and propaganda, instead of letting people live.

In order to pursue effective engagement - and not just engagement with the regime for engagement's sake - there needs to be a bold shift in policy.

The European alliance for human rights in North Korea (EAHRNK) is therefore calling on the EU and its member states to move from 'critical engagement' to 'separative engagement'. In short, we must stop thinking of Pyongyang as one entity, where the regime's stakeholders and its victims are considered one and the same.

A separation of stakeholders is already taking place. In the past, when the state catered for all rations and needs, there were three different categories - loyal, wavering and hostile.

Now that the state-planned economy has collapsed and rations have ceased, the system has effectively broken down into two classes - those who need the regime in order to survive, and those who have been left to die and must fend for themselves in the informal market economy.

Some have suggested that this 'marketisation' demonstrates the regime's interest in reform and opening up when in fact, 'marketisation' has persisted despite the government's efforts to crack down on it, so it has turned to co-opting it to exert control, surveillance and rent-seeking. 

This assumption also rests on a fundamentally flawed understanding of the regime. Because its power depends on isolation and surveillance, it will not be able to sustain itself if it pursues reforms or an opening up.

The principle of 'separative engagement' is this - not to choose between engagement and isolation, but rather to maintain a principled approach where the bottom line is the pursuit of engagement and policies that give people space to separate from the regime, both psychologically and physically.

When asked for a concrete example, EAHRNK research and policy officer James Burt said, "in the sphere of information, the BBC world service broadcasting to North Korean citizens would allow the people an alternative to the regime's constant propaganda." 

"In the sphere of economic or business training, engagement would be focused on companies held under people's economy auspices, serving to counterbalance the concentrated power and authority of those held under the Korean Workers' Party and military auspices, which are the stakeholders of regime maintenance."

The bottom line is, the restoration of human rights for the North Korean people begins with their separation from the system. If there is to be engagement that produces meaningful results, rather than engagement for engagement's sake, this is the principle that must be kept in mind.

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